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ABSTRACT
A vast literature on the incompatibility of socio-economic development and environmental conservation (also referred to
as sustainable development) has developed over the past few years. This study takes on the form of a critical, problem-
driven discussion and evaluation of the applicability and viability of the concept of capacity-sharing to the current South
African water management regime. Within the study, the complexities involved in the shift from a supply- to demand-
oriented management strategy are examined in depth. This transition in strategy proves to be problematic for water
policy makers and managers because of past management regimes and structures, measurement related problems,
incorrect or insufficient definition of criteria needed for demand-oriented approaches and the emotional complexities
regarding water use. Developments in water policy are currently at a point where problems are experienced regarding
the practical implementation of proposed water demand-oriented policy.
The concept of capacity-sharing is explained and discussed in detail, leading to the identification of the applicability to
three of the most important problems (basic contradiction within the 1998 National Water Act, initial allocation for market
adoption and equity within the market) faced within the transition towards a demand-oriented approach.
This study found that the concept of capacity-sharing does hold applicability in addressing the above-mentioned three
problems towards the transition to a demand-side management approach. Capacity-sharing, therefore, should be part of
this timely transition and the state should make use of the advantages of this concept. To support this view, seven
studies are proposed for further research to address the problems as mentioned in section 5.2 of the thesis.
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UITTREKSEL
'n Uitgebreide literatuur aangaande die onversoenbaarheid van sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling en omgewingsbewaring
(ook volhoubare ontwikkeling genoem) het oor die afgelope paar jaar ontwikkel. Hierdie studie neem die vorm van 'n
kritiese, probleemgedrewe bespreking ten opsigte van die toepasbaarheid en relevansie van die konsep van
kapasiteitsdeling binne die orde van huidige Suid Afrikaanse waterbestuur, aan. Die vele aspekte van die
klemverskuiwing van 'n aanbod- na 'n vraag-georiënteerde waterbestuur-strategie, word ook beklemtoon. Hierdie
oorgang is problematies vir waterbeleid-formuleerders en bestuurders as gevolg van vorige waterbestuur-ordes en
strukture, meetbaarheid georiënteerde probleme, foutiewe of onvoldoende definieering van watergebruik-regte en die
emosionele kompleksiteite van water. Tans, word probleme rakende die praktiese implementering van voorgestelde
vraag-georienteerde waterbeleid ervaar.
Die konsep van kapasiteitsdeling word in detail verduidelik en bespreek waarvandaan die toepasbaarheid op drie van die
belangrikste probleme (basiese kontradiksie binne die 1998 Nasionale Waterwet, aanvanklike verdeling van water
gebruik regte vir opname binne die mark en die kwessie van regverdigheid binne die mark) vir die oorgang na 'n vraag-
georiënteerde strategie geïdentifiseer word.
Die studie het bevind dat die konsep van kapasiteitsdeling wel relevansie ten opsigte van die bogenoemde drie probleme
tydens die oorgang na 'n vraag-georiënteerde strategie, inhou. Kapasiteitsdeling behoort dus deel te vorm van die
oorgangsfase na 'n vraag-georiënteerde water bestuur strategie en die staat behoort gebruik te maak van die konsep se
voordele. Ter ondersteuning hiervan word sewe studies voorgestel vir verdere navorsing ten opsigte van die probleme
soos geïdentifiseer in afdeling 5.2 van die tesis.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background information
Natural resource management and, more specifically, water resource management, has developed into one of the
most important political, social and economic issues of this age, and one of the main problems is the distribution of
usable water resources for all users and uses.
Water-related issues are currently a controversial and relevant topic in South Africa due to the following underlying
problems:
• A skewed distribution in the supply of usable water (poor communities often have no access to usable
water).
• The agricultural irrigation sector is blamed for considerable misuse and for inefficient water practices.
• Pressure from environmentalists to guarantee minimum reserve flows to sustain the basic ecological
functioning of catchment areas (National Water Act, 1998:A-31).
• The potential for new water supply development projects in South Africa is limited and costly.
These problems hold potentially negative effects for water security in South Africa. The problem of water security is
essentially one of conflict between different uses and users in catchment areas, conflict between present and future
generations of people, conflict between human resource development, consumption and other investments and
conflict between economic prosperity and environmental conservation. This conflict can be reduced through
bureaucratic (state intervention) or market processes or some combination of these. Controversy over the
appropriate balance between market and regulatory approaches towards water allocation makes resource economics
a relevant and dynamic sub-field of the discipline of economics.
As water resources develop from a "developing" stage towards a "mature" stage, the tension between market forces
and broader social values becomes more prominent in state water transfer policies because of increasing
competition (Groenewald, 1998:153). Economic development from extensive agriculture, irrigation and mining
towards urban growth, services, tourism and industry, brings strong motivation and market incentives to transfer
water from agriculture to meet the growing urban need (Louw, 2001 :80).
Therefore, economists argue that market forces should play a greater role in water allocation-related problems.
They emphasise the inefficiency of allocating water to low value crops while other non-agricultural users struggle to
develop expensive new water supplies, because generally the cost of reducing agricultural water use is less than the
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cost of developing new water supplies. Furthermore, the transfer of only a small portion of the water used in South
African agriculture would be sufficient to satisfy a significant proportion of the non-agricultural demand.
The establishment of tradable water use riqhts' could play an important role in improving the efficiency, equity and
sustainability of water use pattems in developing countries. This would require well-defined tradable rights which
would formalise and secure the existing water use rights held by water users; economise transaction costs-: force
water users to consider the full opportunity cost of water; and provide incentives for water users to internalise and
reduce many of the externalities inherent in irrigation practices. The institutional requirements, potential and
feasibility of developing markets in tradable water use rights should receive increased attention from researchers
and policy-makers (Groenewald, 1998:154).
Water markets are controversial both in theory and in practice but their potential benefits include greater efficiency
and flexibility of water use and less state intervention and expenditure, while their drawbacks include social and
environmental externalities, vulnerability to high transaction costs and examples of "market failures" (Bauer,
1997:639). However, before a water market could become active, a proper institutional framework must be in place
to accommodate the practical workings of the market system.
The National Water Act of 19983 provides the institutional framework for the development of water markets in South
Africa. Although the main reason for the Act is to address equity related issues, other important issues included are
the development of a more efficient water allocation system which values water as a scarce resource, and the
protection and conservation of the environment (Nieuwoudt, 2000:58). A remarkable shift from water supply
management towards demand management is noticeable. However, this demand-oriented management approach
presents several problems and limitations. These limitations in the current demand-oriented management efforts by
the Directorate of Water Conservation and Demand Management can be summarised as follows (Gakpo and Du
Plessis, 2001 :7):
• Excessive state control over water management institutions still exists.
• Bureaucratic approval of water re-allocation is still necessary.
• Administrative pricing mechanisms still exist.
• Lack of institutional provisions for supply and demand management.
1 Market transactions are undertaken for economic gain, based on the perception that water supplies will generate higher returns
in their new use than in the former use. A third party (state) can gain some leverage on the transfer and start playing a role in
water allocation decisions by decreasing these expected gains through imposing transaction costs on one or both parties and
therefore have bargaining power (Colby, 1990: 1186).
2 Transaction costs are generally characterized as factors that prevent the efficient functioning of markets. Some are known and
measurable while others are unknown and not measurable. In the water market paradigm, transaction costs usually consist of
searching for trading partners, determining the characteristics of the water commodities, negotiating terms and prices for the
transfer and obtaining legal approval for the transfer. Excessive transaction costs create artificial scarcity because the potential
buyer of the right cannot afford the right due to high prices and the seller cannot sell the right due to high transaction costs. This
artificial scarcity results in an excess supply of water (Colby, 1990:1185).
3 Which repealed more than 35 previous acts.
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• Lack of appropriate arrangements to facilitate trading of water (defining exclusive rights and providing the
needed incentives).
• Unclear water transfer arrangements still remain.
Since most of the controversial issues regarding changes to be made to accommodate demand management policy
have already been addressed in the literature, the last two of these limitations are of particular importance for this
study, because the practical implementation of demand management policy will be the next problem area in this
transition process. The co-operation between the public sector and private sector will be essential for the successful
implementation of demand management policy.
Successful water institutions require co-operation between the public and the private sectors and the ideal
institutional framework needs an approach that will integrate the public and private sectors and give market forces
the chance to facilitate the allocation of water. The concept of capacity-sharing is the key to this process.
1.2 Capacity·sharingand the implementationof demandmanagementpolicy
Capacity-sharing is an institutional arrangement that guarantees water use rights for allocating water among multiple
users. These rights are exclusive, transferable and enforceable by law (Gakpo et aI, 2001 :91). The concept
originates from Australia where a distinction was made within the market of water per se and water use rights (the
right to buy water). With the separation of land and water rights in South Africa, the concept of capacity-sharing
becomes an attractive alternative in handling uncertainty and potential conflicts within water management, because it
facilitates the trade in water use rights and make a clear distinction between the market for water per se and the
market for water use rights.
Capacity-sharing has been identified as an option that could play an important role in the transition towards a
demand-oriented water management strategy. Capacity-sharing respects the needs of emerging water users
(especially small-scale farmers) and therefore promotes equity. The concept fits into the proposed ideal institutional
framework of Gakpo et al (2001 :87) (refer to figure 4.1) and can also accommodate water banking for addressing
social equity, while saving on transaction costs.
The relevance of capacity-sharing for this particular study lies in the fact that the concept could be used to make
useful suggestions for engaging practical problems experienced in the practical implementation of demand-oriented
water policy.
3
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1.3 Statement of purpose
The focus of this study will be to investigate, in a critical way, the theoretical basis of the viability of "capacity-
sharing" in addressing problems regarding the practical implementation of decentralised water management in South
Africa. This will be done by identifying three of the most important problems (namely: a contradiction within the 1998
National Water Act, an initial allocation for implementing tradable water use rights and the equitable functioning of
the market) that stand in the way of the practical implementation of demand-oriented water policy. The relevance of
capacity-sharing in addressing these problems will be investigated in order to test the viability of the concept.
However, this cannot be done without a detailed description and evaluation of the complexities of current water
management-related problems.
The following questions refine this broad statement of purpose:
• Does capacity-sharing sufficiently accommodate the basic principles of efficiency, equity and sustainable
water resource development as mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998?
• Is it possible to formulate a pricing strategy for the equitable and efficient allocation of water in South Africa
that will also be institutionally accomplishable?
1.4 Rationale of the study
The consequences of water management and policy decisions are frequently difficult or impossible to predict
because of the many complex interactions between technological, physical, institutional and socio-economic factors.
This complexity, together with the objectives of sustainable resource development, decentrslisanon' and an
equitable water allocation led to a situation where some difficulties are experienced in the process of implementing
the proposed demand-oriented water policy. To add to this problem the National Water Act (1998) emphasised that
the concepts of "efficiency" and "equity" should be transparent in water management strategies, but some
vagueness is to be found in the description of the implementation of the above-mentioned concepts.
The purpose of this study is therefore to serve as a point of departure on testing the viability of the concept of
capacity-sharing within the practical implementation of demand-oriented water policy in South Africa. This should
4 The concept of decentralisation strives to let all water users participate in the management of the resource. However, caution
must be used because one of the weaknesses of decentralisation is a lack of the consolidation of power. This could lead to a
situation where no authority has the final decision-making power and therefore no decision will be made at all. Capra (2002:76)
mentioned that the economist, John Kenneth Galbraith distinguishes between three kinds of power. Firstly coercive power that
wins submission by inflicting or threatening sanctions, secondly, compensatory power by offering incentives or rewards and
thirdly, conditional power that changes beliefs through persuasion and education, and the art of politics is to find the right mixture
of these three kinds of power in order to resolve conflicts and balance competing interests. The consolidation of power is
therefore necessary to keep conflicting interests at manageable levels and to retain social order.
4
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prove to be useful if govemment should decide on capacity-sharing as a viable option for water management in
certain areas.
1.5 Literature Review
Current literature and research on capacity-sharing has been conducted mainly in Australia. Norman Dudley
(University of New South Wales) (Dudley, 1988a; 1988b; 1990a; 1990b; 1992; 1994; 1999; 2002; Dudley and
Musgrave, 1988; Dudley and Braynt, 1995) features as a prominent figure and is also the person who has done the
most research on the practical implementation of the concept of capacity-sharing within catchment areas and
reservoirs.
Within the South African context, capacity-sharing has been dealt with at an institutional level and some
comparisons have been made between mathematical programming techniques that could be used in the
implementation of the concept (Viljoen et ai, 2000:1). No research project focusing on some specific problems
regarding the implementation of demand-oriented water management, were found. Therefore, this study will be
aimed at examining the concept regarding the practical implementation of demand-oriented policy in order to reduce
uncertainty on the viability of the concept as a decentralised water management option.
1.6 Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework, methodology and model of the concept of capacity-sharing have been suggested by Dudley
(1988a:633-640 and 1988b:641-648) and Dudley and Musgrave (1988:649-658). Updated versions of the articles in
1988 are to be found in Dudley and Bryant (1995) and further readings on the concept of "capacity-sharing" are to be
found in Dudley (1990a:381-402; 1990b; 1992:757-778 and 1994). Several problem areas have been identified, but
the researcher is of opinion that the work of Dudley can be used as a point of departure to test the concept of
capacity-sharing within the South African context.
1.7 Research design
Research design refers to a plan that guides the process of research activity. Within this study the research design
will be build around semi-structured interviewing, the collection of documents, the attendance of various relevant
conferences and informal discussions.
1.7.1 Semi-structured interviewing
The semi-structured interview is an important source of data production in interpretive and evaluative studies. The
purpose of the interview is to provide descriptive data in the interviewee's own words and to access that which is
5
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unobservable. Semi-structured interviews therefore provide opportunities for responding to both predetermined
questions and free responses. Semi-structured interviews are the ideal method for producing in-depth and detailed
information that cannot be provided by other sources. Denzin and Lincoln (1994:367) argue that interviews provide
better quality data if there is a relationship of trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. They recommend
that relationships of trust should be developed with interviewees through empathy, sensitivity to context, appearance
management and the development of shared interests.
Interviewing is therefore one of the most common and powerful ways available to help the researcher understand
the human "self'. It has a wide variety of forms and uses and the most common type of interviewing (also to be used
in this study) is the face-to-face verbal interchange, but it could also take on the form of face-to-face group
interviews, mailed or self-administered questionnaires and telephone surveys.
The semi-structured interview was used in this study for obtaining detailed information regarding demand-oriented
water policy and the three problems (as mentioned in the statement of purpose) to be addressed by capacity-
sharing.
1.7.2 Informal discussions
Informal discussions mostly took place during conferences and proved to be a useful in gaining insights on the
research problem. Information shared in informal discussions provided insights into the opinions of other researchers
within the field. This provided valuable information for delimiting the study.
1.7.3 Collection of documents
Documentation provides additional information to what may be accessible through observation and interviewing. It
further helps to clarify other data, and includes records, files, internal and external communications, agendas, policy
documents, forms, reports, news articles, journal articles, textbooks, published speeches and so on. Through the
research study, documents applicable to the focus of this research were collected. Documents, drafts of writing
material like conference papers, research reports and project proposals on South African water policy, as well as
documents on international water policy, provided rich sources of insights for constructing the broader socio-historical
and socio-economic contexts of the study and also substantially build the researcher's personal field of reference. It
also helped with the interpreting of the study within the broader context.
1.7.4 Conferences attended
The three main conferences attended by the researcher were the 2001 and 2002 annual conferences of the
Agricultural Economic Association of South Africa as well as the 2002 annual conference of the Forum for Economics
6
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and the Environment. The attendance of conferences and parallel working sessions were of great value in meeting
people who shared the same passion and interests regarding water management. This was the ideal situation for
the development of personal bonds ("networking") with important people within the field.
1.8 Chapter outline
This study is primarily concemed with a critical evaluation of the potential viability of the concept of capacity-sharing
within the current South African water management regime. The present chapter is followed by a literature review
on relevant issues related to water as an economic commodity, water policy and policy reform and water allocation
strategies. The literature review (chapter 2) starts broadly on issues like the definition of water rights, valuing water
as an economic commodity, the opportunity cost of water and sustainable water resource development by making
use of integrated management strategies. Thereafter, the emphasis moves to water policy-making and water
allocation strategies. Chapter 3 presents a detailed description of the capacity-sharing model (as a specific type of
water use right allocation strategy) followed by a discussion on the viability and practical implementation of the
model. Chapter 4 evaluates the viability of capacity-sharing with regard to the applicability to policy-related problems
related to the practical implementation of demand-oriented water policy in South Africa. The final chapter consists of
conclusions and recommendations for further studies.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will serve as a point of departure to direct and help the reader to form a suitable context for this study.
The basic point of departure for the study is the National Water Act of 1998. Within the act, sustainable development
and equity are defined as central guiding principles in the management of water resources (National Water Act,
1998:A-15). Therefore, this literature review will start with a review of water rights under the National Water Act of
1956, followed by a summary of the National Water Act of 1998. A discussion on sustainability within the context of
water management follows the section on the review on water rights since sustainable resource utilisation is one of
the guiding principles of the 1998 National Water Act. This will be followed by a discussion on water as an economic
commodity, because the study supports the use of the market mechanism to achieve the efficiency and equity
related objectives as mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998. The accomplishment of these objectives is
dependent on the follow through of an integrated approach towards water resource management thus leading to a
discussion on integrated catchment management. From there, the emphasis moves on to the institutional changes
facilitating an integrated approach towards water management. The literature review ends with a discussion on the
legitimacy of the introduction of water markets as an alternative water allocation mechanism. Within this discussion,
a clear distinction will be made between water markets for water per se and markets in water use rights. Once this
distinction is clear, the reader will be able to understand the concept of capscity-sharinq' as an instrument in
facilitating trade in water use rights.
2.2 Review of water use rights in South Africa
This section will not give a detailed discussion of the old and the new South African water law, but an overview of the
most important and relevant characteristics for this study.
2.2.1 The National Water Act of 1956 (Act 54 of 1956)
Backeberg (1994a) deals extensively with all the important issues pertaining to water rights, which were contained in
Act 54 of 1956. This section is largely based on this work and is included for the sake of completeness.
The National Water Act of 1956 (Act 54 of 1956) incorporated and amended many of the historical developments in
water law over a period of 300 years. It was an amalgamation of certain of the legal principles of Roman Dutch Law
and English Law, supplemented by rules developed in South Africa. It was based on the riparian right doctrine of
5 Throughout this study, the work of Scott and Coustalin (1995:961-979) will found many similarities with the concept of capacity-
sharing.
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English Law. Another 33 acts dealt with water use rights to use water out of specific schemes or works within certain
demarcated areas. The power to exercise authority lay with the Minister of Water Affairs. Water rights were not
contained within the act as the act only contained the mechanisms for determining and obtaining water rights. The
section of the 1956 Water Act that deals with water rights was based on two principles:
• The first was the distinction between two water-use categories, namely private water and public water (this
was mainly due to the influence of the Roman Dutch Law). Public water flowed in a known and defined
channel and was capable of irrigating two or more pieces of land, which were original riparian grants to that
stream. Private water was water not derived from a known and defined channel, and that it was not capable
of irrigating two or more pieces of land that were original grants. The normal flow of a stream was limited to
the maximum quantity of water available for beneficial irrigation during peak demand, but without storage,
usually during the three to four months immediately preceding the raining season. Surplus water could be
used for beneficial irrigation only after it had been stored.
• The second principle was a distinction regarding water rights per se. Rights to use groundwater and public
water differed between areas not declared as govemment water control areas and areas declared as such.
No property rights to public water existed, but only a right for certain persons to use the water subject to
certain conditions. In an area not declared as government water controlled area, all the owners of land held
common property rights to all the water in that stream for irrigation and/or urban use (this was mainly due to
the influence of the old English Common LawS). In an area declared as government water controlled area,
the right to use the groundwater and public water, was vested in the Minister of Water Affairs, subject to the
beneficial exercise of certain rights.
The system of surface water rights, comprising 90% of usable water resources in South Africa, was based on riparian
ownership. This linked water rights to land ownership or use. According to the 1956 Water Act, there were no
ownership rights and decision-making powers regarding the transfer of rights rested with the Minister. However, a
gradual relaxation of central control over water management occurred from the mid 1980'S7.
The newly elected government (in 1994) believe that the new Water Act should contain sufficient enabling legislation
to allow an appropriate catchment management authority to be set up for a catchment. This would allow leading
agencies to facilitate the development of appropriate frameworks for catchment management plans; allow the
regulatory authority to enforce permit conditions and aspects of the management plan and set up appropriate
6 The rights to private water (excluding ground water) could not be affected by declaring the area as a government water
controlled area. An owner of land with groundwater in such an area (not declared as government controlled) had the sole and
exclusive use of such water. It could therefore be argued that there were unlimited property rights to these waters (this was also
due to the old English Common Law) (Backeberg, 1994a).
7 Some of these relaxations included changes in water management that have influenced the limited transfer of management
responsibilities to farmers on state irrigation schemes and the deregulation of certain water management decision-making
powers to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry officials in certain catchment areas (Backeberg, 1994b).
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consensus-seeking and conflict mediatory mechanisms. In the govemments' view, the revised Water Act should
allow the minister to issue regulations on a catchment-specific basis regarding (DWAF, 1996:52):
• The geographical boundaries of the catchment.
• Resource management objectives of the catchment.
• The nature of the process for developing the catchment management plan.
• Agency and stakeholder responsibilities for implementation of the plan.
• Legal status for the catchment authority.
• Conflict resolution processes.
• Monitoring, auditing and reporting requirements and responsibilities.
• The time scale and process for review of regulations.
2.2.2 The National Water Act of 1998 (Act 36 of 1998)
The National Water Act of 1998 (Act 36 of 1998) identified sustainability and equity as the central guiding principles
in the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources. These guiding
principles recognise the basic human needs of present and future generations, the need to protect water resources,
the need to share certain water resources with other countries, the need to protect social and economic development
through the use of water, and the need to establish suitable institutions in order to achieve the objectives of the new
Act. These objectives were to be achieved through an administration system that should be self-financed primarily
by the users of the water resource.
The National Water Act of 1998 stipulated that all existing claims to water rights should be registered within a
reasonable time period. On completion of the registration process (January 2001) and the establishment of a
comprehensive database on water users, the starting point for the pricing strategy would be the water management
area. Through geological assessments and the use of hydrological models, the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry would calculate the available water for each water management area. From this quantity, four deductions
would be made to determine the total water that could be allocated:
• Private usage as defined in schedule one of the Act (National Water Act, 1998:A-177). This section
represents reasonable usage for domestic, small gardening (not commercial), watering of animals (not
commercial) which graze on the concerned land within the grazing capacity, emergency and waste
discharge purposes as well as sewerage systems such as in rural and local government areast.
81rrigation and other commercial water use activities are therefore excluded from this deduction.
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• The reserve component which is made up of two sub-components namely a basic human need sub-
component? and a long-term ecological sustainability suo-component".
• International obligations, which are relevant where inter-country transfers exist.
• Inter-basin transfers in certain areas where a charge will be levied in this regard depending on the
circumstances and objectives of the inter-basin transfer.
The above-mentioned quantities will be excluded from the pricing strategy, which, by implication, implies that the
users of the remaining water (including irrigation users) will subsidise the provision of the above deductions. The
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry will then determine a water pricing strategy for the remaining water use. This
pricing strategy may contain a strategy for setting water use charges for:
• Achieving the equitable and efficient allocation of water (for example correcting past injustices and ensuring
optimal utilisation, which implies an increase in water prices for agricultural purposes).
• Funding water resource management (for example catchment management agencies).
• Funding water resource development and the use of waterworks (for government water schemes).
The general approach to the pricing strategy will thus be one where the water user has to pay the entire cost of
provision, management and the servicing of the water resource and waterworks, whichever applies to the specific
water management area. In essence, this means that agricultural irrigators will also pay for bureaucratic structures
for the administration of water.
The following key aspects have been identified with regard to the National Water Act of 1998:
• The concepts of sustainability and equity serve as the dominant guiding principles in the protection, use and
management of all water resources.
• The National Water Act of 1998 specifies a reserve flow, which is the first priority over and above the
agricultural and industrial uses.
• Water property rights have shifted from private landowners to the state. The separation of land and water
(and the substitution of water rights with a water use licence) will have a negative impact on land prices.
This will have a negative impact on the net wealth of irrigators and the security position of financers.
However, the Act respects the existing water rights and farmers may continue using water until a call is
made for the application of licences.
9 This sub-component provides for basic human needs and includes water for drinking, food preparation and personal hygiene.
An unofficial estimate of 25 litres per person per day will be allocated for this need.
10 This sub-component will ensure that sufficient water of suitable quality will be reserved to sustain the basic ecological
functioning of the water resource.
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• South Africa has been divided into 19 Water Management Areas, each consisting of Catchment
Management Agencies (the agency will be responsible for managing the supply of water) and Water User
Associations (the association will be responsible for lobbying for water use rights).
• Certain specified areas may, however, use water without a licence within specified limits and if these limits
are exceeded, registration will be required. All other significant water users that are excluded from this
authorisation have to register for water usage. (If a specific user fails to register, it will have detrimental
effects on the allocation of water licences at a later stage. If a user has not registered existing water use
rights, he will be treated as a new applicant when the licensing process commences.)
• Given that the water licenses have a time span of 40 years and are subjected to a reviewing process at
intervals not exceeding 5 years, long-term planning and investment decisions within agriculture are
complicated. This is especially true for long-term crops and irrigation equipment.
• From now on water supplied by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry will be priced at its true
economic cost". This implies that the farmer will have to pay the capital, operating and maintenance costs
of the entire water supply system and consequently water tariffs can be expected to increase.
2.2.3 Limitations in the NationalWaterAct of 1998
The two basic limitations of the National Water Act of 1998 include the dualistic nature of the Act and the lack of
security and incentives for decentralised water management. Chapter 4 will build on this section as the most
important part of the study.
2.3 Sustainability andwater resourcemanagement
Paul Hawken (1993) argues that commerce and sustainability are antithetical by design (not by intention) and that
the commercial systems of the future should be more like biological systems - self-sustaining, non-wasteful and self-
generating. Only big businesses have the power to reverse ecological destruction and he outlines realistic ways of
redesigning commerce so that everyday acts of work accumulate environmental benefits. Rather than a
management problem of efficiency ("doing things right") we have a design problem of effectiveness ("doing the right
things") - a flaw that runs through many businesses. The question therefore is, can we create profitable, expandable
companies that do not destroy, directly or indirectly, the world around them?
Capra (1997:289) supports this argument and argues from a natural science paradigm that "reconnecting with the
web of life" means building and nurturing sustainable communities in which we can satisfy our needs and aspirations
without diminishing the chances of future generations. For this task, lessons could be learned from the study of
ecosystems, which are sustainable communities of plants, animals and micro-organisms. He argues that in order to
understand these lessons, we need to learn the basic principles of ecology. Capra (1997:290) mentions that we
11 This concept seems to be justifiable, but it proves to be difficult to implement in practice.
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need to "revitalise" our communities (including our educational, economical and political communities) so that the
principle of ecology becomes manifest in them. Capra acknowledges the differences between ecosystems and
human communities? and emphasise that we cannot learn anything about human values from ecosystems, but we
can learn from them how to live sustainably",
Based on the understanding of ecosystems as auiopoienc" networks> and dissipative structures, it is possible to
formulate a set of principles of organisation that may be identified as the principles of ecology. This could be used as
guidelines to build sustainable human communities" (Capra, 1997:290-295)
The first of those principles is interdependence. All the members of an ecological community are interconnected in a
vast and complex network of relationships. Understanding ecological interdependence means understanding
relationships. It requires the shift of perception (that is a characteristic of systems-thinking) - from the parts to the
whole, from objects to relationships, from contents to patterns. A sustainable human community must be aware of
the multiple relationships among its members.
The second principle is the cyclic nature of ecosystems. A major clash between economics and ecology derives
from the fact that nature is cyclical, whereas economic systems are mostly linear. Businesses take resources,
transform them into products and waste and sell the products to consumers who discard more waste when they have
12 According to Capra (1997:290) there is no self-awareness in ecosystems, no spoken language, no consciousness and no
culture - and therefore no justice and no democracy; but also no greed and dishonesty.
13 An interesting analogy could be found between sustainability in "nature" and "equilibrium" within economic theory.
Sustainability in nature strives to find a balance between all parties involved to sustain their functionality in perpetuity. Capra
(1997) mentions this as a constant striving towards a "bio-balance" (or it could be defined as a strive towards a homeostatic
situation). Ironically, when all natural systems are in perfect homeostasis or balance, absolutely no activity will occur. (If for
example, your own body were in perfect homeostasis, you would be dead!). Therefore, the "constant striving towards a perfect
balance" is what keeps all life-forms on earth functional, yet when this balance is reached, no functionality will occur. "Constant
change" is therefore essential in order to be sustainable, therefore, it is impossible to try to make once-off changes even within
the economic policy paradigm and expect to achieve equilibrium (sustainability). The ability to change and to adapt to changing
conditions implies sustainability and emphasises the importance of interdependency between all functional parties within a
specific defined population. The same basic idea holds for the market equilibrium argument, except for the fact that micro
economic theory states that at market equilibrium, optimal functioning of the market system will be found (optimality). Ironically,
this idea translated back into "nature" terms means death (no activity at ali). Perhaps this is the human niche: to keep the whole
system in disequilibrium in order to remain sustainable. (This argument is supported by Cilliers (1994:20 and 200) and forms the
basic argument for following an integrated approach to water demand-oriented management.)
14 Refer to Capra, (2002:13, 30 and 71) for more detail on autopoietic systems.
15 Capra (2002) notes that all living systems are organised along the idea of a network. In this book, Capra developed a unified,
systematic understanding that integrates the biological, cognitive and social dimensions of life and demonstrates how life at all
levels is interlinked by complex networks. There are two developments that will have a defining impact on the future of humanity.
Both have to do with networks and both involve radically new technologies. One is the rise of global capitalism, which is
concerned with electronic networks of financial and informational flows; the other is the creation of sustainable communities
based on ecological literacy and the practice of ecological design, concerned with ecological networks, energy and material
flows. The goal of the global economy is to maximise the wealth and power of its inhabitants; while the goal of eco-design is to
maximise the sustainability of the "web of life". These two goals are contradictive and the great challenge of the twenty-first
century will be to change the value system currently underlying the global economy to one compatible with the demands of
human dignity and ecological sustainability. Environmental economics and more specifically water-related issues feature in the
above-mentioned complexities and research within this field should be effective in order to find some answers to these problems.
16 Cilliers (1994:7) identified ten essential characteristics regarding complexity within functional systems and "translates" these
characteristics into socio-economic terminology to form an alternative paradigm in viewing complexity within the social-economic
context. The arguments and reasoning followed within this study find an analogy within the work of Cilliers (1994:10-12).
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consumed the product. Regardless of the reduce, re-use and recycling efforts of environmentalists, sustainable
patterns of production and consumption need to be cyclical, imitating the cyclical processes of nature. This is not the
case in most market economies. The free market does not provide consumers with proper or complete information,
because the social and environmental costs" of production are difficult to quantify and are therefore not part of
current economic models. Private profits are made at public cost in the form of the deterioration of the environment,
general quality of life and at the expense of future generations. The marketplace simply gives us wrong information.
There is a lack of feedback and basic ecological literacy tells us that such a system is not sustainable.
The third principle is flexibility. The flexibility of an ecosystem is a consequence of its multiple "feedback loops"
(diversity) that tend to bring the system back in balance (dynamic balance) whenever there is a deviation from the
norm due to changing environmental conditions. Disturbances happen all the time and thus the net effect is
continual fluctuation. Change is what keeps an ecosystem functional and allows it to maintain itself in a flexible state,
ready to adapt to change. The more a given variable is kept fluctuating, the more dynamic the system, the greater its
flexibility and the greater is its ability to adapt to changing conomons". In human communities, ethnic and cultural
diversity may play the same role. Diversity means many different relationships and many different approaches to the
same problem. However, diversity is a strategic advantage only if there is a truly vibrant community, sustained by a
web of relationships. If the community is fragmented into isolated groups, diversity can easily become a source of
prejudice and friction, but if communities are aware of their interdependency on others, diversity will enrich all the
relationships as well as the community as a whole. In such a community, information and ideas flow freely through
the entire network and the diversity of interrelationships and learning styles will enrich the entire community (Capra,
1997:295). The above-mentioned argument stresses the importance of effective and efficient communication
between communities.
The last principle is conflict resolution. The principle of flexibility also suggests a corresponding strategy of conflict
resolution. In every community, there will be conflict that cannot be resolved in the favour of one or the other side
(for example communities need stability and change; order and freedom; tradition and innovation). Rather than by
rigid decisions and rules these conflicts are much better resolved by establishing a dynamic balance. Ecological
literacy includes the knowledge that both sides of a conflict can be important, depending on the context. The
contradictions in the community are signs of its diversity and vitality and thus contribute to the system's viability.
The ability of all nations or societies to develop and prosper is partially tied to their ability to properly develop, utilise,
protect and sustain their water resources. Ultimately, the achievement of these objectives is dependent on the
implementation of an appropriate management system that ensures the long-term sustainability of both the water
resources and their uses. In this context, well-managed water resources allow industrial development, transportation
17 "Eco-auditing" is a new strategy, which is concerned about the environmental consequences of flows of material, energy and
people within a company, and therefore tries to accommodate the true costs of production (Capra, 1997:293).
18 There are however, limits to tolerate change within flexible systems. There is always the danger that a whole system would
collapse when a fluctuation goes beyond the adoption capability of that system.
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of goods, agricultural production, public health protection, enhancement of recreational opportunities and the
production of energy, while environmental degradation is minimised. Therefore, one of the highest priorities of all
countries should be the development and maintenance of the most efficient and equitable water resource
management system possible.
The process of water management involves managing the complex interrelationships and interactions between
ecological systems, land use activities and water which control and characterise the water resource. The peoplewho
use the resource, as well as the people and institutions who are responsible for developing and managing the
resource, have to be included in the process. Current intemational trends towards policies of "sustainable
development" and "sustainable resource management" reflect a growing commitment to the principle of stewardship
at all levels of strategic and operational management (DWAF, 1996:8).
Sustainable development of water resources in South Africa entails the adoption of three successive steps in water
management (DWAF, 1996:10):
• Identification of the system characteristics, which involves the specification of the characteristic features of
the water resource system relevant to the different problems encountered. (These features consist of the
bio-physical, economic, social and environmental characteristics of the system.)
• Prediction of the behaviour of the system, which corresponds to determining how the system will respond to
certain actions taken by man (including pollution discharges into water bodies, urbanisation, changes in
agricultural practices, the building of structures which confine or condition the behaviour of water resources
within the system and implementation of management actions).
• Management of the system, which involves selection and implementation of the best strategy to attain
certain objectives, where the management decisions are based on the previous steps of identification and
prediction.
The Department then intended to develop a management plan for each catchment area, which would help to ensure
the equitable distribution of water resources between different water use sectors. It was anticipated that a suitable
"catchment authority" would then be created to undertake the operational management within the catchment. This
"catchment authority" would represent each water use sector in the catchment and would be responsible for
executing the management plan under the supervision of the Department. The market mechanism will play an
important part in the executing of the above management plan. Sustainability in the market is, however, not without
problems. The perceived value of water will determine the sustainability of the use of that water. However, market
prices fail to a greater or lesser extent to reflect the "true19" values of water in a variety of uses and it is therefore
important to estimate (with expected values of water in altemative uses) the "true" value of water in order to achieve
19 The term "true" value is a hypothetical concept and refers to the value of water (for different uses) after taking into account all
the opportunity cost and externalities associated with the use of the resource. Also, refer to footnote 73 for detail.
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a more sustainable use. Research which focuses on the determination of the opportunity cost of water will be
important to determine the expected value of water in altemative uses. The next section will discuss water as an
economic commodity in more detail.
2.4 Water as an economic commodity20
Almost all economic activities degrade water resources (therefore creating externelfies" that are mostly negative)
and thus we have a responsibility regarding the conservation of the finite available freshwater resources. According
to the "user pays principle" (Pigram, 1993: 1315) water users may pay for storing water, for transporting it to where it
is used, for treatment of the water and for the disposal of retum flows. Arguments for "user pays principles" are
based on the cost of supply without the consideration of the ability of users to pay. Too little consideration is given to
users' willingness to pay vs. their ability to pay and whenever the distribution of water entitlements does not match
the demand, a true economic value of water will not be reached. It is therefore unlikely that users under a water use
rights regime will be able to afford a full user-pay regime. Water policies should also be blamed for not promoting
efficient water use in urban areas and for irrigation purposes. Examples of such inefficient water pricing policies
include (Louw, 2001 :33):
• The use of average cost pricing mechanisms rather that marginal cost pricing22.
• The use of decreasing block rates for water pricing where the last unit of water used is cheaper than the
initial blocks.
• Cost recovering for providing water services through property taxes rather than through charges based on
water usage. Full cost recovery pricing, combined with improved institutional arrangements, has the
potential to encourage water use efficiency through the transfer of water use rights to the highest value use
possible.
The above-mentioned pricing practices provide inaccurate "price signals" to consumers which give the false
impression that water is an "abundance resource" and in most cases will lead to an overuse of water. It may also
result in an imbalance between investment in water-supply infrastructure and water conservation.
20 A clear distinction should be made between a market for water as an physical substance and a market for water use rights.
The price determining forces playing a role in these two types of markets hold some similarities, but are not completely the same.
21 Externalities are essentially activities whose full cost or benefit is not incorporated into an economic decision, hence they lead
to sub-optimal social allocation. It could be seen as positive or negative factors, which have an effect on the market, but are
difficult to quantify. An externality operates outside the market but with a certain effect on the functioning of the market.
Externalities include: reduced water supplies and return flow for other water right holders, diminished economic activity in
communities from which the water is taken, lower river flows and degradation of water quality, wildlife and recreational
opportunities.
22 Marginal cost pricing is the cost of providing the last unit (volume), and in practice, the average cost is mostly less than the
marginal cost per unit, resulting in an incentive for not using water efficiently. Goodstein (1999:48) and Hosking (2002) provide a
simplistic but relevant discussion on marginal benefit analysis. However, when marginal costs show a significant seasonal
variation, seasonal pricing must be used instead.
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The next three sections will describe three important factors pertaining to water as an economic good as well as the
interaction between them.
2.4.1 The cost of water
According to Nieuwoudt (2000:60), water can be priced either through (a) tradable water by making use of the market
mechanism, (b) opportunity cost through administrative pricing or (c) some other method such as actual operating
cost. However, if water is transferable then the market will attach an opportunity cost to water, which is the preferred
strategy within the international economic literature (Livingston, 1995; Thobani, 1997 and Howe, 1996). In the
absence of a water market, the value of water is incorporated in the land value and as no volumetric price is attached
to water, no incentive exists to use water as a scarce resource.
According to Dudley (1990b) the main roles (or arguments for putting a price on water) of water pricing are to:
• Communicate to each user what is the current highest value of water to other users (in other words the
opportunity cost).
• Recover at least some of the operating and capital costs of the water supply and distribution system.
• Determine when the current value of water has risen to the point that supply supplementation is called for.
The price itself consists of various components and it would be naive to consider only the direct costs involved in
providing the water service to the relevant users. However, due to the complex nature of the "product", economists
constantly have to deal with a measurement-related problernë and imperfect information when trying to put a "real"
value on the resource. As far as this thesis is concerned, the "real" price of water is made up by the full direct supply
cost of the servlce> plus the opportunity cost25 associated with the alternate use of the same water resource plus the
extemalities26 imposed on others. Within the context of a water market, the above-mentioned value could be taken,
but the transaction costs while trading the water use right should also be added. The next step would be to quantify
the above-mentioned price determinants of water and currently no proven method of doing so, exists. The next two
sections will discuss a few methodologies for estimating the price of water and the value of water in alternative uses.
23 Challen (2000:200) emphasises the measurement related problems regarding transaction costs.
24 This cost will include the infrastructure-related costs associated with the supply of the service to consumers.
25 Determining the opportunity cost of water is controversial due to the wide variety of uses of the resource. It becomes
increasingly more difficult to determine an opportunity cost for a product with few or no substitutes. The only "substitutes" that
water does have is in the form of "substitute uses" and each use of water is user-specific which cannot be standardised for easy
comparison to other uses, making it difficult to measure. According to section 3.2.3, the opportunity cost of water equals the
market price minus the transaction costs.
26 Externalities in this regard are any form of impact which may have an effect on the use pattern and price of the resource which
is not accommodated within the market system. These externalities could be negative (pollution) or positive (the use of clean
water for free) and could be sub-divided into economic and environmental externalities.
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2.4.2. Methodologies for estimating the value of water
The values for water could be either average or marginal values, it could be use-specific or for a mixture of uses or
be for the long-term or the short-term. It is therefore an oversimplification to try to put a single value on water,
because of the great variation in possible uses. The "best" option would only be valid within a specific context and
given time period", This thesis will not focus in detail on the several methods that could be used for estimating the
value of water in different end uses, because the type of use will usually determine the methodology used.
Therefore, a whole range of methodologies could be found within the Iiterature28 that deals with the estimation of the
value of water in different uses. Some of these methods include (James, 1993:63):
• The use of standard methodologies like the travelling cost method, hedonic regression and contingent
valuation.
• The estimation of demand curves29 and the measurement of the areas under them.
• The estimation of production functions30 and loss in output as a result of a loss in available water.
• The estimation of the costs involved of providing the service if the existing resources are unsatisfactory.
Tietenberg (1994:53) notes that ordinary cost-benefit analysis could also be used in valuing water, but emphasises
that it is difficult to conduct a true valuation and quantification of all cost and benefits associated within the analysis.
Moilanen and Schulz (2002) introduced three different welfare functions to determine the relationship between the
price of water (mainly for residential uses) and social welfare within a water tariff structure (administratively planned
water management strategy). A "standard additive utility model", a "weighted utility welfare model" and a "Rawisian
welfare function" were used. These models demonstrated how the welfare function is decisive for the determination
of a suitable tariff system. However, within the context of this thesis the market as a price setting instrument will be
the main focus and not administratively planned tariff systems.
27 The value of a specific volume of water is therefore bound to the context and time-period of use.
28 Within the list of references, the work of Bush et al (1987), Louwand Van Schalkwyk (2000) and Goodstein (1999) will mention
some of the methodologies used.
29 Arriaza et al (2002) recently conducted an interesting study where they made use of a multi-criteria decision-making strategy in
order to simulate the price sensitivity (response to prices due to policy intervention, but not transaction costs and externalities) to
water of irrigation farmers in southern Spain. They used utility theory and a method that does not require interaction with
decision-makers in order to elicited utility functions of three groups of farmers. Utility was measured as a function of the first two
moments of the distribution of total gross margin and the utility functions were then used to derive a water demand-curve for
each of the three groups of farmers. Unfortunately, they did not include transaction costs and externalities in the study, which
make it less applicable to "real word" situations. However, their method could be used as a point of departure for the simulation
of policy scenarios for local water markets.
30 Production function analysis is mostly used within agriculture where crop-water production functions and farm-crop budget
analysis (including linear programming) are used. Irrigation water values are heavily dependent on crop prices. In crop
budgeting and linear programming, the value of water is also dependent on non-water input costs. As the prices of other inputs
increase, the estimated value of water decreases, as long as crop prices and irrigation efficiencies remain constant. Subsidised
inputs lead to distortions and affect the estimated value of irrigation water. The value will be underestimated to the extent that
these negative effects are not incorporated into irrigation water values when using other valuation methods.
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According to Hearne and Easter (1997:191) the value of water within a market mechanism is predominately
determined by the "willingness to accept" compensation for not using the resource in its current use, but in an
alternative use. Goodstein (1999:131) mentioned that the "willingness to accept" normally proves to be higher than
the "willingness to pay" because the receiver will be made marginally "richer" when compensated for the resource.
Louw (2001 :37) mentioned a number of important aspects in the interpretation of the values of water (these
characteristics are also emphasized by Colby et aI, 1993:1572):
• Water has four main dimensions (quantity, quality, timing and location) that influence its value for different
uses. Of these four, quantity is the most widely used, however, since water uses are subject to diminishing
marginal utility, the larger the quantity at a given time and locality, the lower the marginal value.
• The quality of water is important for most water uses disregarding the fact that it stands secondary to
quantity within market price negotiations. Water quality also influences both the value of the water and the
cost structure. Drinking water has to be of the best quality and provides high value to the consumer.
However, water for personal hygiene, gardening, industrial cleaning, cooling, transportation and agricultural
irrigation has different levels of value and therefore willingness to pay.
• Timing can have an important influence on water value. Irrigation water for example is more valuable when
applied during periods of critical plant growth and during droughts.
• The value of water will vary among locations, because relative to its value, water is expensive to transport
out of existing natural drainage systems. (Within a drainage system, allowance should be made when
comparing values of off-stream and in-stream water.)
Brennan and Scoccimarro (1999:81-83) supported Louw (2001) and Colby et al (1993), mentioned that value-in-use
depends on the timing and reliability of water supplies. Timing is especially important within irrigated agriculture and
a lack of reliable water supplies in centrally managed water reservoirs could lead to a lower willingness to pay the full
cost of irrigation water. According to Tisdell (1996), the improvement of the reliability and timing of water supplies
needs additional investments in storage capacity and/or pumping facilities. These costs could account for as much
as 20 % of the net value of output from these crops and indicate that farmers' willingness to pay for reliable and
timely water supplies is quite high. Therefore, those institutional and financing arrangements which improve reliable
water supplies are likely to be more sustainable for improving water use efficiency than those which only focus on
cost-recovery.
2.4.3 The opportunity cost of water
Opportunity cost of water could be defined as the value of a given volume of water in its next best use or the potential
amount of utility lost by making a choice of water use. In other words, opportunity costs address the fact that by
using a specific volume of water, the user is depriving another user of the water at that specific moment in time.
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Given that the second user has a higher use-value for the water than the current use, the opportunity cost to society
(due to this "misallocation" of water) would be that difference between the current use and the potential "better" use
of the water. In the absence of the consideration of these costs, water will be undervalued, which leads to serious
misallocations between users and disrupts long-term investment strategies.
Any form of uncertainty that affects the supply and demand of water will add to the opportunity cost of water". This
is where the market mechanism comes to the fore, because water buyers' willingness to pay and water sellers'
willingness to accept water is an indication of the opportunity cost of the specific unit of water under consideration. In
other words, the opportunity cost of that unit of water could be defined by the water market price (after the process of
price negotiation) for that unit minus the total transaction cost and the externalities of the water use.
The opportunity costs of water are therefore generally reflected in market decisions and prices. However, in-stream
flow and water quality values are most often poorly accounted and modifications in water right transfer approval
criteria would be required to ensure that in-stream flow and quality values are accounted for when market
transactions are considered. These changes would, however, raise the costs of implementing a market transfer
(transaction costs) and could prevent other transfers that could have been economically beneficial for the user and
the surrounding community. Therefore, tradeoffs exist between the benefits of protecting third party and public
interests and the cost of doing so. Water trade policies must find a balance between transaction costs and
opportunity costs in order to neither "over regulate" (so that efficiency gains provided by market transfers are eroded)
nor "under regulate" (so that significant externalities are ignored when transfers take place). However, to find this
balance requires information that is costly and/or does not exist because alternative uses and allocation processes
have not been tried. Water management therefore plays an important role in determining the opportunity cost of
water.
2.5 Water resource management
Water resource management can be defined as the systematic use of a set of technical and non-technical measures
designed to ensure the effective and efficient management of water resources. The primary goal of water resource
management must be to optimise the relationship between the availability of water and utilisation of the
resources(DWAF, 1996:28). The sustainability of a country's resource-use depends on sound governance and
appropriate sets of property rights that are all interconnected in one dynamic system (Tisdell and Roy, 1997:28).
Vaux (1986: 1135) distinguished between three approaches to water management. Louw (2001 :20) support this by
saying that there are three main categories of water management:
31 The only time when the opportunity cost of water will be zero is when there is no shortage of water in the long-term and when
the transaction costs regarding water are equal to zero.
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• Water supply management
• Water demand management
• Integrated32 water management
Louw (2001 :20) pointed out that historically most governments have attempted to solve the growing demand for
water resources by following a water supply management approach. This approach has been costly in terms of
capital investment and has involved the building of new dams and water infrastructure to satisfy the growing demand
for water. South Africa has been no exception. However, as the water economy "matures" the supply-developing
possibilities decrease and the developing costs increase (Groenewald, 1998:153). Few countries in the world could
afford to continue with a supply-oriented strategy and gradually, as water development possibilities have become
scarcer, a demand-oriented management strategy has developed.
Demand-oriented strategies focus on efficiency gains within the existing water-use system. Such efficiency gains
may be realised through improving the co-ordination of water resource management, enhancing the flexibility of
reservoir operations, expanding the conjunctive use of ground and surface water and taking advantage of new
analytical and forecast systems.
The principle objectives to be achieved through water demand management are:
• Restraining the demand for capital (for water infrastructure development) at a time when available funds are
limited and borrowing is expensive.
• Promoting the efficient use of water, thus easing competition for water resources and helping to minimise
the pressure on the natural environment.
The actions needed to achieve these objectives are not restricted to water authorities. Most importantly, it requires
changes in community attitudes and behaviour. It will therefore be important to promote an understanding of the
factors affecting water use and to encourage an active community interest in the use of water. Efficiency gains could
offset or postpone the building of large and costly structures. Demand management measures are also important
because they often have short payback periods and lead to reduced capital and operating costs for water supply and
wastewater treatment facilities.
However, water demand strategies are not always acceptable to users, particularly irrigation farmers, who see it as a
restriction of their freedom to cultivate anything they wish and who usually argue that it will result in income
reductions. The government, on the other hand, is obliged to provide water to a wider range of the population and
32 Dinar and Lee (1995) did a review on integrated approaches to river basin planning, development and management. They
compared different modelling approaches (refer to chapter 4 for detail) and reviewed existing models in terms of a set of
categories ending with discussion on important barriers to effective planning and management. Throughout the paper, a
integrated approach towards water management is emphasised and therefore, this study will also follow this approach.
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has the responsibility of ensuring that limited water resources are used in the most efficient and effective way while
also ensuring food security.
Winnpenny (1997) argues that water demand management implies taking into account the value of water in relation
to its cost of provision and introducing measures that require consumers to relate their usage more closely to those
costs. It implies treating water more like a commodity or product, as opposed to a "taken for granted" public service.
Water must therefore be treated as an economic good.
The conceptual basis of integrated catchment management relies on the recognition that the different components of
the hydrological cycle are linked to each other, and each component is affected by changes in every other
component (interdependency). Therefore, they cannot be managed effectively as separate and disconnected units.
The National Water Act of 1998 calls for an integrated approach» towards water management because interventions
will not always produce with certainty the intended outcomes, and this has direct implications for catchment
management in general. This dilemma leads to the following principles (DWAF, 1996:22) or critical factors for
effective integrated water resource management:
• An integrated approach is required to properly assess and link together the processes that cause
biophysical and ecological changes in catchment systems with economic variables.
• An adaptive management approach is needed, which responds to changes in information regarding
catchment conditions and allows corresponding adjustments to management actions and strategies. This
will allow continuous optimisation of resource allocation (personnel, equipment and funding), while at the
same time being effective enough to promote the overall goal of sustainable water resource use in a
changing environment.
• The social organisation for catchment management needs to be based on an active partnership approach
and joint strategic planning to achieve outcomes which are acceptable to all participants and which ensure
sustained use of the resource.
• Institutional arrangements for facilitating the social and economic roles required in catchment management
as part of a formal process of water resource management, which is supervised by the Department of
Water Affairs and Forestry.
• An effective catchment management plan is necessary for management to be successful. It must set out
agreed policies, provide leadership, define roles and responsibilities, communicate effectively and mobilise
resources.
33 Systems-thinking forms part of an integrated approach towards water management and provides a distinctive, holistic view of a
situation and the problems that are associated with that situation. Systems-based methodologies provide a practical approach to
decision-making that deals with complex problems in a disciplined balanced way. A systems-approach pays considerable
attention to the identification and diagnosis stages of decision-making by taking a holistic view of the situation and the diagnosis
of the problem is deffered until sufficient awareness and examination of the situation has taken place to avoid the error of
imposing inappropriate solutions (Jennings and Wattam, 1998:53).
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In South Africa there has been a noticeable lack of success in the ability to integrate all these processes and
functions into a coherent whole. This could be the result of the fact that integrated catchment management is a
relatively new concept in South Africa (DWAF, 1996:21).
To conclude the discussion on integrated catchment management, a few points can be made regarding the level of
commitment and types of arrangements that would be required to implement this approach in South Africa. It is clear
that the objectives for adopting integrated catchment management will influence the type of approach that eventually
will be implemented in South Africa. These objectives include (DWAF, 1996):
• Devolution of authority and responsibility
If the Department's objective is to devolve more of the operational management functions down to local
level in order to relieve pressure on the available manpower resources and to achieve a higher level of
management efficiency, then it may be appropriate to set up statutory catchment boards with the power to
raise levies, issue permits for discharge and abstraction and enforce permit conditions.
The advantages of such an approach are that responsibility, accountability and authority are held at the
catchment level and this is in line with the philosophy of the present govemment. Decision-madnq> can
then take place at catchment level, assuming that catchment boards (or catchment management agencies
and water using associations) are structured in such a way that all stakeholders are represented (DWAF,
1996:40).
There are however also disadvantages to this model. Firstly, the appropriate expertise, experience and
judgement are not likely to be available within stakeholder communities at catchment level to play their
expected role in the decision-making processes of integrated catchment management. It is also unlikely
that South Africa will find skilled people in the short and medium term to fulfil this role. Secondly, the
activities and administration of the catchment management agencies would probably have to be financed
from the local tax base, possibly with additional help from the central and provincial govemment, but
sufficient funding may not be always available. Thirdly, given that many of South Africa's river catchments
are shared across provincial and state boundaries (therefore inter basin transfers are common) there will be
a substantial amount of administrative coordination required. This may be problematic if authority for water
allocation is devolved to individual catchments or provincial level (DWAF, 1996:49).
34 Decision-making of all kinds rests on assumptions about the to predict the future. This ability is hampered by the "chaos of
reality" which characterised by the absence of regularities which prevent the accurate prediction of the future. This fact should
make researchers aware of some limitations in their approaches to resolve problems (Jennings and Wattam, 1998:311).
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• Improved resource management
Given that one of the objectives of water management in South Africa is to improve the long-term
management and protection of water resources, the Australian" model would probably serve as the best
basis for implementing integrated catchment management in South Africa.
Clearly, if integrated catchment management is to succeed in South Africa, there must be a greater acceptance of
the need to properly empower people so that they can participate in a transparent decision-making process. This will
require a dramatic change in attitude and approach, both from the public and water managers. South Africa does
have the opportunity to facilitate this change as an integral part of the socio-economic reconstruction of the society,
but will not succeed if the approach is not supported the by legal, institutional and administrative frameworks.
Ideally, South Africa should look at a gradual shift from a situation where integrated catchment management is
regulated by central and regional government levels, but still with some stakeholder consultation like Australia. This
would allow for sufficient time for learning and the development of an appropriate skills base for the successful
implementation of an integrated approach. On the ground, this could take on the form of priority catchments and
working initially with a catchment forum, or something similar. This forum could then gradually be developed in to a
catchment committee, taking more responsibility and accountability as local capabilities are developed and
enhanced. The next step would be the development and constitution of a catchment authority, whose legal,
executive and fundraising status would depend on the needs of the local situation.
2.6 Integrated catchment management and land reform
Given the limited employment opportunities in the formal sector of the rural South African economy, many of the poor
depend heavily on the natural resource-base for their day-to-day survival needs. Their living standard is therefore
closely related to the well-being of their natural environment. However, poverty, overpopulation, lack of education
and slow technological development together with a strong short-term oriented consumption pattern, usually results
in environmental degradation. Van Zyl, et al (1996:237) argues that poverty among the rural population and a past
35 Refer to Louw (2001) for detail on the Australian model. The Australian alternative looks promising for South Africa. This
approach relies on active community and stakeholder participation in the management of natural resources and leaves a
guidance and supporting role for the government to play. An advantage of the Australian model is that planning and actions are
community-based. All stakeholders play an active role in management, from the institutional level down to the individual
landowner. Broad policies and objectives for water resources management can still be set at central government level, and
these serve as a framework within which catchment agencies may do their operational management decision-making. However,
a disadvantage of this approach may be that integrated catchment management is seen as a long-term process, where
implementation is a gradual and slow process of learning, negotiating, planning and action (it is a lengthy process). In addition,
this model should be adapted to deal with the complex and sensitive water allocation issues within the South African context.
The Australian model requires the following:
• A core of skilled personnel at central and regional government level to initiate, facilitate, assist and guide catchment
agencies with a national policy towards integrated catchment management.
• Access to technical support through scientific and engineering strategies for dealing with resource management
issues.
• Improved collaboration between state departments and agencies involved in resource management.
• Long-term commitment of funding and personnel to support each catchment agency.
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property right regime that allowed almost unrestricted use of natural resources by favoured groups in society, poses
the most serious environmental threat in low-income developing economies and should therefore be confronted (by
improved access to land) in order to protect the environment.
Integrated catchment management could play an important role in co-ordinating the planning and implementation of
land reform and management. The current water care initiatives encourage the establishment of strong partnerships
between government agencies and communities, this could also be used for developing an integrated land
management programme for South Africa. Currently within land reform disputes, certain land areas are preferred
over others due to water availability on that piece of land. (The fact that there is water available on the piece of land
under consideration plays a direct role in the monetary value of that land.) This study suggests an alternative form of
defining water use rights for adoption in the market system. Water use rights will be independently defined from land
property rights and this would have a definite effect on land prices and therefore land reform disputes.
2.7 Institutional change and economic performance
The foundations of economic systems are rooted in political and legal systems and in general in the institutional
structures of a society (Tisdell and Roy, 1997:28). These institutions could be defined as "collective actions in
control, liberation and expansion of individual action" (Commons, 1931 :648 as cited in Armitage, 1999:6).
Within the context of a water economy, institutions are defined as sets of values, customary rules, water rights and
water laws. Together, these form "the rules of the game36" with respect to market control over water. They are
capable of creating order and certainty for users to facilitate the achievement of economic and social goals while also
creating incentives for efficient resource use.
Van Zyl and Vink (1997) studied the effects of two different water policies on the farm sector. These policies could
be grouped under "command and control" methods37 as mentioned in Goodstein (1999:11). Van Zyl and Vink (1997)
compared increases in water tariffs (price limitation) with water restrictions (supply limitation) as two policy
alternatives, to determine their effects on output, prices, welfare and employment. Both control measures should
have a negative effect on producer surplus, but the extent of the effect was unknown. To know the producer
sensitivity on each of the policies could be useful for water authorities to make a choice between these two
alternatives, depending on the objectives of the authorities. Applied to the Western Cape, Van Zyl and Vink (1997)
identified a noticeable shift away from intensive irrigated production to more extensive production and a decrease in
producer welfare under both policies. Irrigators seemed to be more sensitive towards water restrictions than water
tariff increases, because a large tariff increase is required before it has any effect on producer welfare. It seemed
that a water restriction also restricts the management options to a greater extent than tariff increases, and therefore
36 Chapter 4 refers in more detail to the "rules of the game" and other related equity issues.
37 Feichtinger (2001 :23) mentioned that a strong analogy could be found between "command and control" environmental policy
and control measures for criminal behaviour (law enforcement). Refer to Feichtinger (2001) for more detail.
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have a greater negative impact on producer welfare. Under the increased tariff regime, the effect on consumer
surplus fell disproportionately on the poor, but was mitigated by an increase in employment. However, they found
that under the water restriction regime, the loss in welfare and other negative effects fell disproportionately on the
poor as employment decreased as producers switched to more extensive production patterns. This has negative
implications regarding any type of equity-related policy intervention and should be kept in mind when planning an
appropriate policy intervention. The study also showed that none of these suggested policies would realise a net
social gain and the question remains in searching for appropriate policies with net social gains and sustainable
properties.
As seen above, the term "economic performance" is associated with economic efficiency and equity goals. That is,
we are not interested in improving irrigation allocation systems to merely make them more efficient, but also to
improve them in the context of the decision-making of the small farmer (in order to accommodate the equity
objectives as mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998). The rationale for this argument lies in the fact that if
irrigation allocation systems for the small farmer could be improved, the operation and production activities of the
small farmer would improve and the small farmer will become more self-sufficient. More food will be produced, a
higher level of income could be achieved and a more equitable income distribution could be reached (Bromley,
1982b:1). Equity goals are therefore closely related to small-farmer activities. It is therefore necessary to have a
look at the situation of small farmers within any form of policy development if equity issues are to be considered. It is
important to accommodate these small farmers in a theoretical framework which allows the analysing of the current
decision-making behaviour of small farmers, and to relate that behaviour to the way in which their irrigation supply
system operates.
2.7.1 Policy, institutional change38and property rights
According to Bromley (1995a:1), the formulation of environmental policy in South Africa can only succeed if three
ideas are kept in mind. The first is that natural resources are a function of accepted social relations at any moment in
history. In other words, what a society regards as a "natural resource" is socially determined. The second idea is
that the definition of property rights is necessary for policy formulation. The third idea focuses on the concept of
"individualism". Economists say that only the individual counts, and then they construct models that try to prove that
an individualised world leads to "efficiency" and "social optimality". This economic view de-Iegitimises traditional and
community-based structures and behaviour and is not compatible with an integrated philosophy.
The relationship among these three ideas is obvious: the market drives "value", individual choices drive the market
and property rights over natural resources must therefore be individualised (privatised) in order to protect
38 Ultimately, any form of institutional change within water resource management could in a large part be explained in: (1) the
demand for institutional change, which is associated with the willingness to pay to reduce static transaction costs associated with
achieving particular economic objectives relating to water resources and (2) the supply of new institutions, which is constrained
by dynamic transaction costs arising in the costs of the transition from one institutional structure to another (Challen, 2000:147).
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environmental resources and to promote "efficiency". This relationship could be illustrated by looking at the
degradation of communal (traditional) owned land and water resources. When natural resources are regarded as
private property it should ensure that they would be managed wisely. Economic efficiency is claimed to be an
objective guide to sound environmental policy and therefore state intervention in the market would be considered
unnecessary and inefficient. Criticism of the above-mentioned argument could be based on numerous negative
externalities associated with private ownership as a point of departure, leading to the conclusion that complete
private ownership is no assurance that environmental problems will not arise.
When the first idea of Bromley (1995b:1) is considered, it becomes clear that political power, culture and social
norms play an important role in the process of defining and valuing natural resources. Different cultures will define
different natural resources as valuable. It is difficult to define and value water resources according to Bromley's
argument, because the value of water is congruent with the specific use thereof. Without getting involved in value
judgements, it is important to let context and time playa role in defining which natural resources are to be regarded
as valuable to a specific culture. Therefore, the determination of the value of an environmental resource comprises
two issues:
• Whose interests count when the state formulates policies regarding environmental resources.
• Which aspects of the environmental resource management those individuals choose to value.
Therefore, one of the essential elements of environmental policy-making is to work out who matters in the policy
formulation process and then what matters to those who have been identified.
The second idea of Bromley (1995b:1) focuses on the definition of property rights to facilitate policy formulation.
Bromley (1995b:4), emphasises the concern with the "social construction of scarcity" as the result of social rules
which control the use of natural resources in such a way that an artificial scarcity of the resource develops. Under
the National Water Law of 1956, groundwater belongs to the owners of the land above, and only some privileged
groups could own land in South Africa. Groundwater may not be scarce in an absolute physical sense, but if a
person does not own land (or if a person cannot own land) then groundwater is scarce in a social sense.
Furthermore, it is known that farmers (Le. not necessarily landowners) as well as the urban sector have a "right" to
groundwater. The legitimacy of this "right" could rightfully be questioned: "What is this right?" and "Where does it
come from?" When a party does have a right, it means that the party has the power of the state to enforce the
outcome of the specific right in favour of the holder. Therefore, a right could be seen as secured form of protection.
Different people or groups of people have different interests in particular outcomes. These people or groups will try
to have laws passed that favour their interests best. Given the competing nature of different laws to be passed, the
individuals or groups who are able to have their law (social claim) passed will have their interests protected by the
state.
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It is important to note that "property" is not an object (land and water), but rather a stream of benefits arising from the
control over objects (or ideas). This stream of future values comprises the property of such interest. The magnitude
of the stream of benefits will vary depending on the extent of managerial discretion for the owner of the right (the
more restricted the control over the benefits, the less value it has for its owner). It is therefore clear that social
entitlements arise to give certain interests the needed protection for the use of a specific natural resource. This
suggests that property rights are created to serve particular social purposes. Therefore the question arises, how
does the state choose in an objective way between alternatives and what is to be considered as fundamentally fair
and how does one judge these property regimes in terms of nature and content? The fact is that the state often
passes laws that favour its particular interests.
The third idea of Bromley (1995b:1) is concerned with the problem of individualism and the choice among different
policy regimes. This could be seen as a more normative dimension of property right analysis because ideologies and
value judgements underlie the choice of a policy regime.
Given the above-mentioned arguments, environmental policy-making is about disputes over different natural
resource use regimes. At the one extreme is the economic logic of individualism and at the other end the social logic
of larger scale to reduce the number of decision-makers across which external effects might travel (Bromley,
1995a:9).
According to Tisdell and Roy (1997:30), four broad categories of property rights can be identified in the literature:
• Private property in which all rights to the given property applies only to that individual.
• State property in which property rights rest with the state.
• Common property in which an identifiable community of users controls the property.
• Open-access property for which access is free and open to all.
Without going into a detailed analysis, one could say that different property regimes have their own compelling logic.
In some cases, private property is the most useful social arrangement for scarce resources, and sometimes common
property is the best option. There is no magical "one size fits all" property structure. The appropriate property regime
depends on the purpose and the requirements involved. In some cases, a combination of the two will be appropriate.
Within the South African water policy context, it is essential to reassess what is regarded as a natural resource and
to decide whose interests are to be served by the limited water supply. This reassessment will confront the attitudes
and privileges of the current privileged parties. It will challenge the conventional ways of thinking about natural
resources and question the ownership and control of these resources.
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Public policy, according to Bromley (1995a:14) is about three ideas: intentions (or purpose); rules to accomplish that
purpose, and the means of realising behavioural changes to bring compliance with new rules. For the development
of appropriate water policy in South Africa, policy-makers must decide whose interests are to be served and precisely
what those interests are. From here, it is possible to redesign rule structures (institutional arrangements) that will
direct policy in a new direction.
It therefore is a question of: Who has which rights, when.
2.7.2 Evaluating institutions
Challen (2000) addresses institutional reform for water resources, arguing that in most social sciences, there is
diversity in economic schools of thought as to how institutional change can be described and how institutions can be
evaluated. Because neoclassical economics remains the mainstream of economic thought, the bulk of literature in
resource economics reflects this view. However, Armitage (1999:11) mentions that standard neoclassical economic
theory is abstract and incapable of dealing with current real world problems. (This is supported by Challen, 2000:1-
11).
A fundamental methodological question concerns the grounds upon which alternative water institutions should be
evaluated. There is a critical and substantial difference in the philosophical basis used in neoclassical and
institutional economics. Neoclassical economic analysis rests on methodological individualism39 and, according to
this view, the "public interest" does not exist. Rather, economic analysis must rest solely on the subjective
preferences of the individual decision-maker, aggregated through market forces. In contrast, institutional economics
relies on "methodological collectivism" and is typically more holistic. Institutionalists incorporate some notion of the
"public interest" as part of the parcel of individual and social welfare (Livingston, 1993:816). However, this type of
model is often broadly inclusive, highly complex, detailed and messy, because problems are viewed in an
interdisciplinary and integrated way.
2.7.3 The neoclassical approach
According to Bardhan (1989:3), neoclassical economics is concerned primarily with the allocation of resources
through the forces of demand and supply in a market economy, without the full consideration of the complex
institutions on which contracts in the actual market depend. However, the existence of political, legal, monetary and
other systems is acknowledged by neoclassical economics, but are either regarded as having neutral effects on
economic processes or are taken as given and are specified in a way that suggests that institutional influence is of
minimum importance, thereby setting aside institutional change as a subject for economic analysis.
39 Refer to the third idea of Bromley in the previous section.
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In theory, neoclassical economics uses the "Walrasian general equilibrium model" as an analysing instrument for
studying small segments of isolated systems. Prices and quantities are determined in a market by equating demand
and supply, while imperfect information and uncertainty are not considered. A competitive economic system, in the
context of the general equilibrium40 model requires the following for the achievement of a first best pareto optimum
configuration: (a) zero transaction costs and individuals acting completely rationally, (b) individuals and firms are both
profit maximisers, and (c) institutional arrangements play no role in determining equilibrium solutions (Armitage,
1999:12).
According to neoclassical theory, the three marginal equivalences needed for pareto optimality are satisfied at
market equilibrium. These are: (a) the marginal rates of substitution for all consumers are equal (b) the marginal rate
of input substitution is equal for all producers and (c) the marginal cost of production is equal for all producers and is
equal to the price of the product (Armitage, 1999:13).
The First Theorem of Welfare Economics states that each competitive equilibrium is pareto efficient. A social state is
pareto efficient if no individual's position can be improved without causing a worsening in the position of another
individual. Taking the assumption of zero transaction costs, then the initial allocation of property rights is irrelevant in
terms of efficiency because these rights can be traded free of transaction costs until a pareto efficient allocation is
reached", Consequently, the concepts of efficiency and equity become separable under the neoclassical
assumptions (Bardhan, 1989:5).
Any form of market disturbance within the Walrasian model results in the instantaneous attainment of a new
equilibrium because with no transaction costs, the adjustment costs are zero. Therefore, no effort is required in the
exchange process, prices will allocate resources to their highest valued use and economic efficiency is ensured. As
a result, prices are taken as exclusive indices of individual and social welfare and as criteria of the efficiency of
allocation and the optimality of decision-making (Armitage, 1999:13).
However, the major shortcoming of the neoclassical approach lies within its assumptions. The assumption of zero
transaction cost is of particular relevance for this study. Under real world conditions, every trade agreement involves
a contract that must be defined and enforced. Transaction costs are then costs of specifying and enforcing the
contract that underlies the exchange. These costs include search and information costs, bargaining and decision-
making costs and policy and enforcement costs, as well as risk and uncertainty associated with transfer of rights due
to imperfect information (Colby, 1990:1185). These costs can be divided into ex ante and ex post costs. Drafting,
40 Capra (2002:28) also notes the analogy between living systems and economic systems which need a state of disequilibrium in
order to be functional (as mentioned in footnote 13). The argument regarding the efficient functioning and the achievement of
pareto optimum solutions at a state of equilibrium, is also questioned. This study is of the opinion that economic systems
certainly could not be viewed independent of these interactions and efficient functioning of an economic system will not be
reached at a state of equilibrium because no functioning (interaction) will be necessary when a system is at a state of true
equilibrium.
41 The Coase-theorem supports this belief (Goodstein, 1999:53-54).
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negotiating and safeguarding an agreement are ex ante costs. The problem of moral hazard, cheating and shirking
lead to ex post costs, which includes contract enforcement and risk. Transaction costs are likely to increase as the
number of individuals who are participating within the market increases, when the level and sophistication of
technology increases or when a degeneration in social conventions (that reduce risk) occurs (Armitage, 1999:14).
The initial distribution of property rights influences the initial distribution of wealth and income in society by
determining who benefits from income flows generated by the use of resources", When transaction costs are
present, the allocation of property rights becomes critical. A primary pillar of neoclassical economics is the
separation of equity and efficiency. This is not valid for this situation, because the terms of contracts in various
transactions, which directly affect efficiency of resource allocation, now depend crucially on ownership and property
right relations.
Neoclassical models are therefore rich in theoretical simplicity and rigor. They are reductionist in their attempts to
describe problems and solutions in terms of market principles. Unfortunately many economic problems cannot be
reduced to a matter of markets and prices alone.
Therefore, the attractive normative criterion of pareto optimality cannot be used to analyse institutional change.
According to Bromley (1982b), policy change is by nature redistributive, because institutions establish all initial
endowments and any change will result in losses as well as gains (therefore not be pareto optima~. The
controversial criterion of potential pareto optimality could be used as an alternative to evaluate change that involves
losses. According to this form of optimality, a change is efficient when those who gain could compensate those who
lose (actual compensation is not required) and still be better off. Standard benefit-cost analysis rests on potential
pareto optimality in that the goal is to "maximise discounted net benefits, to whomsoever they accrue" (Livingston,
1993:816).
According to Bromley (1990:86) the potential pareto optimum criterion of economic efficiency as suggested by
Livingston (1993) does not pass the test of consistency and coherence within economic theory, nor do such
measures accord with what public decision-makers seek in policy advice from economists. However, such efficiency
measures are, nonetheless, durable components of the ideology of economics in general and benefit-cost analysis in
particular.
The ultimate test of efficiency can be seen as agreement on changes in rules governing market exchanges. If
individuals agree to institutional changes and trade is voluntary, then the new institutional arrangement may be
considered as more efficient than the previous arrangement. Agreement between the parties involved signals that
individuals perceive the previous arrangement to be inferior. Since individuals are driven by self-interest, the
42 It is therefore important to have a "fair" initial distribution prior to the activation of the market mechanism. This argument will be
discussed further in chapter 5.
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institution that evolves because of change will allocate resources in a more efficient manner. Artificial restraints
placed on exchanges between parties via a political agency preclude an observation of the true test of efficiency: the
agreement between parties. As a result, the resource allocation arising under such a situation can only be presumed
to be inefficient (Buchanan, 1989:98).
2.7.4 The institutional approachë
Institutionalists44 have recognised that economic processes cannot be adequately explained as self contained and
self sustaining systems, isolated from a social and physical environment. Rather, institutionalists view an economy
as an open system in perpetual dynamic interaction with a complex social, political and physical environment.
Economic processes receive important organising impulses from this environment and in return exert their own
influences on the environment. In other words, a definite interdependency exists between these two environments
(Armitage, 1999:15).
Institutional economics could be described as an understanding of the structure of the institutions that constitute the
market and the structure of property rights that determine which individuals' interests shape demand and supply
within the market. Institutions must therefore be included as an endogenous variable in the economic system.
Institutionalists view transaction costs, and the institutions that evolve to minimise them, as the key to the
performance of an economy. The levels of these costs determine the degree to which individuals can profitably
exchange property rights for mutual benefit.
Livingston (1993:815) studied the normative and positive45 aspects of institutional economics and the implications for
water policy. Institutional economics provides an alternative framework for analysing existing and proposed water
policies. Livingston, with the normative model, employs the concept of institutional value, rather than efficiency.
Water policies are judged based on whether they foster the long-term viability of economic and ecological systems,
not on whether they maximise the net present value. The positive model used by Livingston (1993:815) is holistic
and more inclusive than standard market models.
While economic efficiency is described by the concept of pareto optimality within the neoclassical paradigm, the only
way in which the outcome of the exchange processes can be evaluated is through the revealed choice behaviour of
43 This study supports the institutional model mentioned by Livingston (1993) and this school of thought will be used throughout
this study. This institutional economics paradigm is supported by the field of new institutional economics as mentioned by
Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) and also by Challen (2000:3-7).
44 The original institutionalists such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons and later John Galbraith, tended to reject forms of
atomism and abstraction and instead assume approaches of investigation and writing that were descriptive, anti-formalitave,
holistic, behaviouristic and collectivistic (Challen, 2000:5).
45 Livingston (1993:819) notes that positive models enhance the understanding of real world events and causal relationships
regarding water issues and could be used for predicting future changes up to a certain degree. Normative models could be
useful in developing recommendations for desirable water institutions.
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individuals to potential exchanges. Each individual will have different perceptions attached to a potential exchange of
rights, and there is no way for an external observer to determine whether or not the observed level of exchange falls
short of some idealised norm. Efficiency of resource use within an institutional setting is thus ensured, as long as
exchange is voluntary to market participants. This implies that resource allocation is shaped by institutional
arrangements and efficiency is comparable only between institutions and not within an institution.
2.8 Water allocation systems
Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994:1613) ask what water policies can lead to efficiency increases in irrigated
production while reducing resource degradation in the irrigated areas and releasing water for growing non-agricultural
use. They suggest four broad categories of policy prescriptions that could be employed: technological solutions,
reform the public management of irrigation systems, communal irrigation management and the establishment of
tradable property rights. The first three prescriptions have been widely utilised internationally, however the last
strategy of tradable rights has not been vigorously pursued.
It is important to make a clear distinction between a market for water as a physical substance and a market for water
rights (or water use rights, as it will become clear later in the thesis). A market for the physical substance of water
focuses on the allocation of water via the market mechanism. Therefore, volumetric units of water are traded
between willing sellers and buyers until the demand is balanced out with the supply. In this regard, the state
normally acts as the dominant seller (because all water inherently belongs to the state) and water users (like
irrigation farmers and municipalities) as the dominant buyers. The market price (or spot price) of the volume being
traded is only partially determined by supply and demand forces, because the main force for price determination
originates from the state, which implies that the state already determined the "ideal" price46 of water for a given use-
category. This proved to be problematic, because given the inelastic nature of water demand for the bulk of the
water users, most of them are price-takers and therefore the state finds itself in an monopolistic position with scope
for unrealistic price settings. With the state as the dominant price-setting force, questions regarding the method of
price-determination used by the state given the equity and efficiency objectives in the National Water Act of 1998,
also comes to the fore.
A market for water rights (this thesis prefers to use the term water use rights, because the utility derived from water is
in reality a derived demand for the particular use of the physical substance) focuses on the allocation of water use
rights via the market mechanism. It should be made clear that this is a market where rights to buy water is traded,
and not the volume per se. It is therefore impossible for a specific user to buy a greater volume of water as specified
by the current use rights held by that specific user. Price-setting within this market is to a greater extent determined
by supply and demand forces, because the state is not the dominant end user in the market system.
46 The state is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the water allocation system and these costs will be recovered
from water sales to the users of lawful water use rights.
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According to Livingston (1995:209) the balance between market and administrative allocation mechanisms will vary
between countries and the degree to which either dominates, is determined by the following:
• The development stage of the economy and experiences with command and control mechanisms.
• The organisational skills and leadership abilities of water users and the state.
• The technical skills, client relationships and unbiased ability of govemment agencies to evaluate economic
gains or losses from water transfers.
• The scale of the reallocations considered, with small transfers favouring market interaction between
individuals and large transfers requiring involvement of the state.
Within South Africa, the market for water as a physical substance is certainly not a new idea given the trade in
riparian water rights under the National Water Act of 1956. The National Water Act of 1998 facilitates the trade of
water use rights, but a great degree of uncertainty remains with regard to the practical implementation thereof.
Capacity-sharing presents some possibilities for the implementation stage of a market for water use rights and
chapter 4 will give more detail in this regard.
2.8.1 Requirements for tradable water use rights
The efficient construction of any market requires the following conditions for trading to take place. Firstly, well-
defined property rights, secondly an effective communication system and thirdly the physical possibility for trading to
realise the negotiated transfers. Each of these will be discussed in the following sections.
2.8.2 Institutional requirements
Sampath (1992:968) notes that water rights are generally based on three systems: riparian rights, public allocation
and prior (appropriative) rights47. Riparian rights link ownership of water use to ownership of adjacent land. Public
allocation involves administered distribution of water. Prior rights are based on appropriate doctrine under which the
water right is acquired by actual use over time. None of these systems satisfies the conditions for well-defined
property rights to water. Riparian rights are the most restrictive of transfers because they limit use of water to
adjacent land but even appropriative rights can be highly restrictive, building in a bias toward maintaining possible
existing inefficient water uses.
Well-defined property rights define and delimit the use rights of the holder relative to other users and to the rest of
society to the use of a certain amount of water (which is defined in terms of stream flow shares or volumetrically). If
47 This right implies that the first person to divert water from a stream and apply it to a beneficial use has the superior right to
keep doing so (McCormick, 1994:953).
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these rights are poorly defined, market processes cannot be relied upon to allocate water resources efficiently. It is
therefore crucial that the state, as far as water markets are concerned, should define, allocate and enforce property
rights in water. Government policy therefore plays a critical role in defining the institutional setting for market
operation and provides the basis for market activity (Backeberg, 1994a). These property rights can take on the form
of licences to use ground water from private wells or to surface water supplied through public irrigation systems. The
quantity specified in the right can be determined according to historical use, but whether these rights will be traded in
the market system depends on the buyer's willingness to pay, the seller's current water productivity level (willingness
to accept compensation for the resource) and the transaction and opportunity costs involved.
According to Colby (1987:1116) the definition of rights and duties of water users relative to one another and to the
rest of society, provides a basis for market exchanges. In order for market participants to estimate the value of a
water use right, they must be able to form expectations regarding the future benefits associated with owning the
water use right and the degree to which the right is protected from impairment by others. Only on that basis can they
make economically rational decisions about water use and transfers. If property rights are not well defined, the
consequent uncertainty will reduce the expected value48of the rights and the incentive to engage in trading. To
produce efficient resources allocation through market transfers, the definition of property rights should satisfy the
conditions of specificity, exclusivity, transferability, comprehensiveness and enforceability (Bush et aI, 1987:619).
Scott and Coustalin (1995) identified five characteristics of property rights that are relevant within this context:
• duration
• flexibility
• quality of title or security
• transferability or assignability
• divisibility
These characteristics can present problems in the establishment, definition and enforcement of property rights.
Within this design of water use rights, it is important to note that the more detailed the definition of the right, the
greater the transaction costs and heterogeneity of rights and hence the more difficult it will be to organise a market
(Howe et al, 1986).
By contrast, Colby (1987:1116) states that water rights are heterogeneous, each consisting of a bundle of legal and
hydrological characteristics which affect the value of the right and its price. For example, according to Bush et al
48 Statistically, an expected value of a variable (within this context it is economic gain) within a predefined population (population
density function or range of possible outcomes) could be defined as the sum of the products between all the possible outcomes
and their corresponding probabilities. In other words, the expected value is a weighted (because the variable is not random)
average of all possible outcomes of the variable (Gujarati, 1992:36-38).
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(1987:619-623), the reliability of water deliveries, water quality and institutional restrictions on location, season and
purpose of use, have been shown to influence water use rights prices in specific market areas.
It is therefore important to consider the relevant criteria for defining water use rights carefully and in such a way as to
avoid an excessively detailed right, because markets operate more efficiently when the commodity being traded is
homogeneous.
An often-cited prerequisite for an efficient market is the establishment of completely specified, enforceable and
transferable property rights (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994:1615-16120). When property rights are clearly
specified, water users have a secure basis on which to make long-term investment decisions. If all values associated
with water are encompassed in property rights, then market prices will also reflect social values and the holders of
water use rights will face the full opportunity costs of their water use and transfer decisions. Transferability ensures
that marginal values for water (net of transfer costs) are equal between different uses and users by allowing water
use rights to be re-allocated whenever re-allocation would generate positive net benefits. Completely specified,
enforceable and transferable property rights are the ideal institutional conditions for efficient market performance.
A water market also requires an effective administrative system that will prevent abuses of the system. Government
agency performance in the administration of water transfers is necessary to legally sanction water trading, enforce
legislation or regulations and resolve disputes among users (Livingston, 1995:207-208).
However, a market for transferable rights does not have only institutional requirements and the efficiency of the
market will be determined by the compatibility of institutional with other kinds of requirements.
2.8.3 Effective communication
Publicly available information on the supply and demand characteristics of water use rights must include the means
of identifying willing buyers, sellers and intermediaries or water brokers and the means for entering into enforceable
contracts. Hydrological information is also required to permit the right to be defined. Various types of information are
therefore essential for rational decision-making by water use rights holders. This implies the existence of suitable
data and monitoring systems and it is at this point that the equity issue again comes to the fore because most small
farmers do not have access to effective communication systems.
The irrigation community should be aware of entitlements at the time of the water licence sale. The price and
amount of water being transferred should be accessible to the public (details of water use rights transfers should be
transparent). This will promote fairness in the market, and traders selling or transferring water allocations for
personal profit (which will not be used for the benefits of the irrigation community) should be fined accordingly.
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2.8.4 Infrastructure requirements
Before the transaction, it is important to verify whether the transfer can be realised in terms of delivering the water to
the desired location. A flexible infrastructure enables sellers to transfer water to buyers at reasonable costs and for
this reason water transactions take place within the existing distributional systems. However, an effective information
system could save transaction costs by linking local buyers and sellers to avoid water being transported over vast
distances.
2.9 Important issues regarding water markets
Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994:1617-1622) listed nine of the most important issues regarding the implementation
of tradable water use rights:
• Increasing benefits from reallocating water - where the main argument focuses on the fact that as
economies grow, and water demand increases, the benefits from water allocation will rise exponentially.
• Transaction costs and institutional requirements for alternative mechanisms of reallocating water -
transaction costs certainly decrease the expected gains from water transfers, but are in general not totally
prohibitive. The question should rather be how do the transaction costs of market allocation strategies
compare with alternative allocation strategies.
• Markets in water use rights vs. water pricing - the two major advantages of tradable water use rights include
a reduction in information costs, because the market, composed of water users with expert knowledge of the
value of water as an input in the production process, would bear the costs and generate the necessary
information on the marginal value product and opportunity cost of water. Secondly, tradable water use
rights would formalise existing rights to water rather than being seen as an expropriation of these rights and
is therefore politically more feasible than water pricing.
• Property rights and externalities - appropriately defined property rights will to a large extent cause users to
internalise externalities.
• Private vs. communal property rights - tradable water use rights can be assigned to communal groups (or
Water User Assoclatlons=) as well as to individuals.
• User involvement in investment decisions - government will still remain the sole financier of large irrigation
schemes, but the establishment of tradable water use rights is conducive to farmer input and will provide
strong incentives for cost effective investments in irrigation if the rights are issued before the development of
such a scheme.
• Variability in water supply and the design of water use rights.
49 A detailed discussion on Water User Associations could be found in the National Water Act of 1998 (1998:A-117). Scott and
Coustalin (1995:972) refer to a river ·corporation".
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• Inter-sectorial competition for water - there was great concem regarding the outflow of water from
agriculture to urban uses. This however, did not realise because a small transfer from agriculture to the
urban sector is adequate. (The urban sector is currently seen as a "low volume-high value" user.)
• Tradable water rights, market power and equity - evidence from Pakistan and India showed that greater
availability of alternative ground water sources increased competition and lowered water prices. Therefore,
policies encouraging the development of water markets should improve access of the poor to water and not
hinder it.
Apart from this theoretical literature on the gains of institutional change, there are also a few studies which tried to
quantify the potential gain from changes in a particular segment of water institutions like water markets, inter-regional
transfers and water quality institutions (for example the work of Vaux and Howitt, 1984; Dinar and Latey, 1991 and
Hearne and Easter, 1997). There are also a few studies that provide a rough estimate of the opportunity cost50 or
potential social gain of change in water institutions as a whole (for example the work of Hearne and Easter, 1997 and
Saleth, 1996). There have also been attempts to estimate directly the transaction costs of reform (Colby, 1990;
Easter et al, 1998; Connor and Perry, 1999; Louw, 2001 and Viljoen et al, 2000).
The present approaches towards estimating both the opportunity and transaction costs of institutional change in the
water sector remain partial, for they do not adequately account either for the segment-specific institutional needs of
different water sub-sectors or for the component-specific cost variations across the components of water
insntufions". Variations in the opportunity and transaction costs make institutional changes easier in some contexts,
but difficult in other. For example, it is easier to formulate and declare a water policy than to design a water law.
Similarly, it is much easier to develop both water policy and water law than to create new or reformed administrative
structures needed for an effective translation of legal adaptations. Since institutional change is continuous, the
easier reforms initiated in the early stages brightens the prospects of further and higher-level institutional changes.
This means that there is a functional linkage between the transaction costs of reforms and the opportunity costs of
earlier reforms. Although these linkages appear to be abstract and theoretical, their practical influence within the
political economy of the reform process should not be underestimated (Dinar and Saleth, 1999:5).
Since the magnitude of net benefits from institutional changes in the water sector is a direct function of the degree of
water scarcity, the economic incentives for institutional change increase with every increase in the level of water
scarcity (as induced by factors like population growth, economic development and climatic change). Increasing water
scarcity also magnifies the real and economic costs of inappropriate water sector policies (for example treating water
50 The problem with opportunity cost pricing is that the supply and demand of water are seasonal and variable and opportunity
costs vary accordingly and could not be estimated. A further problem is that water needs to be metered while opportunity costs
are subjective and cannot be objectively observed (Nieuwoudt, 2000:63). (The market solution to pricing water at opportunity
costs is tradable water rights.)
51 The components include: Water law, water policy and water administration (Dinar and Saleth, 1999:4).
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as an "open access" resource and subsidised water provision), which can be approximated by the gap between the
scarcity value of water and the prevailing water charges.
Besides the opportunity costs of institutional change, the water sector is also strongly influenced by some factors'"
that originate from outside the water sector. Macro economic reform emphasises the fiscal implications of
opportunity costs of institutional change. In contrast, socio-political reforms in South Africa since the 1990's reduce
the transaction costs directly because the institutional changes in the water sector form part of a system-wide reform.
The opportunity cost has also been magnified further by water-related natural phenomena like droughts, floods and
salinity. This means that the original opportunity costs of the water sector need additional support to prompt and
sustain the process of institutional change (Dinar and Saleth, 1999:5).
Transaction costs are generally characterized as factors (externalities) that hamper the efficient functioning of
markets. Some externalities are known and measurable and others are unknown and not measurable. In the water
market paradigm, transaction costs usually consist of searching for trading partners, determining of the
characteristics of the water commodities, negotiating terms and prices for the transfer and obtaining legal approval
for the transfer (Louwand Van Schalkwyk, 2001 and Hearne and Easter, 1997:188). Excessive transaction costs
create artificial scarcity because the potential buyer of the right cannot afford the right due to high prices and the
seller cannot sell the right due to high transaction costs. This artificial scarcity develops in an excess supply of water.
Lund (1993:3103) investigated the probability of an unsuccessful transaction due to high transaction costs. He found
that seeking water transfers becomes more attractive to potential water purchasers and the probability of a
successful transfer increases, if more of the transaction costs for water transfers are incurred after a transfer and if
the costs of delaying implementation of alternative water supplies are small.
Connor and Perry (1999:2833) studied the effect of water quality externalities as a result of market water transfers.
They allowed for both positive and negative externalities, mostly regarding return flows of irrigation water. Their
study describes conditions» when water trade is most likely to generate positive and negative water quality-related
externalities. They also draw policy conclusions about the kinds of institutional rules best suited for balancing trade-
offs between gains to trade, water quality externalities and transaction costs. One of the key implications of this
research is that certain property right schemes (treatments of return flow externalities) and hydrological conditions
are conducive to the possibility of negative water quality externalities. Therefore, water right schemes including the
protection from return flow externalities are likely to protect water quality in streams (because water transfers under
such circumstances will generally reduce effluent loading), but will not reduce the flow (dilution capacity) of the
stream. In contrast, "capital asset" water use rights (which allow the sale of the right to divert with no explicit return
52 Including macro economic adjustment policies and social-politicalliberalisation and reconstruction programs (Dinar and Saleth,
1999:5).
53 These conditions include the following: When water trade causes both reductions in water body loading capacity and dilution
capacity, and the pollutant loading percentage increases, negative externalities regarding water pollution will occur. In other
words, negative water quality externalities will only result from water trade if the percentage reduction in water dilution capacity
(resulting from water trade) exceeds the percentage reduction in pollutant loading.
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flow protection provisions) do not preclude the possibility of negative externalities (Connor and Perry, 1999:2837).
Hanley (1995) also researched the potential of using water markets to control water pollution. His study showed that
empirical evidence exists that water markets do indeed prove useful in controlling pollution.
The transferring of water use rights implies a negotiating process where the two parties negotiate to meet each
other's needs. According to the Coase theorem (Goodstein, 1999:61), it does not matter which party the original
property right belonged to, the outcome of the negotiating process (which can be explained in terms of marginal
benefit analysis) will always be efficient. This will be the case with zero transaction costs and no free riding. The
reality proves otherwise, because asymmetrical information is always present and the ability to impose transaction
costs on the other party represents bargaining power in the negotiating process.
Market transactions are undertaken for economic gain, based on the perception that water supplies will generate
higher returns in their new use than in their former use. A third party (government) can gain some leverage on the
transfer and start playing a role in water allocation decisions by eroding these expected gains through imposing
transaction costs (policy-induced transaction costs on one or both parties). For policy-induced transaction costs to
facilitate efficiency, government must arrange incentives such that reallocation occurs only if the social benefits of the
transfer exceed the social costs (social welfare is maximised when water transfers occur to the point where the social
marginal benefits equal social marginal costs). Given the public good nature of water uses and the externalities
associated with water transfers, private marginal costs are likely to be separated from social marginal costs (Colby,
1990:1186). Transaction costs could therefore promote efficiency, causing private decision-makers to account for
social costs by taxing transferors through policy-induced transaction costs.
Colby (1987:1114) discusses another important factor to keep in mind when decisions regarding market efficiency
are at stake. She raises the question of how market performance should be evaluated. The underlying answer to
this question is conceptually simple. Knowingly, if the benefits of a transfer outweigh the costs, the transfer is
regarded as "beneficia!". The underlying theory and practical methodologies of measuring and weighting benefits
and costs in order to make a decision, however, are controversial and complex. A thorough evaluation of market
processes should answer two questions. First, do increased returns to water use and any other benefits associated
with the transfer outweigh the social costs of market activities? Secondly, is there an alternative water allocation
process that would yield greater net social benefits? The answers to these questions depend on the measurement
technique used and it is therefore important to consider a variety of measurement techniques before making a
choice.
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2.10 Market failures and institutional barriers to water marketing
Neo-Classical economic theory suggests that under specific conditions, markets will yield accurate incentives and
promote efficient resource use. However, these conditions are restrictive and when particular conditions are not met,
markets do not yield appropriate incentives and "fail" to achieve efficient resource use (Livingston, 1995:204).
Randall (1983:147) studied the phenomenon of "market failure" and noted that there are indeed certain kinds of
goods that the open market fails to deliver in an efficient manner. He mentioned the criteria of exclusiveness and
rivalry and suggests the use of these to distinguish whether a certain economic good is suitable for the market or not.
Water per se as an economic good cannot be characterised by these criteria, because it will vary according to use.
Consumptive uses are certainly exclusive and rival, but most non-consumptive uses are non-exclusive and non-rival.
McCormick (1994:953) investigated institutional barriers to water marketing. He mentioned that the lack of
articulation of public interests in the water resource itself leads to incomplete definition of the private rights to water
and it is those private rights that are sold and leased within the market. Therefore, the willingness to define the
nature and extent of private interests in water supplies will determine the development and level of efficiency of any
water market regime.
Five characteristics exist which may prevent market prices from representing the social values of water. These
characteristics include the physical characteristics of water, imperfect competition, externalities, uncertainty and
equity-related issues. The physical characteristics of water violate a number of economic and institutional conditions
for effective market functioning. Three central conditions necessary for efficient market allocations of the resource
include: (1) certainty regarding the resource supply, (2) perfect divisibility and (3) independent use characteristics.
Certainly in the absence of suitable institutional control, these conditions are not met in the case of water resources.
Imperfect competition occurs when one or more users, suppliers or government have the power to significantly affect
the market prices and conditions for water transfers. In this case observed prices may deviate from the maximum
willingness to pay for marginal units of water. Externalities occur when water transfers positively or negatively affect
third parties and these effects are not taken into account in market transactions, and prices will therefore not reflect
full social values. Water systems always involve interdependency therefore the withdrawals and consumption of one
user and the changes it causes in water quality, affect others. Externalities are pervasive. Thus, a market system in
water use rights cannot perform efficiently without some kind of supervision. According to Brennan and Scoccimarro
(1999:70), the "no injury rule" - avoiding damage to other users when water is first appropriated or later traded -
must be enforced by a supervisory agency. Uncertainty reduces the willingness to pay because the buyer of the right
cannot estimate the expected value of the use with certainty. Equity issues and distributional considerations may
affect the appropriateness of observed prices as measures of social values, therefore water transfers will have an
impact on the economic activity of communities receiving the water.
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Market efficiency requires that the rights to water be non-attenuated (explicit, exclusive, enforceable and
transferable). The common property nature of water and the difficulty in clearly defining water use rights, implies that
water trade may affect third parties. The public good characteristics of some water uses imply that parties affected
by these trades may not always be represented in the market. Adequate definition of property rights to the resource
are essential in terms of quantity, reliability, security of tenure, conditions of use and water quality. However, even
where these conditions exist or can be created, market performance can be flawed. According to Pigram
(1993:1318), some theorists would deny that property rights to water would ever be sufficiently defined to permit a
market system to operate. One of the reasons is because water is a "mobile" resource and not fixed like land. The
right to a given specific volume of water is constrained in space and time and for a specific purpose. (This is also
one of the main reasons why capacity-sharing is attractive, because the share is not limited to a specific volume of
water but to a percentage of the storage capacity of the reservoir as well as a percentage of the inflow into the
reservoir.)
Regarding the ability of water markets to distribute (or allocate) water efficiently, there are two reasons within the
South African context why water markets do not release water for alternative use (Nieuwoudt, 2000:58). Firstly, most
of the water trades take place between non-users of water and intensive users of water. It will therefore take time
before all "sleeper rights" (water not in current use) are activated. Secondly, irrigation farmers in South Africa are
permitted to irrigate a larger area if they adopt water-saving technology. Although this water-saving technology will
reduce water application per hectare, the total amount of hectares will increase and therefore no absolute water
saving will be realised. Agricultural water markets are therefore increasing the use of water and at the same time
promoting the conservation thereof. This seems confusing. Nieuwoudt (2000) recommends that water transfers be
based on consumptive use54 if return flows are significant.
It is advisable to retain a certain level of state intervention in any water market in order to keep a balance between a
total free market and a fully bureaucratic controlled system. This emphasizes the importance of putting into place an
acceptable institutional arrangement for managing, firstly, the transition towards a more market-oriented system and
secondly, the sustainable management of water resources. This raises the question of the appropriate mix of
incentive-based mechanisms and "command and control" approaches to achieve these goals.
According to Bauer (1997), pro-market policies have both strengths and weaknesses in different areas of water
management. At their best they implement the fact that water is an economic good with economic value. Such
policies can raise economic efficiency through financial incentives and flexible resource allocation that is most likely
to be effective at the local scale involving similar types of water uses. Water markets can also facilitate long-term
trends in regional economic development such as urbanisation at the expense of agriculture, although this is often
politically controversial as well. However, water markets are unable to handle broader problems such as multiple
54 Consumptive use is the volume of water that the farmer withdraws from the irrigation scheme minus his return flows back into
the drainage system.
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uses, environmental and third party effects, river basin management and conflict resolution. It is here that
environmental sustainability and social participation meet the economic value of water in all of its competing uses.
Such problems are theoretically and practically difficult and complex and can rarely be solved by a simple exchange
of rights and when private bargaining breaks down, they highlight the importance of wider legal and political
institutions.
Lastly, it is important to realise that the conversion of the current water management strategy to a water market is a
slow evolutionary process. The initial steps should be consistent with the final design of the system. Starting small
gives the institutions and parties involved time to adjust to the new system, and since most of the initial efforts will be
precedent-setting, it will take time to work them out. Once the precedents have been established, the process will
become smoother, quicker to respond and better able to handle large numbers of transactions.
2.11 Conclusion
This discussion concludes the literature review. It should be clear at this stage that the problem of achieving efficient
and equitable water management is complex and sensitive partly due to the historical context and the emotional
reactions of the bulk of water users. The next chapter will focus on capacity-sharing as part of an integrated
demand-oriented approach to water management.
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Chapter 3
DEMAND·ORIENTED WATER MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
3.1 Introduction
The shift from supply- to demand-oriented water management strategies should be evident in the preceding literature
review. The focus of this chapter will be on the development-path of the concept of capacity-sharing as well as the
detail explaining of the concept.
Neo-Classical economic theory served as the original point of departure from where the "single decision-maker"
approach was developed. As the most restricting assumptions under this approach were dropped, alternative
approaches to demand-oriented water management were born. The volume-sharing and later on the capacity-
sharing of reservoir water are examples that will be discussed here in detail. It should be noted that capacity-sharing
will not be the final and "best" form of demand-oriented strategy, as the water management is a dynamic and multi-
contextual field.
3.2 A single decision-maker approach
The work of Dudley (1988a and 1988b) and Dudley and Musgrave (1988) will be used as the basic point of departure
to investigate the legitimacy and role of the concept of capacity-sharing within the current South African water
management context.
The main issue, which Dudley (1988a and 1988b) and Dudley and Musgrave (1988) focused on, was concerned with
the efficient management of water resources in terms of profit maximisation (in the broader sense) and the
sustainable use of water resources. These two concepts seem contradictory, but when the concepts of capacity-
sharing and equity issues come to the fore, this apparent contradiction will be resolved.
Dudley (1988a) developed a single decision-maker reservoir management model that made use of data produced
from a soil-water plant-growth model (the so-called "Narribri"-model, which is mentioned in Dudley, 1988a:635) to
produce its data. The single decision-maker reservoir management model consists of three sub-models. The first is
a computer simulation sub-model, the second is a dynamic programming model and the third is another computer
simulation sub-model. The purpose of the first simulation sub-model is to calculate expected gross margins and
state variable transition probabilities for each combination of state- and decision-variable levels being considered.
The purpose of the dynamic programming sub-model is to select values of the decision variables (for example
maximum area to keep under irrigation in the immediate stage) for each state and stage combination. This will
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maximise expected net benefits over the remainder of the planning horizon. The purpose of the second simulation
sub-model is to simulate the effects of using the optimal decisions (derived by the dynamic programming sub-model)
for each of a range of discrete irrigable areas (Dudley, 1988a).
One of the main functions of this model is to examine trade-offs between increasing mean annual net revenue and
increasing standard deviation of annual net revenue as irrigated areas are progressively increased.
According to Dudley (1988a:633), irrigation systems throughout the world have the following four characteristics
(which were not included in the literature on how best to operate irrigation systems) and are applicable for South
African conditions:
• The demand for and supply of water is highly variable over time. "Demand" within this model is the quantity
of irrigation water required per time period (for example per month) to maintain a specified minimum soil-
water level for given areas of specific irrigated crops. "Supply" is the quantity of stored water available for
use per time period. (Note that price does not playa role in Dudley's definition.)
• Seasonal water supplies are difficult to forecast, often being dependent on reservoir catchment rainfall after
the irrigation season has begun.
• The frequency of droughts justifies the storage of water in reservoirs, often for more than a year. This
justifies the construction of storage facilities to reduce the impact of water shortages to economically
tolerable levels.
• Land suitable for irrigation is plentiful in relation to the available water and has relatively low value in
altemative non-agricultural uses.
Each of the above-mentioned characteristics has an influence on the stochastic nature of irrigation water supply and
demand. (pigram (1993:1313) also emphasizes the stochastic nature of the supply of Australian water resources.)
Dudley (1988a:634) argues that these four characteristics of irrigation management represent a general case. It is
more likely that the supply and demand characteristics for arid environments take on a more deterministic nature.
This general case was dealt with by Dudley (1988a:635) by proposing that there is a hierarchy of short-, medium-
and long-term decisions to be made which should all be optimal if the expected net benefits from the use of irrigation
water within a catchment are to be maximised. The problem of asymmetrical information was overcome by assuming
a single decision-maker who has the power to make decisions about when and how much to irrigate as well as the
timing and size of controlled releases from the single reservoir in the catchment.
Dudley's (1988a) objective in the paper was to provide a basis for comparing the results obtained from a single
decision-maker model with a more realistic multiple (a reservoir manager or catchment management agency and
individual irrigation farmers) decision-maker model. The main assumptions of the single decision-maker approach
were (Dudley, 1988a):
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• A reservoir irrigation system is assumed in which a single reservoir supplies water by a direct channel to
storage facilities within the irrigation area (much like the Olifants River canal scheme in the Westem Cape).
• No water other than releases from the water reservoir is available for irrigation (such as downstream
tributary flows).
• The irrigation area storage is of sufficient capacity to ensure that all releases from the reservoir are retained
for irrigation and that irrigators are not restricted in their timing of irrigations.
• Only one irrigated crop and one dry land crop are considered and it is assumed that they can be grown
continuously on an area of land without ill effects when using the budgeted production practices.
• It is also assumed that prices and reservoir capacities are fixed.
Although restrictive, the assumption of a single decision-maker intemalises the derivation and communication of
supply and demand probabilities. This results in a higher level of economic efficiency and sets a standard against
which to judge decentralised models.
The systematic relaxation of the above-mentioned assumptions serves as the basic motivation for the development
of the concepts of volume-sharing of reservoir water and, later on, capacity-sharing of water reservoirs.
3.3 Volume-sharing of reservoir water
The concept of volume-sharing was the first attempt to examine alternative methods for allocating reservoir water
within a catchment area when reservoir managers and farm managers are separate decision-makers (when the main
assumption of the single decision-maker model is relaxed). A major problem in relaxing the assumption of a single
decision-maker is communicating of stochastic nature of supply and demand between reservoir and farm managers.
It is important to note that water supply under the concept of volume-sharing is redefined to the quantity of reservoir
water released for irrigation, which is a function of random inflows and release strategies. (Note that price is still not
included in the definition.) Demand55 remains the quantity of irrigation water required to maintain a given minimum
soil water level over given areas of specific irrigated crops. The probabilities of supply to irrigators depend in part on
the degree to which reservoir management considers stochastic demand. According to Dudley (1988b:641),
reservoir managers can consider user demand when formulating reservoir release rules and associated supply
probabilities of a reservoir in three ways:
• User demand may be taken into account by assuming deterministic demand, a target to be met in each
inter-seasonal interval. Depending on targets set and the penalties for failure to meet them, reservoir-
55 Demand is a function of the (1) random difference between evaporation and rainfall, plus the transfer and application efficiency
losses, (2) soil water deficit at which irrigations take place and (3) areas of specific crops irrigated (Dudley, 1988b:641).
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optimising models could be used and probability distributions of supply derived. This approach has the
advantage of determining the probability clearly and simply, but has the disadvantage that if these
probabilities are to be maintained in practice when demand is random, releases would have to be made
even when not required (releases would actually be made irrespective of demand!).
• The reservoir management could apply irrigation water use data from a soil water-growth model (the
"Narribri"-model, mentioned in section 3.2) as the basis of stochastic demand and derive reservoir release
strategies that would minimise the squared differences between quantities supplied and demanded'".
Another option is to take historical records and take some measure of the evaporation less effective rainfall
per hectare, multiplied by the size of the irrigable area to obtain the total water demand, and calculate the
probabilities of supplies matching demands when following specific release strategies. This approach has
the advantage of providing users with clear information on the relationships between uncertain supplies and
uncertain demands as long as these releases are actually made. Because actual farm management
behaviour is not considered when determining reservoir releases, actual user demand may sometimes be
less than releases made to satisfy potential evaporation minus rainfall over the whole irrigable area. Within
this setting, three problems need to be addressed. Firstly, there is the problem of developing a decision
model to determine reservoir release rules/strategies for the reservoir management. Secondly, there is the
problem of developing a means of communicating the probabilistic nature of reservoir releases to users.
Thirdly, there is the problem of modelling the water-using behaviour of users in response to the probability of
releases. This should help users to make better use of the probabilities of releases, and provide a way of
choosing between reservoir management and system design alternatives, as well as providing information
necessary for public evaluation of the total project.
• The reservoir management may also consider actual user behaviour. Under actual system operation, both
supply and demand probabilities would interact and evolve over time as the supplier reacts to perceived
demand stochasticity and the demanders react to perceived supply stochasticity. At any point in time, each
probability would be conditional on the other. Therefore, any form of modelling would only be approximate.
Accurate modelling would be limited to real-time processes that would be of little use for planning purposes.
The volume-sharing model also consists of three sub-models. The first is a simulation sub-model deriving data for
the second (a stochastic dynamic programming sub-model), which in turn provides data to a third model (a second
simulation sub-model). Both of these simulation sub-models use data from the "Narribri" soil water plant-growth
model mentioned in section 3.2. The purpose of the first simulation sub-model is to derive state variable transitions
and expected values of squared deficits for each state and decision variable combination in each stage. The
stochastic dynamic programming sub-model chooses the maximum releases, which will minimise the expected
56 The statistical theory behind this method is grounded in the method of ordinary least squares as mentioned in Gujarati
(1992:129-138).
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square of deficits (for example demand release squared) for each state and stage combination. To do this, it
requires the first simulation sub-model. The second simulation sub-model, provides a sequence of reservoir releases
for each of the four decision-making stages per year57for the 84 years (therefore 336 values) of data available. This
sub-model uses extemally determined quantities to release in each decision interval as a function of reservoir
capacity. Dudley (1988b:643) used two types of release rules:
• Release enough to satisfy demand if reservoir content is sufficient.
• Releases must not exceed the quantity specified as the optimal release by the stochastic dynamic
programming sub-model.
Thus, the stochastic dynamic programming sub-model releases are considered as maximum releases. Releases
actually made by the second simulation sub-model will be less than maximum release if demand during the specific
decision interval is less than the maximum release.
Dudley (1988b:641) used an optimising model to develop release rules for reservoir management when all users
share equally in releases, and computer simulation is used to generate an historical time sequence to announce
releases. These announced releases became a state variable in a farm management model that optimises farm
area-to-irrigate decisions over time. Such modelling uses climatic data to gauge water demand and the transfer of
water supply data from reservoir managers to irrigation farmers.
The results of the volume-sharing model showed a lower mean aggregate farm income and lower variance of
aggregate farm income than the single decision-making reservoir management model. This short-term efficiency
loss coupled with likely long-term economic efficiency losses due to the attenuated nature of property rights,
indicates the need for quite different ways of integrating reservoir and farm management decisions (Dudley,
1988b:641).
It appears impossible to equate the single decision-maker model (in terms of efficiency) with centrally controlled
reservoir and farm management strategies. Therefore, a quite different property-right structure incorporating
decentralised management and preserving economic efficiency (if a user is risk neutral), or allowing each user to
choose his own level of income variability independently of others (if risk aversion is present) will be discussed in the
next section.
57 Dudley assumed that there are four irrigation decision-making stages within the growth season. The first is just before
sowing/planting, the second is 60 days after sowing, the third is 90 days and the fourth is 120 days after sowing/planting (Dudley,
1988a:634).
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3,4 The theoretical concept of capacity-sharinq
The most common approach to the management of publicly owned resources for irrigation purposes is to allocate
either the current reservoir contents or potential reservoir volume of regulated flow. Capacity-sharing is different in
the sense that it is an integrated, demand-oriented water management strategy that focuses on the interaction
and communication between water users and managers of water reservoirs or storage capacities (Dudley and
Musgrave, 1988:649). Major questions to be answered include (1) how reservoir releases should be managed
through time, (this question includes aspects like the way weather dependent fluctuations in irrigation water demand
should be incorporated into release strategies), (2) how best the probabilities of such releases can be summarised
and communicated to users and (3) how users could be assisted to make the best use of such information.
The basic procedure, (as with sections 3.1 and 3.2) develops computer models of a simplified river irrigation system
and uses these models to answer the above-mentioned questions. This simplified system makes use of inflow,
evaporation and capacity characteristics of the specified storage capacity and climatic data of the cultivation area, for
the modelling. Tributary flows downstream of the storage capacity are assumed not to contribute to water supplies
and the growing area of the water storage and distribution system is of such a nature that it does not limit the user's
ability to apply water when desired. The only limitation to water supply is the quantity available for release from the
storage capacity. Only one irrigated crop is used in the initial modelling, but later multiple crops are used.
The concept of capacity-sharing divides the single large reservoir into many "compartments" or "sub-reservoirs", each
controlled by a single decision-maker who controls releases from the sub-reservoir and makes farm management
decisions. The management of the whole reservoir is reduced to the monitoring of the individual releases by water-
using decision-makers. Thus, the model is essentially an aggregation of the many small, single decision-maker
models that are scaled-down versions of section 3.2.
Each user is allocated a percentage share of the reservoir's total capacity and a percentage of the net reservoir
inflows (in the form of water use rights)58. These percentage shares would not need to be equal across users, nor
would the percentage shares of inflow and capacity allocated to a specific user necessarily be equal. It is therefore
possible for a specific user to have a 2% capacity share, but a 1 % inflow share, where another user could have a
1% capacity share, but a 2 % inflow share (Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:650). (For the sake of simplicity, it will be
assumed that each user's capacity share is equal to his inflow share and that these are equal to all the other users
shares).
Dudley and Musgrave (1988:650) illustrate the fundamentals of capacity-sharing as follows:
58 Net inflow is defined as the inflow within a specific time-period minus the evaporation and seepage losses (Dudley and
Musgrave, 1988:650). Note that the water use right (that was bought) on inflow shares reserves only the right to buy these
shares, the shareholder must still pay for the volume of water he wishes to buy.
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"To illustrate the fundamentals of reservoir capacity-sharing as envisaged in the paper, first assume that the
single reservoir in question is cube shaped. Imagine that vertical water tight partitions are inserted in this
cube, two parallel to the east-west sides and two parallel to the north-south sides, dividing the cube into nine
equal-size cells. Thus the plan or birds-eye view of the reservoir would show nine equal-sized squares.
Each of the users would be allocated exclusive use of the cell, able to withdraw water from it over time as
wished, and each receiving an equal share (one ninth) of net inflows to the reservoir unless the relevant cell
was too full to take the net inflow share. In the latter case the inflow in excess of that required to fill the cell
would be lost to that use," (Note that there will be periodically adjustment of spilled inflows where the user
will regain some of the lost inflow.)
"Refer to the contents of each user's cell as that user's inventory. It would be necessary to monitor each
user's inventory through time in a real-world application of capacity-sharing because the imaginary partitions
introduced above would not exist. Thus, the operations of the reservoir could be likened to those of a
money bank where each depositors' money is not kept in a separate physical location to monitor accurately
the amount, which that depositor has in the bank. Instead, the homogeneous money is intermixed and the
monitoring performed by keeping tally of each depositors' withdrawals, deposits, interest charges, eet.
Similarly, each users' inventory within the reservoir would be monitored by tallying withdrawals and net
inflows. »
It is useful to continue this analogy by noting that the reservoir capacity shareholder is like a bank depositor who
cannot incur a negative balance, cannot accumulate deposits in excess of a maximum (which is a percentage of the
maximum sum of deposits which the bank can hold) and cannot control the amount or timing of deposits. Instead,
deposits (inflows) are made according to a stochastic process with a probability distribution, which is known to the
capacity shareholder. However, beyond these stochastic deposits (inflows), which are made independently of the
actions of other shareholders, there may be extra deposits made periodically to a depositor's (shareholder's) account
(capacity share) because of the heterogeneous behaviour of all shareholders (periodic adjustments of spill over
effects and trading). To illustrate this, let us use the cube example again. Identical withdrawals (and therefore
identical management behaviour) by each of the capacity shareholders from their "accounts" would under the
assumption of equal sharing of net inflows, result in all capacity shares (or inventories) being equal as they fluctuate
over time. Such identical behaviour would eliminate the need for the periodic adjustments, since all would fill
simultaneously. As one cell of the "cube" is filled, it would spill into the "neighbouring" cell and so on. However,
these spill-over flows from one cell to another do not realise in reality (because they are not measurable, attitudes
towards risk differ and therefore release patterns will differ) and are accumulated in a separate capacity share. This
capacity share is allocated among capacity shareholders at the beginning of the next season - this allocation is the
"periodic adjustment" mentioned earlier. The magnitude of the above-mentioned periodic adjustment depends on
evaporation losses through the season. The assumption of a cube-shaped reservoir meant that the surface area of
each capacity shareholder's share (cell) was independent of the volume (inventory or current level) of the capacity
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share. The assumption also implied that the sum of the "cells" equals the total surface area of the reservoir (cube).
Since surface area and depth are important factors determining evaporation losses, the assumption implied that each
shareholder's inventory level (or volume of the capacity share) could be ignored in calculating total reservoir
evaporation losses. (This also implies that the evaporation component of each user is identical.) However, in reality,
reservoirs are not cube-shaped, which implies that the tempo of evaporation losses changes as the volume of the
reservoir changes. This means that the total reservoir evaporation is dependent on the withdrawal behaviour of all
the shareholders. This raises questions on how best these evaporation losses could be divided between
shareholders. Should they be divided equally or should those whose capacity shares contribute to more than a
proportional share of evaporation loss be debited accordingly?
Given that capacity-sharing has the accumulation of these surpluses as a by-product, the management of these
surpluses would be the main concern of the reservoir managers. Within the model of Dudley and Musgrave
(1988:652), two ways are tested, but only at one time period (beginning of the season). The first way (also known as
"efficiency sharing") allocates surpluses first to the risk preference users (the users who are prepared to take some
risk) until their inventories are full and lastly to the risk averse (those who will avoid risk) users. The second way
(also known as "equity sharing") allocates the surplus equally across all users until some inventories become full,
then equally to the remainder etc., until exhausted. (Note that such allocations, or periodical adjustments, are not
taken into account by decision-makers when formulating decision strategies.) A major concern is to gauge the net
social benefits from the two allocation methods. (The surplus is allocated free of charge within the model, but in
reality it could be auctioned under efficiency sharing or sold at a flat rate under equity sharing.)
It is likely at this stage that the reader will not have a clear picture of the different types of "sharing". Therefore, it
seems appropriate to distinguish between the terms. Let contents-sharing be the allocation among users of the
current actual contents of a reservoir at a given point in time and let volume-sharing refer to the allocation of water
which will become available from the reservoir over time. If the reservoir could be assumed to be full at the beginning
of each irrigation season with no further inflows during the season, there would be no point in distinguishing between
contents and volume-sharing, because the contents at the beginning of the season would equal the total volume
available for the whole season (which would be the relevant future, since the reservoir fills completely at the
beginning of the next season and a user with a capacity share would allocated his total share for that season).
However, if significant inflows during the irrigation season are the norm (stochastic water supply), the total volume
available for that irrigation season could exceed the total storage capacity of the reservoir if all the water received
through the irrigation season were to be stored at one moment in time. (Note that building a bigger reservoir is not
an option since that would be a supply-oriented water management strategy and this study is concerned only with
demand-oriented water management strategies.)
For illustrating the difference between volume- and capacity-sharing, given a stochastic water supply, assume that
the term "volume" refers to the current reservoir contents plus the net inflow received through the season. The
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volume through the whole season is therefore dependent on demand early in the season. If releases are made
early, reservoir space will become available to store the later flows. A capacity shareholder would be able to use the
reservoir volume at the beginning of the season as well as the probabilities of stream flow and evaporation, to
determine the probabilities of various quantities of water being available through the season, depending on his own
water use pattern. (The user with a volume share would need the demand patterns of all the other users through the
season in order to be able to determine the same information, namely probabilities on water availability for various
use patterns for the user). Therefore, a user under a capacity share system has a greater sense of security via a
more clearly defined right (the estimation of supply probabilities in response to different use patterns would be the
responsibility of the individual user) and would require less information (reducing transaction costs) for decision-
making. Secured capacity shares provide a better basis for the transfer of water between users than the probabilities
of water becoming available conditional to early season use patterns as in the case of volume-sharing (Dudley and
Musgrave, 1988:651). Users with capacity shares would therefore be able to predict their future supplies more
accurately and therefore be able to determine with greater certainty the quantities of water they wished to buy or sell.
This last point makes capacity-sharing an ideal point of departure for the introduction of water markets in the given
catchment.
If there is no guarantee that the reservoir will be full at the start of the irrigation season (in other words assuming a
stochastic supply), a user with a more secure title to a capacity share might behave risk-aversely by developing only
a small area of land for irrigation purposes (one that can be irrigated across years with a high degree of reliability).
Alternatively, a user might develop a large area, knowing that irrigated production from it will fluctuate from year to
year. In this case, it seems that the greater degree of security of tenure offered by the capacity share, which includes
the net inflow, would allow for more effective long-term investment decisions and short-term water transfers in
comparison with volume-sharing.
What makes capacity-sharing appealing (according to Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:651) is because it allows the
probability of water supply for a user to be defined to a large extent independent of intra- and inter-seasonal
carryover policies of reservoir management as well as being independent of the quantities and timing of the usage
demands of other users through time. Therefore, each user can, to a greater extent, achieve his desired reliability of
water supply, independent from others. This also means that the adverse effects from other users and water supply
authorities are minimised. This greater control over storage capacity in the long run should allow a user to consider
the full opportunity cost of stored water in his capacity share. If market transfers of such capacity shares were
possible or be allowed, the efficiency of water usage should further increase.
In summary then (Dudley, 1990a:401):
• Capacity-sharing would make water within a reservoir a private property rather than a common property
resource. Therefore, users would have incentives to conserve water when it becomes relatively more
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scarce (the opportunity cost of water is considered). Note that common property regimes may be
accommodated by making it a separate user who participates in the market with other users, but the share
that was bought will be managed as common property (Dudley, 1992:776 and Backeberg, 2002).
• Capacity-sharing would have the consumption-reducing advantages of highly fluctuating water prices,
without producing a destabilising effect on the user's finances.
• Capacity-sharing would stabilise the net revenue of supply authorities. The "user pays" principle would
apply to water collection and distribution rather than water use as such.
• Capacity-sharing allows a high degree of separation between the allocative and revenue-raising roles of
water pricing.
• Capacity-sharing virtually eliminates the problem of uncertainty regarding supply probabilities and water
costs over time.
• The sound non-attenuated (that is, explicit, enforceable, exclusive and transferable) property rights nature of
capacity-sharing provides an ideal basis for the development of water markets as such and for reservoir
capacity and inflow shares.
• Existing water users and owners of capacity shares will not experience water supply and reliability
reductions without compensation via the market.
• A market for capacity shares (separated from inflow shares) would provide a measure of the value of
marginal units of current reservoir capacity, which could be used to indicate the best time to expand
reservoir capacity.
Capacity-sharing is therefore designed to integrate and coordinate supply and demand management decisions,
which is in line with the arguments of integrated and decentralised water resource management mentioned in the
NationalWater Act of 1998.
3.5 The modelling of capaclty-sharinq
The implementation of capacity-sharing could be modelled with the aid of a computer simulation model, using only
one irrigated crop (this could be developed into a multi-crop simulation).
In section 3.2 a single decision-maker approach towards reservoir manacement= was briefly discussed. This model
could be used to derive estimates of the annual net revenue obtainable from different sized irrigation areas, given a
particular reservoir and a non-limiting distribution system. Where section 3.2 was applicable for a whole reservoir,
59 The single decision-maker approach towards reservoir management showed average annual net revenue and the standard
deviation of the annual average net revenue as a function of area developed for irrigation when the cost of expanding the area is
$1DO/hectare (refer to figure 3.1), ( Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:651). Figure 3.1 shows average annual net revenue increasing
at a decreasing rate for larger areas while the standard deviation curve is slightly sigmoidal. For higher costs of expanding the
irrigable area, the decreasing rate of increase in average annual net revenue is more pronounced, with a maximum value
becoming evident and occurring at smaller and smaller areas developed as expansion costs are increased.
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this same argument could be applied to the capacity-sharing model (and therefore to the individual decision-maker)
by changing the scales of the answers obtained in section 3.2. For example, if a user has a 1% share in both
reservoir capacity and net inflows, the answer obtained in section 3.2 and by Dudley (1988a) divided by 100 would
be applicable to that specific user. Therefore, it is possible for a user to apply the model in section 3.2 to select the
combination of mean annual net revenue and its standard deviation and consequently the area to develop for
irrigation which best suits that user's risk preference (Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:652). In other words, the long-
term investment decision problem faced by a single capacity shareholder would be a scaled-down version of the
land-development-investment problem facing the single decision-maker of section 3.2.
35
Standard deviation of
annual net revenue
Average annual
net revenue
$m
30
25
20
5
o
o 80 160 240 320 400 480
Irrigable area (hectares)
Source: Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:651)
Firgure 3.1: Average and standard deviation of annual net revenue.
A potential participant in a capacity-sharing system is envisaged to have access to such a scaled-down single
decision-making model with which computer experimentation could be conducted. The results of such
experimentation would help the user decide whether or not to become a share user in the system at all, how large an
area to develop and what short-term inventory release and farm management strategies to follow.
The model (Dudley and Musgrave, 1988) requires a historical sequence of reservoir inflow and cultivation area
climatic data. Note that no assumptions would be required about the reservoir management's release policy,
because there would be none. Each capacity shareholder will formulate his own release strategy in conjunction with
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farm management strategies used. Decision-makers could make their own decisions without being concemed that
the water demands of others would influence their own water supply probabilities.
The results from the single decision-maker approach could be made applicable to the capacity-sharing model if two
conditions are met ( Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:652):
• All users must make identical releases (but not necessarily at the same time). If they did so, all inventories
would move together (all would fill and spill together). This means that the sum of the spills would equal the
actual reservoir spill. To the extent that users employ different release strategies, individual inventories
would fill and spill at different times, causing the aggregate to be greater than the actual reservoir spill. This
would result in the accumulation of a surplus in the actual reservoir that would need to be allocated across
users periodically on some basis.
• The second condition is that reservoir evaporation and seepage loss must be a linear function of reservoir
contents. If this were true, the sum of individual inventory losses would equal the actual reservoir loss. To
the extent that this is not true, a discrepancy will arise, resulting in either a surplus or deficit allocation to
shareholders.
From the above-mentioned a computer model could be developed to simulate the behaviour of all the capacity
shareholders so that the importance of the difference between the sum of shareholder capacity shares and actual
reservoir volume can be gauged. This type of model could also be used for aggregating the effects of each decision-
maker's behaviour on the overall social, economic and environmental outcome. (This is important in following a true
integrated water management approach.) The following is a model that makes use of crop-water-requirement data
and was developed by Dudley and Musgrave (1988:561) for a single crop (cotton). This could also be done for
multiple crops60.
One of the major characteristics of capacity-sharing is the freedom it gives to shareholders for managing their share.
Therefore, it would be impossible to forecast the exact behaviour of shareholders when running the model. Thus, to
operate a model that simulates the decisions and outcomes of each shareholder and the effects of this behaviour on
broader issues, we need assumptions about the nature of their short- and long-term behaviour. To simplify the
presentation of the results of such a model, the shares have been assumed to fall into four classes, each with equal
numbers. The assumed differences between the long-term objectives of those in each class can be shown with
reference to figure 3.1. Assume that there are 100 users, 25 in each class. The users in the first class are assumed
to be risk averse (operating in the first increment on the horizontal axis in figure 3.1) and would therefore develop
only 80 hectare per user (or 2000 hectare for the class) for irrigation purposes. The second class is assumed to be
60 This model fits perfectly into the Water Management Plan that has to be performed by each Water User Association, as
proposed by DWAF (2000). See chapter 4 for a further application of capacity-sharing within the current South African context.
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slightly less risk averse and would develop 160 hectares per user (or 4000 for the class). The third class is assumed
to develop 240 hectare per user or 6000 for the class and the last class's users will develop 320 hectares per user or
8000 hectares for class four. The short-term decision strategies for each user class are taken from the results of the
stochastic dynamic programming model of section 3.3. It is assumed further that the users operate in the short-term
in such a way as to maximise expected net benefits. (In a real world situation, it is possible to have other short-term
objectives.)
Dudley's model (1988:653) simulates the operation of each individual user for eighty-four years of stream flow and
climatic data. The output of the capacity-sharing computer simulation model will not be displayed in full, but only in
part to explain the functioning of the model. The sample which was chosen and which satisfies these criteria fell on
years 56, 57 and 58 (See table 3.1 for details and Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:653).
The detailed results are shown in table 3.1: the first column shows the user class (recall that each class consists of
25 decision-makers or users where a type one user is the most risk averse and a class four user the least risk
averse). The second column indicates the stage of the year (the year consists of four decision-making time intervals
namely the pre-sow stage in the spring, 60 days after sowing, 90 days after sowing and 120 days after sowing). The
third column shows the year number (recall that Dudley's model runs over a time span of 84 years but only the data
of years 56, 57 and 58 are displayed). The fourth column shows the sum of the 25 inventories of that class (that is
the water in 25% of the reservoir, given that the reservoir holds 425 GL and therefore 106.25 GL per class when the
inventory is full). Thus, the table shows that all the classes had full inventories at the beginning of year 56. To
simplify the discussion of table 3.1, each 25% of the reservoir capacity will be referred to as an inventory, whereas it
is composed of 25 separate but similarly managed inventories. For the purpose of discussion of table 3.1, assume
that these are four big users, rather than four classes each composed of 25 identical users. The fifth column shows
the net inflows (stream flow less reservoir surface evaporation loss) into each inventory. (Note that the stream flow
for the first stage is large, being more that 150% of reservoir capacity.) The sixth column shows the millimetres of
irrigation water required to maintain a 50% soil-water deficit at that particular point in tlrne". The seventh column
shows the translation of this requirement (column six) into the quantity of water that has to be released from the
reservoir to satisfy the need of a specified irrigated area, which is shown in the tenth column. The eighth column
shows the contributions of this stage to the overall annual gross margins of each user. It is composed of planting
costs plus the gross margin from a dry land crop on the remainder of the 8000 hectares. For example, user one is
assumed to plant 2000 hectare of irrigated crops (cotton) at a cost of $402.50/ha and 6000 hectare of dry land crop
which gives a gross margin of $125.00/ha, making an aggregate negative value of $55 x 103 ($750 000-$805 000 =
$55 000). Other users have larger negative values because of their larger plantings of irrigated crops. The ninth
column shows the accumulated gross margin across stages per year. The twelfth column shows the yield per
hectare after refraining from applying any further irrigation. Such refraining will be referred to as "abandonment" in
61 DWAF, (2000) contains a detailed equation to estimate the irrigation water requirements of a Water User Association as a
whole.
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the following time interval. Thus, table 3.1 shows that abandonment at the start of the season, or in other words,
applying no water at all, would result in a yield so low as to be unprofitable for harvest that year. The season was so
severe that abandoning it at the start of stage two (applying no water after the pre-planting irrigation) would also
result in a yield not worth harvesting, whereas abandonment at the start of stage three (Le. 90 days) would give a
yield of 254 kg/ha. Abandonment at the start of the last stage would yield 466 kg/ha, whereas irrigation throughout
the whole season would result in a yield of 1007 kg/ha (shown in eleventh column).
Table 3.1: Detail results of the capacity-sharing model for years 56. 57 and 58.
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Table 3.1 shows a large net inflow at stage one resulting in a full inventory at the start of stage two, therefore
implying positive reservoir spills. In stage two net inflows are again sufficient to fill inventories 1 and 2 after their
releases, but not inventories 3 and 4, as shown by the inventories at the start of stage three. At the start of stage
four only the most risk averse user (class one) had a full inventory.
Columns 13 through 18 summarise the results across classes for each stage. Column 13 shows the sum of releases
from all inventories for the stage and column 14, the resulting sum of the inventories. Column 15 shows the surplus
of actual reservoir contents over the sum of the inventories at the end of the stage. (At the end of stage 1, it is zero
because all inventories have filled and spilled. Note that this is in spite of the evaporation of the actual reservoir in
column 17 being less than the sum of the evaporations from the individual inventories in column 18 (the high stream
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flow eliminated the difference.) The accumulation of gross margins across classes and stages within a year is shown
in column 16. Note that a surplus of actual reservoir contents over the sum of inventories of 15.3 GL occurs in stage
2. This is made up of the excess of the sum of inventory evaporation (12.00) over the actual reservoir evaporation
(8.03) of 3.97 plus the sum of the inventory spills exceeding actual reservoir spills. For example, the class 1 user
began stage 2 with a full inventory (106.25 GL), received a net inflow of 16.67 GL but released only 7.33 GL,
resulting in a contribution to the surplus of 9.34 GL. Similarly the class 2 contribution to the surplus is 16.67 - 14.67
= 2.00 GL. The remaining users had no spills, since their releases exceeded their net inflows. Thus, the total
surplus equalled 3.97+ 9.34 + 2.00 = 15.31 GL.
The accumulated surplus of 20.65 GL at the end of stage 3 is obtained from adding the evaporation surplus (10.51 -
7.25 = 3.26) plus the class surplus (6.22 - 4.13 = 2.09) to the stage 2 surpluses, but this accumulated surplus is
wiped out by the large stream flow in stage 4, which resulted in inventories having filled and spilled by the start of the
following irrigation season.
Note that because of the full inventories at the beginning of year 56 and the high inflows during the season, all users
had sufficient water to avoid abandoning any irrigated crop during the season. Year 57 is characterised by low
inflows in stage 1 and negative inflows in stage 2 and 3 because of reservoir evaporation exceeding stream flows.
Therefore, there are no inventory or reservoir spills in stages 1, 2 and 3. Surplus of inventory evaporation over
reservoir evaporation is the only contributor to the surplus of reservoir contents over the sum of inventories. Note
that reservoir evaporation being higher for large inventories causes net inflows to be lower for large inventories.
The combination of low inflows and high crop water demand during the first three stages resulted in relatively large
releases until supplies became low. Then class 4 halved the area to keep irrigated at the start of stage 3 and almost
halved it again at the start of stage 4. User three also abandoned some at the start of stage 4, but stage four proved
to be extremely wet, both in the reservoir catchment (high inflows) and in the growing area (zero crop water demand)
which meant equal yields on both areas abandoned and areas not abandoned at the start of stage 4. From the
accumulated gross margins, it is evident that users 1 to 3 did better than in the previous year but user four did much
worse. With hindsight, abandoning some area at the start of stage 3 proved wrong that year. Note that the
accumulated surplus of 11.47 GL was wiped out in stage 4, because all inventories and the actual reservoir filled and
spilled.
Year 58 had high inflows in stage 1, low in stage 2 and 3 and reasonably high in stage 4. These, coupled with high
beginning season inventories, resulted in no abandonment in the season. The most interesting new point in year 58
is the large surplus at the end of the year to be allocated to the users at the start of year 59. The surplus grew
rapidly in stage 4 because two inventories filled and spilled. Allocating the surplus equally across users whose
inventories are less than full, resulted in the class 4 inventory only being a little less than full at the beginning of year
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59. On the other hand, allocating the surplus first to the least risk averse users, resulted in class 3 having a slightly
under-full inventory at the start of year 59.
Considering the allocation strategies of efficiency- and equity sharing, the model of Dudley and Musgrave (1988:658)
showed that users in class 3 received a higher mean and lower standard deviation of gross margins under equity
than under efficiency sharing. For users in class 4 the mean was higher and the standard deviation lower under
efficiency sharing. The total gross margin across all users is somewhat higher under the efficiency sharing method
(Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:658). The model also showed that the average annual surplus to be distributed among
users is relatively small (about 3.5% of reservoir capacity) and average start-of-the-year contents 4.5%.
It should be clear to the reader, that this capacity-sharing model is a practical example, displaying "water accounting"
and the analogy of water banking with ordinary commercial banking.
The above-mentioned model was based on one irrigated crop (cotton) only and the question could be asked what
would happen when multiple crops are considered. There would be a greater hectare spread with some users with
high-valued perennial crops (using fewer hectares than the risk averse cotton grower) and other users with crops on
which small quantities of supplementary irrigation could result in large increases in yield in some years (such as
wheat and maize) using more hectares than the least risk averse (class 4) users.
Modifying the model to cover multiple crops would not be too difficult if the necessary data were available. This,
however, would imply substantial computer work for stochastic conditions and multiple crops. (Refer to the research
recommendations at the end of chapter 5.)
3.6 Potential feasibility of cepaclty-sharlnq under multiple purposes
Criticism on the above-mentioned section could emphasise the fact that only agricultural uses were accommodated.
The following section deals with possible alternative applications of capacity-sharing. Therefore, the following are
possible applications of capacity-sharing other than for irrigation purposes:
• Urban use - the urban authority would obtain capacity shares by means of the market and make releases to
urban users over time as desired (this form of capacity-sharing is also known as "urban capacity-sharing"
and is discussed in more detail in Dudley, 1990a). The quantity of shares obtained relative to the quantity of
urban demand would depend on such factors as the method of rationing water to consumers in times of
shortage, the urban user's perception of the price of water in times of shortage and the political acceptability
of fluctuating prices and/or quantities of water available to consumers (Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:657).
The situation could range from urban use having a relatively large number of shares and selling water to
other users when the urban inventories are high and buying water when inventories are low. Expansion of
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urban demand over time could be satisfied by buying shares from other users or by expanding the reservoir
capacity (supply-oriented approach).
• Environmental use - the authority responsible for the management of the ecological functioning of the
catchment would also obtain shares by auction and similar factors to those operating in the urban case
would determine the quantity of shares desired relative to the perceived in-stream demand. If share
allocation is obtained by auction with the purchase funds coming from beneficiaries, then needed shares for
ecological functioning are likely to be undersupplied because of the "free-rider problem" among beneficiaries
due to the impracticability of charging each beneficiary their marginal willingness to pay for ecological
related benefits received. The question could be ask whether it is fundamentally fair for the environment to
have to compete on equal terms in the market for the required share, or could a certain capacity be
specified for environmental use? (Refer to chapter 5 for more detail.)
• Flood control- reservoirs used for flood control seem to be in conflict with the above-mentioned uses since
reservoirs are required to be less than full during the flood-prone season. A common compromise is to
specify some space (like the above-mentioned environmental case) therefore usable capacity for irrigation is
less than the total capacity of the reservoir. Under capacity-sharing there may be no need to distinguish
flood control from water supply use since the flood control authority could obtain shares just like other users
and then sell water to downstream users at the best time to balance water price and value of flood control
reservoir space. However, this flood control capacity share needs to be specified because of the potential
uncertainty of supply it could cause to other users.
3.7 Capacity expansionundercapaclty-sharlnq
Suppose another reservoir or dam is proposed (like the proposed "Skuifraam dam" in the Berg River) upstream from
the current reservoir. Since its operation would modify the existing reservoir's inflow probabilities, the problem
becomes one of doing this in a manner acceptable to the existing downstream users. One way of overcoming this
problem is to let the agency that is responsible for the construction of the upstream reservoir purchase the "upper
tails" of the reservoir inflow distributions from the current users. That means that a current user sells his inflow rights
above some level per time interval (say per month). As the "length of tail" being transacted increased, so would its
value to both the seller and buyer. Unlikely high flows are less valuable per unit of water than more likely lesser
flows.
The reservoir development agency would in tum sell shares in the capacity of, and net inflows into, the new reservoir.
The difference between the social opportunity cost of "tails" purchased from the users of the existing reservoir and
social benefits from sales of shares in the new reservoir would need to cover all social costs associated with the
construction and operation of the new reservoir if the development is to be pareto optimal.
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3.8 Commentson assumptions of the model
It was assumed that downstream tributary flows do not contribute to the supply of the reservoir system. However, in
reality all sorts of tributaries are present and these could be accommodated as independent capacity-sharing
structures when suitable.
Dudley and Musgrave (1988:658) assumed that no adaptation to new irrigation systems would be required. Rather,
potential share users decide on their level of investment initially and do not change their plans over time. It is more
likely that a user will start off rather conservatively and build up confidence and financial resources before developing
larger areas for irrigation in relation to their reservoir capacity share. Detailed modelling of alternatives to capacity-
sharing may be necessary here, but it seems that capacity-sharing at least gives users the flexibility to adapt over
time. The uncertainty regarding the rate of adaptation makes the public evaluation of a water resource difficult.
Capacity-sharing results in an increase in the value of capacity shares through time as the value of information
gained through experience is capitalised into share prices. This would have an effect on income distributional effects
of water resource development (Dudley and Musgrave, 1988:658).
Another assumption so far, is that water distribution capacity is non-limiting. (It is therefore theoretically possible for
all users to withdraw their shares at the same moment in time.) In systems where users must share limiting
distribution facilities (in terms of timing) the release patterns must be adjusted accordingly, resulting in a potential
loss of flexibility and could possibly cause a loss of the attractiveness of the concept relative to other allocation
methods.
Another assumption is that the reservoir management is responsible for only the monitoring of the individual
inventories through time and periodically allocates the surpluses across users according to a predetermined system
(efficiency- or equity sharing). It is true that some conservative users normally carry large stocks surplus to their
needs for long periods. (As illustrated earlier and these stocks are wiped out occasionally when the reservoir fills and
spills.) Reservoir management may begin a system of "advancing" some of this stocked water62 to other uses in the
belief that not all inventory holders will demand their water before the next spill. The feasibility of this idea of water
banking (akin to that of normal commercial banks) seems worthy of further research (refer to section 5.2.).
Some concern may be present regarding to what extent private irrigation management decisions influence or
determine reservoir management decision-making. If it is heavily depended, there is considerable scope for
opportunistic decision-making behaviour by private decision-makers and therefore a problem of moral hazard I
62 It is important to remember that apart from the fact that this water is "stocked" for future use for the particular user, the stocked
water also has a variety of positive externalities which must be considered when the possibility of water banking is investigated.
(Some of the most important positive externalities include the sustaining of aquatic ecosystems within the reservoir as well as
downstream.)
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adverse selection63 presents itself. Therefore, the question arises what safety features do capacity-sharing present
to confine possible opportunistic decision-making practices. An example of such opportunistic behaviour in capacity-
sharing is the practice of buying (or renting) all additional unused storage capacity a private decision-maker could
find. The rationale behind this behaviour is seated in the rule that any inflows exceeding the unfilled space of a
shareholder's capacity share will be lost to that user and being shared among others whose share is not yet full. The
opportunistic private decision-maker with ample unused storage capacity will therefore receive a windfall gain each
time another user (who is likely to be considerable more risk averse) caused an internal spill. (The more unused
storage capacity the decision-maker owns, the more windfall gains will be received). In this way, the opportunistic
decision-maker could minimise his inflow shares and therefore save considerably on buying irrigation water (cost
saving would therefore prove to be the underlined motive for this type of opportunistic behaviour). However, such
opportunistic behaviour of gaining on internal spills, are unlikely to occur in practice since the individual shareholder
would sell some inflow shares before the loss of an internal spill could realise. In the case of spilling of the whole
reservoir, no trading would be necessary since all capacity shares are filled and spilled. The water "lost" in such an
event will be of little value to anyone within the reservoir, because it cannot be stored and therefore the opportunity
cost not preserved.
Another argument against the above-mentioned problem of opportunistic private decision-making could be based on
the natural supply-characteristics of the area in which the reservoir is located. Recall that capacity-sharing is
especially suitable for areas with stochastic water supply characteristics. A great degree of uncertainty regarding the
inflow probabilities are associated with this type of supply and therefore creates an incentive to keep an adequate
stock of water at all times. This will certainly not enhance opportunistic decision-making, but it will also not restrict
such behaviour.
A last argument against the problem of opportunistic private decision-making focuses on the management hierarchy
of the capacity-sharing system. Recall that the reservoir management do not deal directly with small private
decision-makers, but with "bulk64" capacity shareholders unless the private decision-maker is of a similar size as the
"bulk" shareholder. Opportunistic decision-making is based on incentives for private gain in order to enhance
efficiency (cost saving or greater profits). Recall that the "bulk" capacity shareholders do not have the same high
level of incentives for enhancing efficiency (and therefore opportunistic decision-making) and since the private
decision-maker deals more with the "bulk" capacity shareholder, the reservoir management is not exposed to
opportunistic decision-making to the same degree as the "bulk" capacity shareholder (refer to Dudley and Bryant,
1995:8).
63 Adverse selection is defined by Lipsey and Courant, (1996:369) as the tendency of people who are most at risk to buy the
most insurance. This problem is closely related to the problem of moral hazard where one party of a transaction has the ability
and incentive to shift costs on the other party (Lipsey and Courant, 1996:368). Both the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard could arise when privately held information is bought and sold.
64 Scott and Coustalin (1995:968) refer to "trusts" and could be seen as similar to "bulk" capacity shares.
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The capacity-sharing model therefore introduces an innovative type of property right structure for managing water.
Its adoption would lead to a decentralised market-orientated approach towards water management allocation and
use. (This is in line with the National Water Act of 1998.) The model also indicates that capacity-sharing has a
number of attractive features (subject to certain assumptions) for promoting socially efficient water use in a highly
variable environment.
3.9 Responses from irrigators
After its initial introduction in Australia in 1988, a number of changes were made to the model. Dudley and Bryant
(1995) presented a discussion paper at the Cotton Research and Development Corporation and the Cooperative
Research Centre for Sustainable Cotton Production on June 15, 1995. The aim of the paper was to focus on some
key questions relevant to the implementation of the capacity-sharing model. These revisions seem relevant to this
study, because it represents experience (in similar conditions) that could save both time and money in the
implementation process in the South African context.
The following (Dudley and Bryant, 1995) explains the most frequently asked questions related to the concept when it
was introduced for the first time and therefore seems relevant for this study.
"What are the main advantages and disadvantages of capacity-sharing?"
The main advantages include:
• Clearly specified water use rights to percentage shares of stream-flows and reservoir capacity. (Therefore
creating a more transparent water right.)
• The shares can apply to all user groups including irrigators, urban residential, environmental and industrial
uses. (This reflects on the flexibility of the concept.)
• The supply of water into the reservoir is known or determinable from historic stream flow data. It is not
affected by policy and institutional rules and therefore enables the user to make use of modern production
and financial aids provided by consultants.
• Computer simulation programmes are available to aid irrigators to integrate supply and demand decisions.
• Capacity-sharing promotes the decentralisation and integration of supply and demand management for both
the short-term operational decisions and the long-term investment decisions. The integration of demand-
and supply-management by shareholders enables irrigators to determine their reliability requirements and
therefore save on transaction costs.
• Individual users may manage their shares with no interference from other users, unless they violate the
operating rules of the system. They mayor may not choose to interact with other users through
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participation in water markets when it is advantageous to do so. (Physical constrains in the delivering
system may sometimes limit the extent of involvement of other users.)
• Capacity-sharing allows water marketing to convey the current opportunity costs of water, eliminating the
need for centralised pricing. However, the accommodation of opportunity costs will remain a function of
private decision-making.
• Under capacity-sharing, a greater degree of certainty regarding the timing of capacity increases will be
achieved. (The best time to increase the capacity of the reservoir or to build new reservoirs would be when
the aggregate value of bids for the shares for the new storage capacity plus a govemment subsidy equals
the construction costs.) The question could be asked whether this advantage could lead to rent-seeking
behaviou~5. There will always be incentives for rent-seeking behaviour within a democratic and capitalistic
regime and it would be naïve to try to neutralise all incentives for rent-seeking behaviour. In this case, a
more realistic argument could be based on the ability of capacity-sharing to withstand rent-seeking
behaviour. (Note that rent-seeking behaviour within this context will be focused on the increase of water
supply to the private decision-maker.) The concept of capacity-sharing hinders private rent-seeking
behaviour because water management is more transparent under this strategy. All water users have
lobbying power through Water User Associations and because of the water market mechanism and
sometimes contradictive water use patterns, water users will monitor each other. If the state decides to give
way to one particular rent-seeker, other rent seekers could make a strong argument against the viability of
the decision based on measurement-related problems associated with the quantification and balancing
(prioritising) of potential gains for the favourable group against the potential social and environmental costs
of the decision. This implies the quantification of the opportunity cost of water that proves to be a
controversial topic. The argument will end in a moral hazard because of the insufficient measurement of
decision-making criteria and the decision will be made in the interest of the party with the biggest lobbying
power. However, given the firm objectives for sustainable development and an efficient but equitable water
allocation as mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998, it would be difficult to imagine that the state
would be interested in private rent-seeking behaviour unless bureaucratic self-interest has the final decision-
making authority.
A second argument against rent-seeking behaviour within a capacity-sharing regime, could be based on the
definition of water use rights. Given that rent-seekersexercise their lobbing power for an increase in supply,
it should by noted that private decision-makers are only allowed the volume as specified in their water use
rights. If the user needs more water, the additional water use rights must first be obtained before the extra
water could be bought. The definition of water use rights will therefore play an important role in the
prevention of rent-seeking behaviour. Braden (1995:1205) notes that water property rights are multi-
65 Rent-seeking behaviour could be defined as behaviour whereby private decision makers try to use the powers of the state to
enhance their own economic well-being (Lipsey and Courant, 1996:377). Within the context of this study, rent-seeking behaviour
could be found when private decision makers use the power of the state to either subsidise their water, keep their water prices at
artificially low levels or promote the development of new water supplies by ignoring negative social and ecological externalities.
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contextual and dynamic. This is an important point for the following discussion. Fundamentally, all animal
and plant species on earth (including humans) must have access to water for the completion of their specific
life-cycles. Any additional needs66 (which are only relevant to humans) must be allocated via an organised
allocation mechanism and within this study the market mechanism is promoted as a suitable allocation
mechanism.
The inherent "common property" and variable nature of river flows complicates the definition of property
rights to water. This variability in supply (stochastic supply) complicates water balances (by creating
uncertainties regarding supply probabilities) within a catchment and it is therefore common practice to use
dams or other forms of storage capacities to regulate and smooth out the supply of water from year to year.
However, these storage capacities do come at a price and it is a complex task to determine the exact
magnitude of such practices. Suitable storage management strategies and policies have to be developed to
cope with this situation. The work of Dudley, 1988a, 1988b, 1990a, 1992 1994, 1999 and Dudley and
Musgrave, 1988) deals extensively with this type of problem. The definition of tradable water use rights
must therefore be compatible with the management of storage capacities. It is, however, important first to
define the use right and then to develop the management strategy and not the other way around.
Recall that in defining water rights for the purpose of accommodation within a market, the emphasis should
be on the use right of a specific unit of water and not on the property right of that unit of water. The reason
is because the utility of water is derived from the use right and not the property right. Therefore, the
characteristics of the water use right should play the dominant role in defining water rights for adoption in
the market. The question could be asked whether water use rights will be satisfactory in terms of
exclusiveness, enforceability and certainty, to develop a market mechanism.
A water use right should not refer to a fixed volumetric unit because in reality, the volume of the catchment
is a variable and a situation could therefore develop where the volume represented by the water use rights
and the actual volume of water within the catchment would never be the same. This could result in a
situation where there would be trading in and transfer of volumes that do not exist. Capacity-sharing
present a possible answer, because the water use rights within this system are defined in terms of a
percentage of stream-flow and a percentage of storage capacity. If the precise volume of the water-use
right is acquired for pumping volumes, computer technology and modem measurement techniques could be
used to estimate the current volume of the right.
The "public characteristics" of some water uses imply that parties affected by water trades may not always
be represented in the market. The benefits of improving water resources use through the market will
66 Some controversy may be found here because the definition of the human life cycle is not that simple. Specialisation caused
commercial agriculture to develop and the question therefore arises whether agricultural usage should be included in the natural
life cycle of humans or not.
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depend on how these issues are dealt with when tradable water use rights are defined. Capacity-sharing
has the unique feature that the above-mentioned parties (mostly previously disadvantaged and minority
groups) could be accommodated as a single shareholder" within the capacity-sharing regime.
One of the difficulties in defining property rights for irrigation water and water per se is that the net use of
water by crops (consumptive use) is generally far less than the total volume diverted to irrigate those crops.
On the other side of the spectrum is the urban use where consumptive use is an even smaller portion of the
total diverted volume. The difference between the consumptive use and the total volume diverted from the
main drainage system is known as the retum flow68. These retum flows could hold negative or positive
externalities for downstream uses, depending on the current use pattern. If water price determination is
based on the diverted use, private decision-makers will have an incentive to use as much of the diverted
water as possible, because the return flow will be considered as a loss to that user. Therefore, upstream
users have no incentive to accommodate downstream users. If the upstream user is paid for his return flow,
there will be an incentive to divert only the needed volume of water (consumptive flow), therefore it should
be argued that water price determination should be based on the consumptive use of water resources and
not on the diverted volume. This could be done by making use of "use specific water consumption data69" to
determine the precise amount of water needed for a given use within a certain set of assumptions. Only this
needed volume of water together with a certain amount of water for transport, drainage and evaporation
losses should be diverted for such use. The same type of argument could be followed for urban use
patterns.
However, given that the consumptive use of urban uses is even smaller than that of agricultural-related
uses, the non-consumptive urban use plays a far more important role in determining the needed volume of
diverted water. In other words, relative to agricultural use patterns with "bigger" consumptive uses (the net
amount of water that is removed from the drainage system) the return-flow related uses70 for urban areas is
bigger. It is clear that non-consumptive use is more important for urban use patterns relative to agricultural
67 For example, 100 small farmers form one capacity share. It should be noted that these farmers would need to have similar
water use patterns. This single share will then be managed as a common property.
68 While the former could be sold without restriction, the non-consumptive element can be sold only if the distribution does not
deprive other uses of water. Thus for transfers in the same basin owners would be free to sell all of their water rights, but if a
user wants to sell his rights to a user whose return flow does not return to the same catchment, only the consumptive element
within the new use could be sold. However, because of the technical difficulties in calculating the return flow component on a
case-to-case basis, this approach may not be appropriate for a developing country like South Africa. It may be possible to
calculate averages that specify the volume of water consumed by a certain crop or activity. In those cases where return flows
are an issue, this average could become the limit on the amount that the current owner is allowed to sell. This procedure would
work for both ground and surface water and even though this system has its shortcomings, it would be an improvement over
prohibiting all transfers or having no control at all.
69 The determining of such data could be achieved by making use of historical use patterns of specific uses. Within the irrigation
sector for example, the water needs of a variety of irrigated crops (given a set of assumptions) is well researched and available.
This data could be used to determine the exact volume needed to satisfy the current consumptive use for that specific crop (use).
70 The urban sector has a small consumptive use demand for drinking, cooking and gardening-related needs, but the biggest
amount of water diverted for urban use goes to return-flow related uses such as personal hygiene, general household and
industrial cleaning purposes, cooling (depending on the technology used) and sewerage.
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use patterns. It would therefore be naïve to base the definition and pricing of water use rights only on the
consumptive use of water. Capacity-sharing defines water use rights in terms of percentage of the total
storage capacity (no open access or common property on stored water exists) and percentage of the total
inflows within the season. It is possible for a specific user to have only inflow shares and no capacity
shares. Each shareholder (which includes consumptive and non-consumptive as well as in-stream and off-
stream users) will have an incentive to save water (economic gains associated with savings) because each
shareholder is responsible for the management of his own capacity and inflow share and the additional cost
incurred in the determining of the exact needed amount of water to be diverted will be justified by water-
saving incentives such as economic gains from water saving.
Capacity-sharing does have some obvious benefits associated with giving users more autonomy in
managing inter-temporal reliability, but would need a detailed institutional arrangement in order to function
effectively. In addition to the market for storage capacity, there would need to be an associated spot market
for water and clearly defined rights to inflows. Moreover, while the aim of capacity-sharing is to make users
independent from each other, the reality often proves to be the contrary".
The problems associated with capacity-sharing could be overcome by "better" definition of property rights.
This requires a specification of rights to inflows and also a specification of rights to water held in the storage
capacity (a market in spills and releases). One of the most important advantages of the capacity-sharing
system is that risk associated with water use rights does not have to be specified. In contrast, the design of
a priority-based system of release rights requires specification of volume and an associated level of
reliability (which proves to be difficult).
Given the above-mentioned discussion on some of the complexities of water use rights, it should be clear
that the rent-seekers would face difficulties exercising their lobbying power in order to enhance their
individual preferences regarding water supply.
The main disadvantages include:
• Capacity-sharing does have the potential to separate the various roles of water pricing, whereas these
become blurred and lose effectiveness under current centralised policy. This separation is certainly a
71 As an example of the interdependency between capacity-sharing shareholders, the more conservative (risk averse)
shareholder will have a higher frequency of "spills" from his inventory which would increase the volume of water flowing into the
capacity shares of less conservative users. The management of this water (which yields a positive externality) has not been
dealt with adequately in the literature on capacity-sharing. Dudley and Musgrave (1988) treat the distribution of this water as a
positive externality that is not included in the decision-making process of shareholders. Unless the market is used to allocate this
"internal spill", the water will not be allocated efficiently (unless all the other shareholders place the same value on the external
benefit). Also, refer to the question "How secure is a capacity share?" in the current section.
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disadvantage under a centralised policy regime, however it could be tumed in an advantage under a
decentralised water policy regime.
• The estimation of supply system losses must be accurate". The difficulty in sharing transmission
losses resulting from evaporation and seepage since transmission losses vary according to the
distance water must travel and the volume of water accompanying it in the stream. This is
particularly important for the South African context because of the substantial water transition
distances associated with water management.
• Each user would need to share the delivering capacity of the distribution system. Maximum release rates
must be synchronised in order to satisfy all needs. This is a potential problem for agriculture in particular,
because of the synchronised nature of irrigation farming in dry seasons.
• Capacity-sharing requires a certain minimum level of education of water users. Capacity-sharing may pose
some administrative difficulties regarding the literacy levels of shareholders (mostly small farmers) who will
need to make their own management decisions, hence principal-agent problems are to be expected.
"How would a capacity-sharing system operate?"
Dudley and Bryant (1995) distinguishes between "bulk" and "retail" capacity shares (refer to figure 4.3). "Bulk"
capacity-sharing (or wholesale capacity-sharing) allocates reservoir water to a few large water users. These users
represent water user groups and may be geographical entities or political jurisdictions like nations, states and
regions, or distinguished according to user class such as irrigation, environmental, urban or industrial users.
The principal objectives of implementing "bulk water entitlements" are (DWAF, 1996:68):
• To provide authorities with a clearly defined property right to water.
• To provide authorities with more flexible management options to manage their entitlements.
• To provide a basis for sharing limited water resources.
• To facilitate water trading between user groups.
• To allow specific entitlements for environmental purposes.
In order for the system to be successful, "bulk water entitlements" must be (DWAF, 1996:68):
• Explicit in defining where or from which source the water will be extracted.
• Exclusive to the authority to which the water has been granted.
• Tradable in part or in total to other authorities.
72 Capacity-sharing is an "real time" water accounting system and it is therefore important to ensure a continuous flow of
information (regarding flow characteristics) for updating the management system and to assist in water management decisions.
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• Enforceable by law through proper monitoring.
The transferring of shares under "bulk" capacity shareholders may occur by means of water auctions, organised by
the catchment management agency. The market could, however, stay active whenever a buyer and seller agree to
exchange shares under the supervision of the catchment management agency. Should someone, say a landowner,
wish to engage in intensive water-use activities (like the construction of a dam) in the catchment of the reservoir
which reduces the inflow of the reservoir, the shareholder would need to buy a quantity of inflow rights from a bulk
user in order to offset the resulting effect on stream flows. However, if there are two reservoirs in the same river with
no important tributary inflows between them, the capacity of the two reservoirs may be added if needed. Bulk
shareholders would be recorded as having shares in the combined capacity.
To support the system of entitlements, a form of water accounting is necessary. Under the system of tradable
entitlements, legal entitlements can be made to environmental users, and it is possible to buy back the entitlements
from users of the state to reallocate them to the environment. In the case of new water supply developments, the
entitlement of the environment would be allocated based on representations made by environmental managers. At
this level, capacity-sharing is a precise, concise and transparent mechanism for allocating water through uncertain
times. However, the incentives for efficient allocation under "bulk" capacity-sharing are limited because the individual
decision maker does not feature and the "free rider" problem occurs.
"Retail" (refer to figure 4.3) capacity-sharing allocates water to the individual users (such as households, irrigation
farmers and firms) each holding their own capacity share of reservoir capacity and reservoir inflows. Capacity-
sharing at this level provides great incentives for efficient water use by the integration of demand and supply
management decisions. Therefore, each user considers the likely value of the unit of water before using it. There is
no "use it or lose it" pressure except for the known probability of large inflows causing the reservoir to fill and spill.
The operator of the system (say for example the "catchment management agency") would monitor all additions to
and non-release subtractions from the main waterworks. (Additions include stream inflows and rainfall directly into
the reservoir and non-release subtractions include evaporation, seepage and reservoir overflow spills. From these,
plus the ordered releases by each of the bulk users, the contents of each bulk user's capacity share would be
updated daily by computer.) Computer printouts of these records could be sent to the users and would be like "bank
statements". Capacity shares are expressed in megalitres to represent a percentage of the total usable storage
capacity. For example, percentage shares of a reservoir with a usable storage capacity of 200 megalitres would be
two megalitres when the dam is first built. If the storage capacity declines because of siltation, the 1% share would
fall below two megalitres. If the storage capacity were increased, however, the original two megalitres would not
change. In this event, the extra storage capacity would result in additional capacity shares. It is however necessary
to periodically "update" each bulk shareholder's share, in order to adjust the sum of all the shares to match the actual
volume of the reservoir. It is recommended that the catchment management agency would be responsible for
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notifying the shareholders of the location of their ordered water within the distribution system. This could be
expressed in terms of volume, the expected time of arrival at the receiving point, estimated travel time and expected
constraints on the distribution system due to the need to limit releases to suit distributional requirements. The
provision of such information would require sophisticated monitoring and system modelling, but would help users in
planning the time of their next release in relation to their on-farm storage capacity.
"How would the transition from the current allocation system to capacity-sharing be
accomplished?"
If capacity-sharing is to be introduced, the timing of the transitions is important. That is because various changes to
the level of demand for water for irrigation and for other purposes have occurred over time, which affects the
reliability of supply. The objective of calculating how many capacity and inflow shares each user would hold under
capacity-sharing, is to determine what portfolio of shares would be needed to provide similar volumes of supplies at
each user's receiving point. Having provided users with portfolios of capacity shares that reflect their previous
volumetric allocations, users would be able to alter their own supply (from that point onwards) in several ways. No
user's portfolio can be affected by other users other than compensation via the market at an agreed price. The only
source of interdependency between users is the release capacity and timing capabilities of the storage facility and
distribution system.
"Would there be any trade-offs in the amount or reliability of water?
Each user makes his own trade-off between volume and reliability of supply. The use of open, shared channels or
rivers, rather than individual pipelines, causes interdependence between users. If a particular user wants an
extremely high reliability of supply, and the others do not, that user might have to "spend" a great deal more reservoir
water to transport the supply to his receiving point, because of transmission losses that must be covered by him
alone. Users are therefore confronted with their own transmission losses and this is an efficiency-promoting feature
of capacity-sharing but does not eliminates the "free rider" problem associated with transmission losses. (A capacity
share could, however, be devoted to keeping a minimum flow in the river, but this would involve low-reliability users
foregoing water for the benefit of high-reliability users and in effect subsidising the latter.)
"How secure is a capacity share?"
The original formulation of capacity-sharing specified that the water use right would be held in perpetuity, so that
holders would make the correct long-term investment decisions. The only way a capacity share may be removed
from a user, is by means of market compensation, unless the user breaks some law. If society or a new user should
decide that water was needed for a new use, the needed shares must be bought in the market from a willing seller.
Whereas the value of land depends on its location, a unit of water (measured in megalitres or cubic meters) within a
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reservoir is indistinguishable from any other, and therefore it would be difficult to imagine a case where some
particular share (unit of water) would be specifically needed. However, when a whole catchment drainage system is
considered, there might be preference through the catchment (the upper reaches against the lower reaches) in terms
of water quality.
However, there were suggestions that the water use rights should not be held in perpetuity, but be held as some
form of long-term lease that would be re-negotiated after a number of years of notice. If leases can be devised in
such a way as not to harm long-term investments and resource management, they could provide a return to society
(social gain) in the form of leasing fees.
There is some interaction of reservoir users due to "internal spills". Recall that capacity-sharing contains the rule that
any inflows exceeding the unfilled space of a shareholder's capacity share, are lost to that particular user and are
shared among other users (through either efficiency or equity sharing) whose share is not yet full. The marketing of
unused storage space could provide some flexibility. This could be done by buying or renting extra reservoir empty
space or capacity from another shareholder. Therefore, a user could become accustomed to receiving internal spills
from other users (probably from those users who need a high level of reliability and thus maintain a higher level of
storage). If some of these high-reliability users were to be replaced with low-reliability users, the above-mentioned
user would find that his spill-over gains disappeared. This phenomenon is rather unlikely in practice because the
user will certainly sell his water before losing it by means of an internal spill. In the case of a total spill of the
reservoir, the spilled water has little value, because it cannot be stored.
"Who are the people and institutions most likely to be considered as capacity shareholders and
what are the likely proportions of water held by each?"
It is important that all water users be part of a capacity share scheme, at either a "bulk" or "retail" level. Uncertainty
among users will not be overcome if some user group (say environmental in-stream flows) does not have a firm
capacity share and can be allocated water by some authority on an "as needed" basis. This "as needed" basis will
be appealing to some users but others will welcome the firm basis of the market mechanism. Environmental users
do need flexible and adaptable access to water until more is known about the "minimum flow for sustaining the basic
ecological functioning" of the catchment-area. The basic idea of capacity-sharing is that all water users be part of
the capacity-sharing scheme, including the environment. If the initial water allocations prove to be unsatisfactory, the
allocation could be changed at a later stage by means of market transfers. However, water that is currently "in
transit" to the desired receiving point, within a natural transport system (the river and not a manmade channel) does
play an ecological role and it is therefore necessary to keep this in mind when buying shares for the ecological
functioning of the river. It is therefore of financial interest for the authority, which is responsible for the environmental
shares to provide incentives for irrigators to alter their release times and their private storage capacities slightly, to
maintain a sufficient in-stream flow for sustaining the ecological functioning of the river.
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"How would water transfers take place under capacity-sharing?"
Initially, probably only two types of water transfers would occur. The first would be the transfer of shares within the
main storage capacity of the reservoir. The catchment management agency would be responsible for checking
whether the seller has sufficient shares in stock to sell and then whether the buyer has the capacity to "absorb" new
stock. The agreed price would be a matter of balancing willingness to pay and willingness to accept between the two
market participants". The agreed transaction will be recorded and shown in the buyer's, seller's and catchment
management authority's records. The second would probably be the transfer of long-term rights to percentages of
reservoir inflows and storage capacities. The catchment management agency would first verify titles held by sellers
and buyers to see that the proposed transfers are feasible (other factors which must be checked include the
distribution system effects of possible under-utilising of the distribution system and rules of inter-basin transfers).
The essential point of transfers under capacity-sharing is clarity about exactly what is being traded, namely rights to
water, with the specific probabilities of its availability in the quantities agreed upon (for water within the reservoir the
probability is 1 (100% or certainty), but with rights to future water, probabilities vary with the streams involved.
Probabilities do change, but these are long-term events and are applicable to any kind of distributional system and
not just capacity-sharing.
3.10 Requirementsof capacity-sharing
In matured water economies such as Australia, Chile, Spain, South Africa and the Western United States (note that a
matured water economy does not necessarily imply a highly developed economy per se) demand outstrips the
supply of water, with sites for further development considered to be few and un-economical. To avoid potential
conflict between different water uses and users, a sophisticated but user-friendly management and allocation system
is needed. Gakpo et al (2001:97) mentioned that the level of sophistication increases linearly with the scarcity (or
competition level between uses) of water resources. It therefore does not make sense to have a highly complex and
powerful water management system in an area with little or virtually no competition for water. With the current
institutional changes shifting more towards allocation, decentralisation as well as privatisation, economic viability,
physical sustainability and integrated management strategies, capacity-sharing as an alternative becomes appealing
and the following are the main requirements for the adoption of the concept.
73 The functioning of this water market could also be seen as similar to a stock exchange where buyers and sellers place their
bids and only the matched bids will realise in a successful transaction and the transferring of shares. This could be
accomplished by making use of specialised brokers or regular and irregular (after heavy rains) auctions. After the system has
been up and running for a while, it may be possible to introduce other forms of trading as well (such as futures and options).
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3.10.1 Institutional requirements
Definition of property rights
The introduction of transferable water use rights needs proper definition of the right itself (Pigram, 1993: 1316). This
is important in South Africa, because the whole water market is based on a secured property-right structure.
Institutional arrangements
The structure and role of catchment authorities must be flexible, allowing for varying social structures and issues.
The government's role in integrated catchment management should be limited to the co-ordination, transfer and
provision of technical advice and support for local groups or individuals.
Long-term relationships
The successful implementation of integrated catchment management depends on sound long-term relationships
between the parties involved. Long-term commitment and continuity from leading agencies for financial assistance
will also be required.
Catchment and waterway management
Catchment and waterway management remains the responsibility of the environmental protection agency and the
catchment management agencies.
Community involvement in water management
The involvement of the community is essential to decentralise the management of water resources to the lowest
possible level and to attain the highest possible degree of efficiency and equity.
3.10.2 Infrastructure requirements
Separation of commercial and non-commercial water sectors
The functions of water supply and sanitation should be separated from the non-commercial function of catchment
and waterway management, unless it is more practical not to do so on a local basis. Water authorities and supply
boards must be regionalised (for greater efficiency and economy of scale) and commercialised. The supply agencies
thus become bulk users of water and/or effluent discharges, and are subjected to the same licensing procedures as
other catchment stakeholders. Metropolitan water supply agencies will be allocated a bulk water entitlement, which
they in turn allocate to domestic and industrial users. Rural water boards should further partition their bulk
entitlement to agricultural and rural domestic users.
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Reliability and security of supply
Suitable water transport systems must be in place to deliver the water to the required point of need. (This is
important with regard to the certainty-factor in a market regime.) Water market transactions are made with the
assumption that the new user will receive the water. Therefore, the ability of the water distributional system to deliver
the required volume of water at the specific site of use, will be a key factor determining the efficiency of this demand
orientated management strategy.
3.10.3 Economic requirements
All the economic related requirements are similar to that of any market situation. Firstly, bureaucratic control over
water must be deregulated and limited to some specific, defined functions. Secondly, because water use rights will
become private property within a market regime, the "user pays approach" must be followed. Any individual who
needs not use water must be paid a certain pre-agreed compensation (Pigram, 1993:1315). Thirdly, the functioning
of the market relies on the fact that a commodity must be tradable or transferable between willing buyers and sellers.
This requirement is closely related to the institutional requirements.
3.10.4 Physical-biological requirements
Regional water supply and demand characteristics must be taken into account when a market system is proposed for
a specific region. In most cases, stochastic water supply and demand characteristics are responsible for most of the
uncertainty regarding investment decision-making. The market mechanism is specifically well equipped (better
relative to administrative control) to deal with uncertainties regarding supply and demand. (Note that capacity-
sharing could also be applied to areas with deterministic water supply and demand characteristics.)
3.11 Possibilities for SouthAfrica
Capacity-sharing is a possibility for the current water management problems experienced in South Africa, because
the concept could easily be integrated and associated within the broad policy and institutional requirements laid down
in the National Water Act of 1998. Capacity-sharing is suitable for integration with water markets because it provides
water property rights that are explicit, exclusive to the shareholder and enforceable by law. Such property rights form
an excellent basis for the development of water markets, for water already in the reservoirs and streams and for long-
term rights for the future. There are incentives to move water between users according to its most valuable use and
time of use and this promotes the integration of supply and demand water management across users through time.
For South Africa and most developing countries, capacity-sharing may not always be feasible for two reasons:
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• Capacity-sharing does need a certain minimum level of education from water managers to make full use of
the advantages offered by the concept in order to manage supply side- and demand-side water decisions.
• Capacity-sharing needs an effective water release system where a specific amount of water could be
released to satisfy the independent needs of individual users.
Gakpo and Du Plessis (2001) suggested a path of development (in chronological order) for achieving an optimal
water allocation in order to assure water security and flexibility and to guide investment decisions. (Refer to figure
3.2 below for a schematic representation of the development path.) Block 1 will start the development path by
determining the true value74 of water (by using a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach) and setting consumer
prices right. (It is clear that the government is struggling to clear this first, but important hurdle.)
The reaction to this new price setting is still unknown, but full cost recovery prices are likely to force inefficient and
low-value users out of the market. However, it is expected that most users will seek innovative new ways of
remaining in business, as referred to in block 2. Production will be characterised by techniques like dynamic
cropping patterns (depending on market conditions) and new water-saving technologies (however this may bring
additional externalities to the fore) as reflected in blocks 3 and 4.
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Figure 3.2: Developmental path for an optimal water allocation and security
strategy
Source: Gakpo and du Pleesis (2001 :99)
74 Viljoen ef al (2000) researched the simultaneous comparison of marginal value products between linear programming and
stochastic programming for estimating the value of water downstream of the Vanderkloof-dam. Their study did not
accommodate the whole capacity-sharing model as developed by Dudley (1988a and 1988b) and Dudley and Musgrave (1988),
but included two of the fundamentally important sub-models of the single decision-maker approach, namely the stochastic
dynamic simulation model which was used for optimising the use of stored water within the dam and the linear programming
model which was used to optimise water use on the farm during the immediate season. Johansson (2000) did a survey (as part
of a World Bank project: "Guidelines for Pricing Irrigation Water Based on Efficiency, Implementation and Equity Concerns") on
current and past views on water pricing in the irrigation sector that will be useful for water policy-makers as they address the
growing demand for allocating scarce water resources efficiently.
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Users may rely more on water management institutions (like Catchment Management Agencies and Water User
Associations) for institutional support and information on appropriate methods of optimal water use (block 5). This
may lead to a reduction in the bulk share of irrigation water as indicated by block 6, and a considerable amount of
water will become available for alternative uses. It is important that these water savings should be used in a way
beneficial to society as a whole (probably to be added to the "reserve" as defined within the National Water Act of
1998). It will therefore be appealing for the government to co-operate with the irrigation sector, should this goal of
water saving be achieved. On the other hand, the irrigation sector (which now has some bargaining power in the
form of water use rights) can exploit the situation by lobbying through the Water User Associations for some changes
within the National Water Act of 1998 and therefore display rent-seeking behaviour.
The final stages of the development path will probably see decision-makers within the water sector considering other
institutional arrangements (such as capacity-sharing) that thrive on well-defined water markets. Judging from the
advantages mentioned above, the agricultural sector should be one of the main beneficiaries if capacity-sharing is
adopted.
The next chapter will look in more detail at some of the problems experienced within the current South African water
management context and what properties of capacity-sharing could be used in resolving some of these problems.
The philosophy of an integrated approach will be followed throughout the chapter and, where possible, some
recommendations will be made regarding potential institutional reforms for achieving a more equitable and efficient
water allocation.
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Chapter4
WATER DEMAND MANAGEMENT: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
AND THE ROLE OF CAPACITY·SHARING
"If the misery of our poor be caused not by nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin."
- Charles Darwin
In his presidential address, Backeberg (1997) emphasised the importance of change in water institutions, markets
and decentralised resource management within policy reform for the South African irrigation sector. He argued that
the development of a suitable institutional framework to direct the needed policy changes for achieving the policy
objectives as stated in the National Water Act of 1998, was necessary and relevant. Backeberg (1997:350) also
noted that further research contributions are required for the design of un-attenuated water entitlements in order to
achieve sustainable resource use. Vink (2000:439) also emphasised the necessity of further research in problems
related to structural change within policy and institutional changes in the South African water sector.
This chapter will provide a suitable conceptual framework against which the identified institutional water-related
issues should be seen and the role of demand-oriented management strategies in resource management will be
emphasised. By using the insights of the detailed literature review and chapter 3, a few of the most important key
problems currently experienced within the South African water management arena will be identified. These problems
will then be conceptualised within the capacity-sharing paradigm and suggestions will be made on how to negotiate
these problems with the aid of the possibilities and advantages of capacity-sharing. The suggestions made within
this chapter could serve as a point of departure in the operationalisation of this concept in South Africa.
4.1 Perspectives on water demand management
Rather than pursuing a definition of water demand at this stage, it is more useful to look at water demand
rnanaqernent" from three different perspectives. These range firstly from the mundane level of the individual firm or
household, secondly through the more important level of society as a whole and thirdly to the radical level of
questioning common notions of need and consumption.
75 Recall that throughout the discussion on water demand management, it is not the demand for water per se to be
accommodated but the derived demand for water (in other words not the physical substances of water, but rather the
"usefulness" of the physical substance Le. it is about use rights and not property rights). The differences in demand elasticity
between water per se and the wide range of uses support this fact.
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Firstly, the water utility, industrial firm, household or irrigation farmer can be discussed as one perspective because
they are all individual economic units and, to one degree or another, all interested in savings. For many of them,
water demand management (or demand side management) is simply a matter of cost-effectiveness: "Will investment
(of time, money or effort) in saving water payoff in whatever terms are relevant to that economic unit?" Of course,
many things may be in the way of achieving an accurate balance, particularly when water is low priced. In addition,
incentives can be misplaced (from an economic perspective) as when is the case, for example, women carry water
but men decide when to invest in water-related infrastructure, or when buildings are charged for water but those rates
are not applied to individual offices or apartments. In sum, calculations for the individual user may be complex, but
the principles are not.
Secondly, a much wider set of variables comes into play when water demand is viewed from the perspective of
society as a whole. Concerns which are of particular relevance here include the renewable and partially non-
renewable characteristics of water per se, the fact that water moves around, crosses boundary lines and has
enormous absorptive capacity. However, when for example user/community "A" uses water, this use affects the
ability of user/community "B" to use that water. Therefore social rules76 are needed to define who can use water,
how much and when. Because all human communities and livelihoods (all life-forms on earth) depend on water,
principles of equity demand that there should be special rules to ensure that each water user and type of use is
provided with its basic need for water. In the case of human-related uses, there is an environmental effect also to
keep in mind. Calculations at the level of society are more complex and less definite than those involved for
individual economic units. Concepts such as externalities, common property resources and public goods all come
into play and a large literature has grown up to deal with them.
Thirdly, there is the radical perspective that asks the question: "What is the purpose of water use anyway?" Modelled
on the approach to energy analysis dubbed "soft energy paths" (Capra, 1997), the theory of soft energy paths is still
too nascent to discuss extensively at this time. However, some lessons can already be seen as analogous to those
leamed from energy (Capra, 1997):
• Beyond the few litres required to sustain life, there are many alternative ways to satisfy demand for water.
Most relevant in areas with severe water shortages (like the Middle East), the importation of food is an
alternative to using water for irrigation purposes (virtual water). If the objective is to feed a given population,
then the use of water to irrigate or use of money to buy food are equivalent. Obviously, the two options are
anything but equivalent in socio-economic and environmental effects.
• Look beyond the immediate end-use to ask about demand management in a larger sense. Drip-irrigation
techniques might be extremely efficient, but the larger question is whether the water should be used for
76 The government is responsible for these social rules and this implies the "first contact" between the state as a regulatory
mechanism and the market mechanism.
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irrigation at all. One could install low-flow toilets in isolated villages, but the larger question is whether
water-based sanitation should be used at all.
• Water quality has a direct effect on the opportunity cost of water. High-quality water can be used for many
purposes but low-quality water for only a few. On the other hand, the volume of use that requires high-
quality water is rather small, whereas the volume of use that accepts low-quality water is large. (It is
therefore possible to propound that the dominant use characteristic of water for human-related use is not
quality-related, but "gravity or flow"-related whereas within environmental-related uses, no such distinction
exists.)
The above-mentioned discussion could lead to questioning the rationale of water saving and the question could be
asked: Why do we need to save water? To be able to answer this question, let us first define what would be
understood as water saving. Assume that all human-related water use patterns degenerate water quality. Given that
a certain use (with a specific level of utility) requires "x" cubic meters of a specific quality of water, but a new or
different technology requires only 'x-c" cubic meters for the same use and utility level", a water saving of "c" will be
realised". By assuming further that technological advances and accumulation of knowledge on efficient water uses
will provide an absolute optimum level of water-use efficiency for all human-related uses, it could be argued that a
substantial amount of water (represented by "c" times all possible uses) will be "freed up" out of current uses and will
become available for alternative uses. The more water is "freed up" from human-related use, the more water is not
exposed to the potential negative impacts of human-related uses and the more sustainable the complete hydrological
cycle will become. The rationale for saving water is therefore directly linked to preserving the quality of present water
resources and, in economic terms, preserving the opportunity cost of water7g•
4.2 Institutional arrangements to ensure optimal water allocation and security
The central question regarding regional water policy has always been: "What institutional arrangement will provide
the most socially desirable allocation of water in a water-scarce environment?" This issue within the South African
context will be the main topic of discussion for the remainder of this chapter. Before starting off, first consider
precisely what is meant by a "socially desirable water allocation". Within the literature regarding equity-related
issues, not one single description could be found of what precisely is meant by a "socially desirable (or optimal) water
allocation". The researcher therefore makes the assumption that the above-mentioned socially optimal (or ideal)
77 Utility-theory is the basis for multi-actor decision-making under uncertainty (Beroggi, 1998: 199).
78 Note that under an open-access property regime, no incentives exist for water-saving practices. Therefore, if a given water
resource is in danger, all the lawful owners will have an incentive to use the last possible amount of water before any other
competing user. However, under the same circumstances, private and common property regimes will provide some incentives to
conserve the water and to use it freely when plentiful. (The opportunity cost of water is also considered as being under a private
property regime.) Capacity-sharing can accommodate both private and common property regimes within one catchment
because the property rights are not on the physical substance of water, but on the use rights of the substance.
79 If the opportunity cost of water is equal to zero, it means that given the current level of technological development, the current
use of water produces its highest possible level of utility. It is highly unlikely that this point will ever be reached because perfect
information would be needed in order to determine that the current use is indeed the highest level of utility. Together with this
dilemma, a moral hazard presents itself, because it is impossible to compare different types of uses in terms of utility.
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water allocation is something imaginary and that there will never be a point in time when an optimal or ideal water
allocation will be reached. The best that current institutional arrangements can do is to try to develop a situation
where social order (conflict levels kept at manageable levels) and justice are maintained.
According to Louw (2001), institutional factors often restrict transfers among users, limit incentives for efficient use
and where uncertainty regarding water use rights occurs, a nation's development is likely to suffer. Besides the state
of resource endowments, the origin of concems for future water shortages lies in the laws, administrative practices
and other institutions that create uncertainty over water use rights, pose obstacles to developing new water supplies
or reallocating existing supplies to new uses, as well as providing few incentives for conservation. In order to sustain
economic and social activity with regard to water resources, unquestionable institutional arrangements must be in
place to guarantee efficient and equitable water use. In order to ensure the development of proper institutions, some
principles must be followed.
4.2.1 Principles of water policy
According to Winnpenny (1997), the following national water policy principles must be kept in mind when policy
development is underway:
• Water is a holistic resource. To obtain the maximum benefit for society, all sources and consumers of
water should be taken into account when planning and operating water systems. The complexity and
interdependency of different parts of the hydrological system should be considered.
• Water is a scarce commodity. A sense of the economic value of water is necessary in order to induce the
needed shifts of consumption towards higher value uses, and the reduction of waste and losses.
• Water is an environmental asset. Supplying, using and disposing of water have a drastic effect on the
environment. Conversely, water is a key feature of the natural environment, with an inherent value as such
which should be recognized in the event of potentially competing uses.
• Water has many stakeholders. The interdependency of different parts of the hydrological system creates
many stakeholders (e.g. upstream-downstream users and users of polluted water). Groups representing the
environment are increasingly asserting their claim on the resource and potential users in neighbouring
countries may have a legitimate stake. Future generations and "passive" users are also, in some eyes,
stakeholders.
• Water is a basic need. Huge numbers of people in developing countries (according to DWAF (1999) more
than 12 million people in South Africa) still lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation. The cost of
under-provision is revealed in disease, and the human and financial costs of people making their own
alternative arrangements. Many of these costs fall on women and children. Providing a basic water supply
and safe sanitation to those currently lacking them should be the first priority of any country's water policy.
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• Participation, delegation and subsidies. Whatever the theoretical advantages of centralised public
provision, there are many situations where this is not, in practice, efficient. The notion that water should be
managed at the lowest appropriate level is a sound general principle, often driven by imperatives of
maintenance and cost recovery.
• Financial self-sufficiency. Shortages of funds because of poor cost recovery are problematic to all kinds
of water systems, at every scale. This is commonly caused by timidity in fully charging for water,
inefficiency in collecting what is due, sometimes corrupt collusion between users and collectors, and a
relentless growth in the demand for services. Whatever institutional model is chosen, there is a need for
better financial performance in future.
To merely take note of the above-mentioned policy principles, will not ensure effective policy development therefore,
some guidelines will be necessary to guide policy-makers.
4.2.2 Policy guidelines
The following could be seen as important aspects (and therefore policy guidelines) in developing an appropriate
water policy for the South African context (Bromley, 1990, 1995a, 1995b, World Bank, 2002 and Van Zyl, 2002):
• Avoid large capital projects, which tie up major portions of scarce capital.
• Focus on applicability through promoting research, the development of technology and products,
institutional reforms, and innovatory systems that are potentially widely applicable.
• Use foreign aid as a catalyst to enable the involvement of other interested parties, (for example NGOs', the
private sector and local communities).
• Be prepared to take risks by backing innovations (whether of products, systems, finance or institutions).
• Stress the diversity and specificity of solutions, and avoid imposing categorical blueprints (especially those
with ideological overtones).
• Be flexible over aid criteria. Assistance to the water sector should not be tied down too narrowly to specific
countries, regions, or target groups. It is important that managers are allowed freedom to intervene across
a range of situations. It is in the interests of aid recipients that the supplier (of foreign aid) has access to as
wide a range of relevant experience as possible.
• Monitor water developments in all countries, to gain some experience for application in the local context.
Effective water policy-making also needs a sound knowledge of social theory. The structuration theory of Anthony
Giddens and the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas influenced developments in social theory in the second half of
the twentieth century (refer to Capra, 2002:67-70). Both these social theorists integrate insights from the natural
sciences, social sciences and cognitive philosophies while rejecting the limitations of positivism. This integration
could be advanced by extending the systems understanding of life (as mentioned in chapter 2) to the social domain
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with the aid of the conceptual framework of four perspectives - form, matter, process and meaning (as mentioned in
Capra, 2002:64). If this integration has taken place, the real systems understanding of social reality will come to the
fore and it would then be possible to formulate effective water policy.
Given the above-mentioned guidelines and principles, the scene is set for the policy development process. However,
before engaging in the process it is appropriate to mention some of the political risks associated with institutional
reforms in the water sector.
4.2.3 Political risk of institutional reforms in the water sector
The conventional view of institutional change is that it is either in the interest of economic efficiency, or it merely
redistributes income (Bromley, 1989). Interest groups form and attempt to influence the decision-making process so
that the end result best serves their interests (rent-seeking behaviour). As correctly pointed out by Haggard et al
(1995), interest-group analysis is not straightforward, and especially in developing countries where several limitations
affect the ability of political scientists to analyse interest group impacts, which include (1) collective action problems
(for example the ability of groups to organize and influence); (2) problems in identifying exogenous-endogenous
reactions to the reform design (for example the design and the implementation sequence, affects the interest group
reaction); and (3) problems in identifying mechanisms through which interests are translated into policy (for example
strikes and bribes). The sustainability of any water related infrastructure investments are dependent on the
performance of the institutions that manage them and it is therefore important to analyze the level of political risk
associated with the implementation of the suggested institutional reforms (Cummings et aI, 1996).
Eggertsson (1997) emphasises the need for approaches that allow interaction of economic, political, and social
activities, in order to improve the design of economic policies and minimize the likelihood of policy failure. To be able
to assess the political risks associated with institutional reforms, it is necessary to know how the stakeholders (also
called interest groups or players) are affected by the reforms, what their interests are, and their ability to affect the
reforms. A quantitative evaluation of risk can be estimated once the extent of the political effects on the institutional
reforms is known, however, according to Dinar et al (1998:4) few studies exist that address the political economy of
reforms in the water sector.
Dinar et al (1998) describe ways in which political impacts and political risks were handled in the literature dealing
with various reforms and economic adjustment projects in countries like Pakistan, Morocco, Chile, Argentina and
Brazil. From the studies surveyed, it can be generalized that reforms of any kind are likely to face the opposition or
support of certain groups. The level of opposition or support is in tum determined by the change of power and
benefits of each affected group compared with the status quo. Reforms may create new coalitions that were not in
place, or predicted. The ability of a group to influence the implementation of a reform is a function of many factors,
and is complicated to generalize. Establishing a quantitative framework to assess the likelihood of accomplishing
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institutional reforms associated with a specific project is therefore not a straightforward task and supporting data from
which probabilities can be calculated, do not generally exist.
Dinar et al (1998) propose a procedure that can be used to calculate the political risks associated with
implementation of institutional reforms in the water sector and also provide insights into the interrelationship of
institutional arrangements, power structure and policy outcomes. The procedure is based on a combination of the
work of Raiffa (1982), which assess the institutional feasibility of reform implementation and a Delphi process based
on expert opinions.
The process used by Raiffa (1982) consists of: (1) an evaluation of the potential winners and losers from the reforms,
(2) identification of the various reform performance levels, (3) identification of means by which the various parties
may influence the level of achievement of various reforms, (4) identification of costs (for example effort required by
each party) to influence the achievement levels. Thereafter, Raiffa (1982) applied the Delphi approach to estimate
probabilities of risk associated with the implementation of the analysed reform.
The above-mentioned approach is a compromise between two options: the first is costly, time consuming, and often
entails using pseudo-precise creation of indices and their analysis, while the second is based on an unstructured
"expert opinion" way of assessing risk. It provides a manageable framework, which, after some testing, could be
added to the feasibility analysis of projects undertaken in politically complicated environments. It would be worthwhile
to investigate how the above-mentioned approach will perform in the South African water management context. The
following section will discuss institutional arrangements made by policy-makers and theorists that are relevant for
changes to be made in water policy.
4.3 Institutional arrangementsto meetthe changing SouthAfrican conditions
In order to promote a situation where market transfers do produce net social benefits (by taking all the costs and
benefits associated with a transfer into account) the marketing of water use rights must be conducted within a
suitable institutional framework, which causes the buyers and sellers to take into account impacts on third parties
without restricting water transferability (Bush et ai, 1987:619-620). The reform of any sector is therefore primarily a
political and not a technical process although high-level technical skills are a requirement for adequate and
successful reform (Abrams, 2000).
Successful water institutions require co-operation between the public and the private sectors and the ideal
institutional framework therefore needs an approach that will integrate the public and private sectors and give market
forces the chance to facilitate the allocation of water use rights.
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Gakpo and Du Plessis (2001) proposed a generic water institutional framework (refer to figure 4.1) to assist in the co-
operation of public and private sectors and in shaping institutional arrangements for achieving economic efficiency as
well as equity objectives and at the same time obtaining water security. This generic framework can be used to
develop a policy for accommodating markets in water use rights within the current water legislation regime. The
need for such a framework comes to the fore in a document of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry that
clearly mentions that a new institutional framework would be required to accommodate the full decentralisation of
water management (DWAF, 1997).
Transaction Costs t----+---l
·irrigation
·industry
-electricity
-environment
-households
Economic Effeciency
-sociel and economic sustainability
-weter security
Figure 4.1: Proposed ideal institutional framework for achieving water security
Source: Gakpo and du Plessis (2001 :4)
With regard to figure 4.1 the following: according to Gakpo and Du Plessis (2001) the public sector must ensure that
the correct institutional arrangements are in place for the successful management of water resources. Such
arrangements include:
• The establishment of water use rights.
• Setting the rules for trading in water use rights.
• The monitoring and enforcement of these rules.
• The mediation of conflicts.
• Making changes in the structure of water use rights and rules as time goes by and conditions change.
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• Charging for water use - procedures and infrastructure maintenance.
The public sector also has to establish a national information system that covers virtually all aspects of water
resources (like quantity, quality, demand, supply, floods, and droughts). This database can assist the central water
agency to promote the fair and efficient allocation of water resources to districts through their respective regions.
Due to the weakness of water markets in maintaining an equitable allocation of water, allocations to address equity
have to be safeguarded by the public sector through regional allocation mechanisms (like Catchment Management
AgenciesBO) supported by water banks". This may be the best alternative to addressing efficiency and equity
simultaneously (Gakpo and Du Plessis, 2001 :9).
The private sector should be involved in water management at local level. Water management at local level has to
be private to facilitate the development of water markets that would allow water to flow to the highest marginal
product value. Other roles of the private sector include operation and maintenance, inducing technological
innovations for the promotion of efficiency. With water use rights guaranteed institutionally, the Catchment
Management Agency must rely on market forces and transfer mechanisms to reallocate water use rights to its most
valued use. The opportunity costs of water between different uses will guide the market in terms of pricing and
shadow prices can be used as estimates of opportunity costs in situations where it is difficult to determine these
opportunity costs. The private sector should also be responsible for operation and maintenance, including
technological innovations that would promote efficiency. They should also co-operate with the public sector for the
achievement of equity objectives. If the public and private sector should perform in the above-mentioned way, South
Africa could move towards a truly decentralised water management paradigm.
In Dudley (1990c), institutional arrangements for allocating water use rights among users were categorised
dimensionally (refer to figure 4.2). Institutional arrangements generally oscillate between centralised bureaucratic
management approaches to completely decentralised market-based systems. Line x:z. (horizontal axis) illustrates a
continuous spectrum of centralised bureaucratic administrative procedures to a completely decentralised system.
Close to the "centralised" end of this spectrum (Y), is the line WX (vertical axis), representing a range of centralised
types of water allocation. At W for example, water management is characterised by a pre-determined set of decision
rules and no decisions are made without such rules, as in "priority sharing". At X, on the other hand, decisions are
made over time in the absence of such rules. At point X lies another range, UV, illustrating decision-making by
different combinations using administrative or political discretion and consensus among representatives of existing
80 The main purpose of Catchment Management Agencies is to delegate water resource management to the regional (or
catchment level) and to involve local communities in the management of water. The functions of these Agencies would therefore
include: (1) investigating the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources in its
management area, (2) co-ordinating activities of water users and water management institutions and (3) promoting community
participation in water management issues (DWAF, 2001).
81 A water bank is an institution that stands ready to buy and sell water under some set of rules regarding certain pre-agreed
conditions. Water banking is a joint venture between the public and private sectors. The public sector makes the rules while the
private sector runs and maintains the bank. In its operation, a full assessment of the target group (the poor) will have to be
conducted periodically to establish shortages or surpluses existing in the current allocation (Gakpo and Du Plessis, 2001 :8).
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users. That means a group consisting of water-supply authority representatives makes allocation and reservoir
carryover decisions periodically. The actual position on the axis is country specific and depends on the needs being
addressed by the country's water sector. South Africa is still far from true decentralisation, especially if Catchment
Management Agencies and Water User Associations do not enjoy autonomy.
Centralised Decentr alised
W
Priority Sharing
y
u
Source: Gakpo and du Plessis (2001 :8)
Figure 4.2: Spectr a of Water Resource Management 0 ecision Making
Internationally, a shift towards the Z - end of the horizontal axis has been reflected in global trends on institutional
arrangements. This trend, together with the flaws and problems of the 1998 National Water Act, leads to the concept
of capacity-shamq" as one of the options that can resolve some of the major water management issues for South
Africa. Capacity-sharing as an institutional arrangement structures and guarantees water use rights that are
exclusive, enforceable and transferable. Capacity-sharing is ideal for accommodating equity by also respecting the
needs of small-scale irrigation farmers and the poor in general. The concept fits well in the proposed "ideal"
institutional framework (refer to figure 4.1) discussed earlier and can also accommodate water banking for further
addressing the equity issue. Therefore, it seems that further investigation on capacity-sharing is worthwhile.
4.4 Capacity-sharing within the context of South Africa
The concept of capacity-sharing is presented in figure 4.3. Essentially, the total capacity may consist of a single
reservoir, multiple reservoirs or a whole catchment area. The shares within the capacity-sharing model could be sub-
divided between "bulk" and "retail" where the bulk shareholders have few incentives for efficiency whereas the retail
shareholders face incentives for efficient decision-making and management. According to Gakpo et al (2001 :91 and
also Dudley and Musgrave, 1988), capacity-sharing is feasible under multiple purposes, ranging from urban use
where the relevant water authority would obtain shares by market or non-market means and make releases to users
over time as desired, to in-stream or river valley environmental use, flood control, recreational use and hydro-power
82 Refer to chapter 4 for a detail discussion on this concept.
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generation. Dudley and Musgrave (1988) stipulated that, capacity-sharing coupled with market transferability of
shares by auction would give all water users a greater security of tenure in water use compared with other water
allocation alternatives. For example as urban- and environmental-related demand grows over time, irrigation users
need not fear that their individual reliability of supply will change without them deciding to sell their shares at market
value. Similarly, urban and environmental users are aware that their shares can always be expanded as demand
increases by paying the market value for additional shares to willing sellers.
Total Potential Capacity Type of Share Share holders Share componens Incentives
· Single reservoir yBulkshare~ . Nations
· Mulitple reservoir . Provinces
Limited incentives for
· A defined section of . Irrigation sector
efficient use of water
• nve \ . Environment and related resources
· Group of river . Industry
sections linked . Other
toghether
1Retail shares ~ . Households rlReservoir capacity
.~::, ~, here
. Any end user Great incentive for
Stream inflow~ effecient use of water
rn_ V Supply and demand
D decisions exclusive to
.ownstream the end- user
tributary flow
share
Figure 4.3: The concept of Capacity Sharing Source: Gakpo et al (2001:92)
An integral part of capacity-sharing would therefore be the establishment of markets for tradable water use rights.
These markets will operate on two levels within the capacity-sharing regime (Dudley and Bryant, 1995 and Gakpo et
al, 2001 :94):
• The transfer of water that is already in storage, streams or channels.
• The transfer of long-term use rights to parcels of shares in reservoir capacity and stream flows.
The water market ensures that water users cannot lose water use rights to other users or the state without market
compensation. Thus, the water market provides two fundamentally important aspects for efficient and sustainable
water use. These include security of tenure of supply rights with known reliabilities to users and the flexibility for
water resources to be moved to alternative uses as conditions change (Dudley, 1994). The security of entitlement to
water currently in the reservoir coupled with the estimates of the probability of future inflows, enables the user to
decide when and how many water use rights to buy (or to sell) at any point in time. A spot price for water would also
reflect current supply and demand conditions (water balance) while possible futures markets (where the user could
hedge against risk) would also allow users to further reduce risk. This idea however, will be more suitable in areas
with a stochastic nature of water supply. Note that a unit of water within a reservoir is indistinguishable and therefore
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under no circumstances will a situation develop where a specific share of water will be at risk of being needed
specifically. This provision under capacity-sharing guarantees impartiality and protects the beneficiary's shares.
Capacity-sharing holds the added advantage of determining the value in use of different dimensions of irrigation
water and other water uses. Since capacity shares consist of inflow shares and shares in storage space, the
shareholder enjoys the leverage of managing his supply and demand effectively. Also the fact that inflow shares
take into account inflow probabilities which are derived from long periods of historical hydrological inflow data means
that water supply reliabilities can be near to perfect and hence the water user's decision to buy or sell water can
hardly be impaired.
The above-mentioned discussion concludes the theoretical side of decentralised water management. The next
section will discuss the current developments within central government in South Africa regarding decentralising
water management.
4.5 Current developments with regard to decentralisation
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1998 and 2000) launched a strategic plan and institutional framework
for the facilitation of the implementation of catchment management agencies in South Africa (Le. the implementation
of a decentralised water management strategy). It should be noted that this document was not designed to be a
guideline on future catchment management practice in South Africa, nor a manual for catchment management
implementation in any specific catchment. This document forms part of the planning and preparation by the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and proposes a catchment management implementation strategy and
programme for the short- to medium-term, and clarifies budgetary and human resource requirements. It also sets out
the policy context and elements of the underlying debate on the issues surrounding the department's role in
facilitating catchment management implementation in South Africa.
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is in the process of developing Water Conservation and Water
Demand Management strategies for each water use sector, namely, Agriculture, Municipal, Industry, Forestry and
Environment. Each National Water Conservation and Demand Strategy will be incorporated into the National Water
Resources Strategy, which is a legal requirement of the new National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998). The Catchment
Management Strategies of each of the 19 Water Management Areas, the National Pricing Strategy and other
strategies (currently being developed by the Department) will also contribute to the National Water Resource
Strategy. The process outlined above is illustrated in figure 4.4 below.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of water conservation and demand management development processes in South Africa
Source: DWAF (2000)
The Agricultural Water Conservation and Water Demand Management Strategy has been circulated for comment
and was discussed in consultation workshops. Water User Associations will implement the strategy through the
drawing up and submission of Water Management Plans83. These Water Management Plans will be similar to the
Water Services Development Plans currently being developed by Municipalities. The objective of the Water
Management Plans is to improve agricultural water management by stimulating self-analysis and planning on the part
of farmers, their water suppliers, catchment management agencies, officials, consultants and advisors. Water User
Associations will develop and implement their plans in a progressive manner. The Water Management Plan may be
superficial to start with and may be lacking in certain areas, but it will be improved annually when the Water User
Associations reviews its plans. Water User Associations are now required in terms of the law to submit Water
Management Plans to their Catchment Management Agency and/or the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.
Essentially, the process aims to conserve water, to improve water supply services to irrigation farmers and
to enable them to use irrigation water more efficiently.
4.6 Specific problems and the role of capaclty-sharinq
Given the discussion thus far, it should be clear that a suitable water policy framework is already in place for the
institutional accommodation of demand-oriented water management in South Africa. Therefore, the main focus shifts
towards the practical implementation of the proposed policy, however, this point proves to be problematic. The
remainder of this chapter will proceed by identifying some basic problems regarding the implementation of demand-
83 In a Water Management Plan, a Water User Association describes its current irrigation water use and conservation measures
and sets out how it plans to implement the best management practices to improve its irrigation water supply services and to
achieve water conservation and water demand management (Van Zyl, 2002).
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oriented strategies in South Africa. An institutional economic approach (supplemented by the field of new-
institutional economics=) will be followed within the reasoning of each problem. The relevance of capacity-sharing
will be discussed in each of the identified issues and possible remedies for the problems will be proposed. Due to
the complexity of the problems mentioned within this chapter and the limitations of modern measurlnq" techniques,
the quantification of the problems is not the focus of this study. Each problem will be described, defined and placed
in context relative to capacity-sharing. Rational and systematic reasoning is therefore important within this
discussion.
Due to limited time, resources and the complexity of presenting the capacity-sharing model as developed by Dudley
(Dudley, 1988a and 1988b and Dudley and Musgrave, 1988), the actual modelling of all three sub-modules cannot
be accommodated within this study86.
4.6.1 Contradiction within the 1998 National Water Act
On evaluating the current South African Water Law, it becomes clear that present government policy takes on a
dualistic nature. The National Water Act of 1998 clearly empowers the minister to regulate the use and flow as well
as exercise absolute control over all water, which is inconsistent with a decentralised policy objective. If the National
Water Act of 1998 (Act 36 of 1998) is studied closely, it becomes clear that there is a basic contradiction (or
vagueness) regarding the management strategy, which is to be followed in order to achieve sustainable water
resource utilisation. The following is a quote directly from the Act:
"Acknowledging the National Government's overall responsibility for and authority over the nation's water
resources and their use, including the equitable allocation of water for beneficial use, the redistribution of
water and international water do matter (National Water Act, 1998:A-1); As this Act is founded on the
principle that National Government has overall responsibility for and authority over water resource
management, including the equitable allocation and beneficial use of water in the public interest, a person
can only be entitled to use water if the use is permissible under the Act." (National Water Act, 1998:A-41).
84 New institutional economics is a dynamic multi-disciplinary field that includes the disciplines of economics, history, sociology,
political science, business organisation and law within the reasoning process. Kherallah and Kirsten do not mention the viability
of this paradigm for water policy research, but the researcher is of the opinion that new institutional economics would be an
appropriate paradigm for reasoning the problems as mentioned in this study because of the strong emphasis on context
dependency, holistic approaches and transaction cost economics. (Refer to Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002: 111-134; Kirsten, 2002
and Karaan, 2002 for further detail.)
85 Recall that the demand for most of the basic water needs of water is inelastic. Standard economic analysis instruments rely
on a responsive demand relative to supply changes and therefore seems not to function satisfactorily within the water demand
management context.
86 Refer to section 5.2.
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"Recognising the need for the integrated management óf all aspects of water resources and where
appropriate, the delegation of management functions to a regional or catchment level so as to enable
everyone to participate" (National Water Act, 1998:A-1).
The first quoted paragraph emphasises the urgency of the state to achieve of an equitable water distribution
throughout South Africa, while the second place the emphasis on an efficient allocation (via decentralisation), which
must be accompanied by the equitable allocalion". The state's aim, therefore, is an equitable and efficient water
allocation for South African water resources. This seems to be justifiable, but to achieve this in practice is indeed
difficult and complexss. The achievement of these two basic ideologies leads to contradictions within the practical
implementing thereof. Much of the current literature suggests the implementation of water markets as the answer to
the above-mentioned dilemma and the concept of capacity-sharing also forms part of the argument for implementing
a water market.
The following objectives are therefore of equal importance in formulating the new water management strategy
(DWAF, 1999):
• social equity
• ecological sustainability
• financial sustainability
• economic efficiency
Social equity
Past water policies distorted the provision of water supply services, so that in 1994 an estimated 12 million people in
South Africa did not have adequate supplies of potable water. These past policies also generated a biased approach
to water resource management, and allocation was never merely an economic matter, but a socio-political one.
Government water policy, and in particular the provision of subsidies (including those associated with the provision of
irrigation water), resulted in considerable advantages to large, mainly white commercial farmers at the expense of
emerging black farmers and smallholders.
It is therefore important to take into account the past social inequalities within the re-formulating and re-structuring of
water policy for South Africa.
87 This contradiction is also observable in the 1998 National Water Act, A-21.
88 The basic reason for this complexity can be found in the nature of the "product" (water) as well as the historical context behind
water allocation and management in South Africa. The demand for water is a derived demand and there are no (depending on
the use, but within the context it refers to basic needs) substitutes for water. This property is a potential source of conflict
whenever there is an increase in competition over the resource. Inevitably, the supply capacity of water provision will run out
and then the state will have to consider demand-oriented water resource management strategies.
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Ecological sustainability
South Africa is committed to follow a path of development that is environmentally sustainable. In the case of water,
this requires that the availability and quality of water resources inherited by future generations should be adequate to
ensure human well-being and the maintenance of ecosystems. As part of overall water resource management, this
means that we need to ensure that levels of water consumption, use, and pollution, as well as the associated
infrastructure to impound, supply, treatment and dispose the water, do not cause either unacceptable or irreversible
impacts on the population or ecosystems.
The following principles underlie ecological sustainability in water pricing strategy:
• In terms of chapter 3 of the National Water Act, 1998, the water needed for the effective functioning of
all ecosystems must be protected. The water required for this purpose refers to both the quantity and
quality of water in the resource and is called the ecological reserve. It must be safeguarded and not
used for other purposes.
• There is a cost associated with the ecological management of the catchment, and all the users of the
resource should be responsible for it.
• In order to preserve water quality, point and diffuse sources of pollution should be discouraged through
the identification of control methods that are more effective than those presently in use. This requires
the adoption of instruments such as a "polluter pays" approach towards the generation of pollution.
(The underlying philosophy of the 'polluter pays' principle is to convince the polluter to internalise the
environmental cost of pollution.)
Financial sustain ability
The methods that have been used by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to finance major bulk raw water
schemes in the past are not financially sustainable for a number of reasons. First, inflation was not taken into
account, resulting in a decline in the value of tariffs over time in real terms. Second, no provision was made for
refurbishment. Thirdly, no provision was made for asset replacement.
A new financial framework is required to accommodate the water sector's increased need to be financially
autonomous, to attract greater contributions to its development from the private sector, and to be financially
accountable and sustainable. In the new approach to water pricing, it is proposed that the full financial cost of
supplying water should be recovered from water users, including the cost of capital. The new approach would
however, be phased in by taking into account the constraints within various user sectors to be able to adapt quickly
to price increases. It is therefore important to incorporate the market system within the new approach of
decentralisation of water management. The question could be asked what incentives do the state have to not rise
water prices to inefficient and inequitable high levels.
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Economic efficiency
Economics is concerned with the optimum allocation of scarce resources between competing uses. In theory,
meeting the goal of optimum resource allocation requires that goods be priced at their opportunity cost or scarcity
value. Section 56 (2) (c) of the National Water Act of 1998 provides for setting a water-use charge for achieving the
equitable and efficient allocation of water. This applies equally to the capital resources used in the development of
water infrastructure (Le. dams, reservoirs, pipelines, etc.), and to natural resources such as water. Failing to price
water at its scarcity value can result in two kinds of misallocation of water:
• An inadequate incentive to conserve water. The resultant over-use necessitates the expansion of
infrastructure and the premature tying up the country's limited capital resources when they could be
better utilised for other purposes.
• Some water being used for low-value purposes. This imposes an opportunity cost in that this same
water cannot be used for alternative, high-value purposes. Without an economic charge, there is no
basis for competition for water supplies between low- and high-value uses, and thus no incentive to
shift available supplies from the former to the latter.
Regarding the argument for the implementation of water markets, the state has made some of the necessary
statutory provisions for the development of "Water User Organisations" in order to delegate water management to the
lowest possible level (for the achievement of a greater degree of efficiency), but does not provide the necessary
incentives and security of property to realise this in practice. The reason for this lack of incentives is because (given
the sensitive nature of water) the state is uncertain regarding the balance of power (distributional related power) and
fears social externalities that will be imposed on the rest of the economy after a market mechanism is introduced.
The state therefore wishes for an efficient allocation without a loss of allocation-related power. This is problematic,
because given the historical context of water allocation in South Africa, a complete reallocation by the state alone
would not be considered as fair and efficient by at least some participants.
This problem is one of the strongest arguments for the implementation of water markets, because at first it may seem
to the state that a market in tradable water use rights may lead to a loss of allocation-related power, but if the state
also actively participates in the market, that power could be regained by buying an equivalent amount of water use
rights for allocating purposes. This however, emphasises the urgency of defining property rights over water (water
use rights) that must be exclusive, enforceable and explicit. The definition of water use rights relates to the water
management strategy that is in place to manage this water and it is at this point that capacity-sharing features as a
method of allocating water use rights in a fair and equitable manner.
There is an abundant literature available regarding efficiency within water markets and it will not be discussed further
here. Therefore, the focus will be on equity-related issues within the water market (this proves to be more complex
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than efficiency-related problems because of the nature of the "product" as well as the historical context of water
allocation management in South Africa). The equity-related issues that will be discussed here include the following:
• The basic need argument (efficiency vs. equity).
• The allocation of water use rights, suitable for conversion into a water market (refer to section 4.6.2).
• Equitable functioning of the market (refer to section 4.6.3).
Water as a basic need
In order to determine what is to be considered as a basic need, all the current water uses must be identified in order
to construct a user hierarchy. Such a hierarchy may look like the following:
• Ecological needs for the basic functioning of the catchment.
• Basic human use like drinking, food preparation and personal hygiene (in urban and rural areas).
• Agricultural use for commercial food production.
• Industrial and mining-related uses.
• Sport and recreational uses89.
The question could be asked which water needs are to be considered as "basic needs" and which are not. It is
important to realise that the term "basic need" is not only applicable for human-related needs, but also for other
needs as identified in the National Water Act of 1998:
"Sustain ability and equity are identified as central guiding principles in the protection, use, development,
conservation, management and control of water resources. These guidelines recognise the basic human
needs of present and future generations; the need to protect water resources; the need to share some water
resources with other countries; the need to promote social and economic development through the use of
water and the need to establish suitable institutions in order to achieve the purpose of the Act. National
Government, acting through the Minister, is responsible for the achievement of these fundamental principles
in accordance with the Constitutional mandate for water reform. Being empowered to act on behalf of the
nation, the Minister has the ultimate responsibility to fulfil certain obligations relating to the use, allocation
and protection of and access to water resources» (National Water Act 36 of 1998:A-15).
89 Most of these activities do not consume or degenerate water quality and may be included in the ecological functioning.
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According to the National Water Act of 1998 (Act 36 of 1998:A-177), a person has a basic right to use water:
• For the need to take water from any water resource to which the person has lawful access for reasonable
domestic household use (this reasonable use includes water used for drinking, food preparation and basic
personal hygiene).
• For small gardening purposes and watering of animals that graze on that land within the grazing capacity of
the land.
• When stored from runoff from a roof.
• In an emergency situation for human consumption or fire-fighting.
• For indirect recreational purposes like boating.
• For discharging waste or water containing waste and run-off water into a canal, sea outfall or other conduct
controlled by another person authorised to undertake the purification, treatment or disposal of waste or
water containing waste.
According to Gleick (2000:11), evidence from international law, declarations of governments and international
organizations, and state practices, concludes that access to a basic water requirement must be considered a
fundamental human right. A formulation appropriate to the existing human rights declarations might be: "All human
beings have an inherent right to have access to water in quantities and of a quality necessary to meet their basic
needs. This right shall be protected by law. "
Capacity-sharing accommodates "equity" within the market system by assuming that the functioning of the market for
current market participants is fair. Capacity-sharing does, however, also accommodate this fundamentally unfair
assumption by using the state as a market participant to care for non-market participants (refer to sections 4.6.2 and
4.6.3 for detail).
4.6.2 An initial allocation for implementing tradable water use rights90
After the proper definition of water use rights for adoption within a market regime, but prior to the activation of the
market, it is important to have a proper initial allocation of water use rights. This allocation should not be based on
market-related powers and characteristics, but rather on alternative91 allocation criteria, depending on the context of
use. How the initial property rights to water are allocated is crucial to the acceptance and success of a water market
and the approach will vary according to the country under consideration. In cases where a well-functioning registry
of water use rights is in place, it is sufficient to simply register the rights in a newly created property rights register. In
cases where the existing property rights registry contains many overlapping property rights (the sum of the water
90 Recall that this whole section refers to the market of water use rights and not water per se.
91 These criteria could be past water use patterns, historical context, national socio-economic objectives and ecological
objectives.
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rights exceeds the available water) it would be better to base the initial allocation on historical use patterns. In cases
where there are gross abuses of water use rights, it would be preferable to assign rights based on need or with a
reasonable upper limit on irrigation water per hectare. In all cases, it is important to recognise the rights of the poor.
It is, however, important to assess the allocation method used for each current water allocation because it would be
fundamentally unfair if owners of current water use rights (who bought the right directly or indirectly via capitalised
land prices) were not compensated accordingly for their use rights. In order to avoid potential conflict, a fair and
justifiable allocation of water use rights (which is defined in terms of capacity and inflow shares) must be in place
before the activation of the water market. It is therefore necessary to obtain a record of all water user patterns and
volumes within the catchment area and the water registration effort that was conducted up to January 2001 was the
first step in the direction of establishing such an allocation.
The essence of equity concerns lies in the tension between individual and collective interests. Trade-offs exist
between the autonomy of individual right holders to lease or sell water to the highest bidder, and collective
preferences for predictability and stability in water allocation. Individual farmers negotiate satisfactory prices for their
water use rights on their own behalf, but have few incentives to consider third party and community impacts (such as
a declining tax base, and multiplier effects on communities). The equity concerns of those who have something to
bargain with (money, water use rights, political power or legal power to impose transaction costs) can be reflected in
market decisions. However, those with no bargaining power can have little influence on market outcomes.
Within this study, it was assumed that there was an unequal distribution of water use rights in South Africa due to
history and past political inequalities. Based on principles of fairness, equity and justice, privileged holders of water
use rights must be prepared to sell some of these rights in favour of disadvantaged (mostly small farmers92)
individuals or groups. These adjustments cannot be made randomly by government, but must be negotiated with the
lawful owners. The distribution must recognise both historical uses and the needs of the disadvantaged. Social
harmony in rural communities would certainly be promoted by such measures. There needs to be a general
acceptance of the fairness of this redistribution of initial water use rights before the water use rights could be
quantified and registered and only then can a market for the rights be established (Backeberg, 1997:357).
This study proposes an alternative for accommodating the previous disadvantaged (as well as the "reserve"
component) in order to obtain a suitable allocation of water use rights prior to the activation of the market for water
use rights93. It is the opinion of this study that the water use rights of the "reserve" component as defined in the
National Water Act of 1998 should not be managed external to the market in water use rights as current policy-
92 Dudley (1999:559) mentioned that large tradeoffs between small and large irrigation farmers could be the result of irrigation
development costs, opportunity costs and price elasticity of demand for irrigation inputs and outputs. However, the size of the
potential gains from "spreading the water more thinly" indicate that examination of the potential advantages and disadvantages
could well be worthwhile in South Africa. This should be kept in mind when small farmers are empowered from the state.
93 In reality, this initial allocation of water use rights implies the first transactions in the market and the activation of the market.
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makers propose (Van Zyl, 2002), because the water use right does not belong to the state and given the sensitivity of
water use rights, command and control measures on these rights could lead to conflict. Therefore, the needed water
use rights must be obtained in the market from the legal owners of those rights94. Given that the state possess water
use rights equal to the volume of the "reserve" as specified by the National Water Act, it would not be necessary for
the state to buy the water (in the market for water as a physical substance) because all water resources already
belongs to the state. In reality, the state must make sure that the water usage of the "reserve component" equals the
volume as specified in his water use rights. If this is true, the state could allocate the volume, represented by the
water use rights, as the state pleases. It is important to note that no component of the "reserve" will own water use
rights since it is the responsibility of the state to provide the needs of the "reserve". However, if an individual small
irrigation farmer who received his part of the "reserve" wishes to enter commercial agricultural production, he needs
to obtain the additional water use rights in the market for water use rights to be able to buy the additional water for
irrigation purposes since commercial agriculture is no longer part of the "reserve". At this stage, capacity-sharing
would play an important role in accommodating this individual small irrigation farmer who needs additional water use
rights9s. This argument would hold for all components of the "reserve". The question could be asked whether rent-
seeking behaviour will be found at some components of the "reserve" (refer to section 3.9 for a discussion on rent-
seeking behaviour).
If the "reserve" component could be accommodated in the market for water use rights, the responsibility of the state
should end with the allocation of water to the different components of the "reserve" (according to the allocation of
water use rights for each "reserve" component) before the activation of the market for water use rights. (Certainly
some water users and uses who failed to apply for water use rights prior to the activation of the market, should still
be accommodated by the state, but only if the applied use qualify as part of the "reserve".) Therefore, the state will
remain an active market participant for as long as applicantss apply for water use riqhts". The monitoring cost for
the state will then be limited to the registration of all applications and approvals of water use rights. Note that the
only way for the state to obtain additional water use rights is to participate in the market and buy the use right from
the current lawful owner. The state would therefore have no incentive to buy more rights as needed and therefore no
"principal agent problem" or "free riding" would exist.
94 The identification of the legal owners of water use rights prior to the state intervention, should be based on historical water
usage and use patterns.
95 Small farmers need a certain minimum level of education to actively take part in the workings of capacity-sharing and market
activities of water use rights. Therefore, these farmers operating under common property regimes, will need representation by
agents or specialists and hence face agency problems. The question therefore arises what incentives or safety features are in
place (such as monitoring mechanisms) to ensure that the agent act in the best interest of the principle. This agent related
problem could partially be engaged by making use of transparent and participative management processes.
96 This point actually reflects on the ability of the state to define and identify the "reserve" and the needed amount (volume) of
water use rights as accurately as possible.
97 Note that the state will only be responsible for providing the water which are part of the "reserve" and which comply with the
definition as mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998. It would therefore not be possible for a specific person (who qualified
as part of the reserve prior to the market activation and who received water from the state) to sell his water use rights in the
market for water use rights, because no component of the "reserve" will be in the possession of such rights.
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Capacity-sharing accommodates the problem of an initial water allocation by facilitating this transfer from the
previous property right structure (under the 1956 National Water Act) to the market for water use rights by making
use of "bulk" and "retail" capacity shares. The first task is to determine how large the various "bulk" allocations to the
main user groups would need to be, in order to give each approximately the same sequence of flows over an
historical period to what they would received before the transition date. These main user groups would include
irrigation boards, environmental, stock and domestic, urban and industrial users. After the determination of the
transition sizes of bulk capacity shares, a suitable "transition speed" should be considered in moving towards retail
capacity-sharing (water markets). The precise speed will be determined by various factors including the social- and
political acceptance of capacity-sharing. A feature of capacity is that some irrigators could operate as "retail"
shareholders from the start, while others remain sharing in a "bulk" capacity share.
4.6.3 Equitable functioning of the market
People's perspectives regarding fairness within water markets are influenced by the economic conditions and social
characteristics of the local area (the local context) (Keenan et ai, 1999:290). Syme and Nancarrow (1997) studied
the determinants of perceptions of fairness in the allocation of water to multiple uses. The focus of their study was to
determine whether social-psychological theories of procedural and distributive justice could serve as a basis for
evaluating the "equity" or "fairness" of water allocation systems. The study showed that people (individual decision-
makers) could make confident judgements on fairness in a wide variety of case studies varying in complexity. They
are able to make these judgements after being presented with detailed information98 pertaining to both procedural
and distributive aspects of the system under consideration. These fairness judgements seem to relate to group
identity especially in the case of environmental users (Syme and Nancarrow, 1997:2151). It was also found that the
four measures of fairness99 were influential in governing the overall fairness of heuristic judgement.
Equity and efficiency are inextricably tied together since the prices used in efficiency analyses depend on the
distribution of wealth. Beyond that, many equity considerations have efficiency implications. In some situations,
there are genuine efficiency tradeoffs, but in many, building equity into policy design also will enhance efficiency.
Therefore, appropriate governing institutions that more closely correspond with the resource systems being
governed, help assure appropriate consideration of both efficiency and equity (Howe, 1996:37).
Equity considerations regarding different market participants could be addressed as follows: a market for tradable
water use rights consists of two types of participants (buyers and sellers) who represent the demand and supply
forces of the market. The relative balance between these two powers will have a dominant influence on the market
98 The quantification of the effects of asymmetrical information and transaction costs on water price determination will have an
indirect effect on the efficient and equitable functioning of the market. Policy measurements that focus on the improvement of
the above-mentioned, would therefore also enhance the efficient and equitable functioning of the market.
99 Being (a) generalised attitudes and philosophies, (b) the importance ratings of philosophical principles, (c) localised attitudes
and (d) ratings of importance of allocation to different uses of water.
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or "spot" price (not necessarily the "real" value of water) of water use rights. However, any market for a tradable
commodity consists of a set of "rules" or "requirements" which all participants within this market must comply with in
order to be able to participate actively in the market. These "rules" or "requirements" ensure the fair and equitable
functioning of the market. However, some potential participants do not comply with these rules and requirements
because of extemalities or historical context and the question could be asked whether they should be excluded from
the market or not. Given that water qualifies as a basic resource (which implies that it is essential for the sustainment
of all life forms), the above-mentioned situation could be regarded as a sensitive and emotional problem. As
mentioned in section 4.6.2, the state could become a market participant in the process of providing the "reserve" with
the needed amount (volume) of water use rights.
Capacity-sharing has an advantage over administratively planned strategies because each user knows the value of
water to other users to a greater extent before deciding whether to use a unit of water now or later100 (Dudley,
1999:97). The capacity-sharing model determines the optimal quantity of water to trade in response to various water
prices for given levels of other stated variables and times of the year. This allows a demand curve, conditional to the
specific time of the year and state of the system, to be formed. (This demand is only for water already in the
reservoir.) With such trading water does not leave the reservoir. Only the title to it is exchanged. The volume one
can buy is limited to the empty capacity space available (the difference between the contents and the total capacity
of the share) whereas the volume one can sell is limited by the contents of the capacity share. The market price of
stored water, relative to its perceived value over the planning horizon, determines quantities traded. (Assuming that
the water trader is risk neutral, the perceived value will be the present value over the planning horizon.v') From
these water sales and purchase decisions, supply and demand curves can be derived for the individual, and the
aggregate supply and demand for each specific time and condition in a catchment area. These demand and supply
curves could then be used to determine a justifiable measure of the opportunity cost of removing marginal units of
water from that specific catchment (given a specific set of conditions) at a specific time.
Therefore, the opportunity cost of water is much more transparent under the capacity-sharing regime, because of the
workings of the market mechanism102. The market price of water use rights (minus the transaction costs and
externalities103) serve as an indication of the opportunity cost of water given a specific use. In addition to this
argument, Syme and Nancarrow (1997:2151) showed that people could distinguish what is fundamentally fair if
presented with suitable information. Capacity-sharing presents suitable decision-making information and should
therefore enhance the efficient and equitable functioning of the market.
100 This characteristic of capacity-sharing engages the problem of asymmetrical information.
101 However, the problem of discounting and choice of a suitable discount rate still remain. The choice of suitable discount rates
remains problematic because different uses have different time spans and different discount rates which complicates the
comparison of present values.
102 There are less uncertainty regarding the supply of water under a capacity-sharing regime.
103 Not disregarding the difficulties in quantifying these costs.
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The accumulation of surpluses while the capacity-sharing system is running seems to be an unavoidable by-product
of capacity-sharing (given a stochastic supply). The timing and method of allocation of these surpluses is the
responsibility of the reservoir management and needs to be efficient and equitable in order to avoid conflict between
users (refer to chapter 3 for a discussion on efficiency sharing and equity sharing within reservoirs).
The above-mentioned discussion focussed on the functioning of the market, but the question could be asked why do
agricultural water markets, as observed by Louwand Van Schalkwyk (2000), not release water for use to other
sectors in South Africa. This is a relevant question since these releases implies the comparison of opportunity costs
between sectors and are currently viewed as an enhancement of equity in water allocation. The first possible reason
is that the water trades that have taken place are between non-users of water (sleeper rights) and intensive users
(Armitage and Nieuwoudt, 1999). The equity objective of releasing water for urban use is therefore at present not
being promoted in South Africa and it may take some time before all sleeper rights are activated. The market
mechanism will need some time before equity-related objects are promoted. The second reason is that the transfer
of diverted use (consumptive use plus non-consumptive use) of water in agriculture neglects to attach an opportunity
cost to the non-consumptive use of water. Agricultural water is therefore not released for urban use despite the
higher opportunity costs involved. The transfer of diverted use provides irrigators with the incentive to irrigate larger
areas by adopting technologies that reduce application rates. The result is that consumptive use of water increases
and higher water prices thus do not promote water conservation. The only way to overcome this problem is to
transfer water at consumptive use-related prices'?', Capacity-sharing promotes the decentralisation of water
management and therefore the pricing of consumptive water use (the individual water user has an incentive to divert
only the needed volume of water) and the concept therefore seems viable.
4.7 Summary and the viability of capacity-sharlnq
Chapter four conceptualised the concept of capacity-sharing within the current transition in South Africa from a
supply-oriented water management strategy to a demand-oriented management strategy. An important point of
notice should that considerable scope for further research still exists for the integration of supply and demand
management by decentralised, individual managers as well as the analysis on this integration. The role of capacity-
sharing within this integration should be researched.
The chapter gave three perspectives on demand-oriented water management strategies, form where institutional
arrangements to ensure optimal water allocation and security, was discussed. The discussion focussed on some
principles, guidelines and potential risks within water policy making. After the theoretical discussion in general, the
emphasis shifted to the South African context and some institutional arrangements to meet the changing conditions
in South Africa. Thereafter, the concept of capacity-sharing was broad on the scene of decentralised demand-
oriented water management where the relevance and possibilities of capacity-sharing within this transition were
104Notdisregarding the fact that non-consumptive uses may have positive externalities.
100
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
identified. The last section mentioned three of the most important problems (a contradiction within the National
Water Act of 1998, the problem of an initial allocation of water use rights prior the activation of the market and the
problem of an equitable market) experienced within the current South African water policy context and also suggests
possible answers derived from the concept of capacity-sharing. In terms of these problems, it seems that capacity-
sharing holds some relevant and viable possibilities for South Africa. However, each possibility must be evaluated in
its own terms and additional research (as mentioned in chapter 5) will be necessary before any policy-related
decisions regarding these possibilities could be made.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusions
This study has offered critical and detailed insights into the current water resource management problems faced by
South African policy-makers. It should be clear that these problems are complex in nature and that the only way to
address them is by making use of multi- disciplinary approaches'e. The problem of institutional choice was posed as
follows: for a particular allocation decision (or class of allocation decisions) what is the "best" institutional
arrangement that establishes the processes for the decisions to be made and the mechanisms for the decisions to be
implemented? Transaction costs matter, since the structure determines the transaction costs and thereby
determines how closely the ultimate resource allocation will approach the hypothetical "efficient and equitable"
allocation. Under an assumption that the distribution of transaction costs is important, the policy problem in choosing
an institutional structure becomes one of selecting the structure (including property-right regimes, entitlement
systems and mechanisms of allocation and reallocation) that minimise transaction costs. However, this study
showed that different types or classes of transactions costs have different effects on institutional choice and
therefore, the choice of policy becomes a problem of optimising an objective function with components of static
transaction costs. There has been a reasonable amount of research regarding this problem, but what is lacking is
methodology and experience in ex ante estimation of transaction costs of alternative institutional structures.
Water policy could be either supply- or demand-oriented. This study has emphasised that supply-oriented water
management strategies perform unsatisfactorily in addressing current efficiency- and equity-driven objectives as
described in the 1998 National Water Act. It was assumed that the future water demand will increase between
different types of uses and therefore not be dominated by one overwhelming use (irrigation). The result will be that
water management will become too complex for public policy and authorities will have to adapt their water institutions
by calling on to the water right system for settling conflicts between different water users. However, the combination
of water use rights and water rights need a market system to fully develop the advantages of a private property
regime. The question of how to make private right-holding users able to contribute to multiple purpose flexibilities (as
a result of the diversified demand for water), transferability and versatility was considered. A strong argument is
made for demand-oriented approaches where the market mechanism is used in order to accommodate private
decision-making in water allocation. This is certainly not a new idea, but what this study has accomplished is to
provide the reader with a problem-driven, structured and organised description of the current situation with detailed
discussions of the most important problems. This was necessary because the current literature on water
management is diverse and bounded by different contexts.
105 However, when multi-disciplinary approaches are used, measurement and comparison related problems come to the fore.
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Some of the criteria for the adoption of a market mechanism have proved to be problematic. Most of these problems
originate from the commodity itself (water) as well as past water management regimes. This study has emphasised
the measurement-related problems when valuing water in different applications for adoption within the market. A
water market could only be developed around water use rights and not water property rights. (This study therefore
supports the fact that all water resources inherently belong to the state, while the water use rights do not.)
It is the conclusion of this study that if the state is serious about its current water legislation, urgent consideration
should be given to the definition of water use rights as well as the other three problems (namely: a contradiction
within the 1998 National Water Act, an initial allocation for implementing tradable water use rights and the
equitable functioning of the market) mentioned in chapter 4. Capacity-sharing could be particular helpful in
facilitating the initial allocation of water use rights prior to the activation of a market for water use rights. The concept
also has several safety features to realise a more equitable functioning market.
The concept of capacity-sharing was identified to assist in the transition from a supply- to demand-oriented water
management strategy by keeping potential conflicts between water users at manageable levels. Capacity-sharing
accommodates the private decision-maker and seemed a viable option to assist in the definition of water use rights
and the development of a market for water use rights. Judging the concept from its developmental stages in 1988
through to its current successes in Australia, it seems worthwhile for further investigation within the South African
context. The running of the three sub-models (by means of pilot studies) within the capacity-sharing model should
provide sufficient information on which to base decisions regarding the viability of the concept for South African
conditions.
If the concept proves to be viable (on the grounds of various case studies), the state could incorporate the
concept in the process of decentralisation of water resource management for each catchment. This study
therefore suggests that a study should be conducted on the customisation of the capacity-sharing model for
South African conditions, but this will only be effective after clarity is received on the three issues (namely:
a contradiction within the 1998 National Water Act, an initial allocation for implementing tradable water use
rights and the equitable functioning of the market) mentioned in chapter 4.
5.2 Recommended studies
The recommended studies within this section are not necessarily exclusive from one another, because most of them
could be grouped into studies addressing broader-defined problems. It is therefore important to conceptualise and
delimit the study in order to determine the correct context for the proposed study.
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The first study suggested by this thesis would engage the problem mentioned in section 4.6.1.106. It seems that
efficiency and equity related issues are inherently contradictive and bounded to a specific context (situation). This
contradiction is complicated further by the inability of measuring techniques to quantify efficiency and equity in
comparable units of measurement. It would therefore be impossible to propose a suitable water policy for all
contexts of use. The best current research can do is to identify and define a specific context (therefore taking care of
the problem of generalisation and too many assumptions) from which to work. The problem of measuring efficiency
and equity could then be engaged within the identified context'" by making use of existing mathematical models.
Within the study, particular attention must be paid to transaction cost considerations as one of the major parameters
in institutional choice, by looking at both the static108 and dynamic109 dimensions of these costs. If some common
ground could be identified from where to compare efficiency with equity objectives (within the context of water
management) it would be much easier for water policy-makers to prioritise their objectives and adjust water policies
accordingly.
Another study (an alternative to the above-mentioned but on the same issue) could focus on the comparison of
different contexts of water uses in terms of efficiency, equity and sustainable development by estimating the political
risk associated with each context. The study should try to develop broad comparison techniques that could be used
to prioritise different contexts of water use. Subsequently, suitable measuring techniques (for comparing efficiency
and equity within the specific context) should be developed. It would be irrational to develop a specific measuring
technique (like marginal-benefit analysis or cost-benefit analysis) and then try to use the technique within different
contexts of water use, because different contexts are not comparable at a specific point in time. The context should
therefore determine the measuring technique used and not the other way around. The procedure suggested by
Raiffa (1982) and Dinar et al (1998) could be used to act as a guideline within this regard.
The second study recommended by this thesis should focus on the proper definition of water use rights in order to
engage the potential problems of rent-seeking behaviour and adverse selection. The objective of such a study
should be the measurement of the viability of water use rights in terms of enforceability, certainty and exclusiveness
for adoption within a market for water use rights market. The most important aspect should be the testing of the
legitimacy of water use rights for adoption within the market regime.
Another study that could be mentioned under the definition of water use rights is an investigation on what effect the
adoption of water use rights will have on the land reform process. The availability of water on a given patch of land
had a definite effect on the market value of that piece of land and has therefore been a consideration in the
106 Recall that this section focused on a basic contradiction between efficiency and equity within the stated objectives of the
National Water Act of 1998.
107 Suggested contexts include commercial agriculture, non-commercial agriculture, urban and industrial use and ecological use.
108 The static dimension is the conventional application of transaction-cost theory to institutional analysis: selecting an
institutional structure to minimise transaction costs of decision-making to achieve particular objectives in resource allocation.
109 The dynamic dimension relates to the transaction costs incurred in institutional change per se. These costs are manifest as
transaction costs and create path-dependencies in institutional developments.
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settlement of land disputes. It is still uncertain what effect unbounded water use rights will have on land reform and
land prices.
The third study recommended by this thesis should focus on the initial allocation of water use rights prior to the
activation of a market mechanism. Such a study should answer questions regarding a "fair" distribution of water use
rights. (In other words, what exactly is meant by a "fair" distribution?) This thesis proposes a few ways of dealing
with this transition phase, but is insufficient to make policy recommendations. Within such a study, equity related
measurements must be developed to deal with faimess within the market.
The fourth study recommended by this thesis should focus on the detailed modelling of the three sub-modules (as
mentioned in chapter 3) of the capacity-sharing model within the context of an equitable functioning market. This
could only be done by means of a case study within a selected area and care should be taken not to generalise from
that area (context) to the whole of South Africa. The study should answer questions regarding the viability of
capacity-sharing within a specific context. Such a study could also be seen as a "pilot study" for each target area
where water policy-makers are planning to implement elements of capacity-sharing.
The fifth study proposed by this thesis should focus on the ability of capacity-sharing to withstand rent-seeking
behaviour as mentioned in section 3.9. This study mentioned two arguments against rent-seeking behaviour in a
capacity-sharing regime, but a detailed study is necessary to clarify potential problems that could result from rent-
seeking behaviour. The focus should be on the transparency of the market mechanism, the identification,
categorisation and quantification of opportunity costs and externalities regarding water markets, and the definition of
water use rights (the second recommended study as mentioned above, should compliment this study) in order to
neutralise all forms of windfall gains such as mentioned in section 3.9. Rent-seeking behaviour is of particular
importance, because if opportunistic individual decision-making should have a substantial effect on the management
of a capacity-sharing system, a principal agent problem would be the result where there would be a great number of
principals and only one agent (the state).
The sixth study proposed by this thesis should focus on potential principal-agent problems. Specific problems
foreseen by this thesis includes agency related problems regarding the minimum level of education needed by
capacity share holders to fully make use of the advantages offered by capacity-sharing. Agency related problems
would be likely in cases where a "bulk" capacity share is managed under a common property regime. Another aspect
of capacity-sharing that is prone to principal agent problems is the price of water per se. The question could be
asked what incentives does the state have for not rising water prices to inefficient and inequitable high levels.
Therefore, the proposed study should focus on the role of capacity-sharing within the context of a market for water
per se (and not for the water use rights) for supplying incentives for not rising water prices.
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A seventh study could be added to these proposed studies, and the emphasis should be on the role of water banking
within a capacity-sharing regime addressing rent-seeking behaviour and principal-agent problems as identified in the
study. Such a study will focus on the administration and management of the reservoir and should be done with
reference to principles of equity. The state would find such a study particularly helpful in managing water reservoirs.
"Nobody makes a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do only a little. n
- Edmund Burke
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